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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an epistemic analysis of the 
transformations occurring in contemporary biological research by considering 
the relation between molecular biology and computational biology. In particular, 
I will focus on bio-ontologies, as the tool which incarnates at best the new face 
of biomedical research.  Such a choice is not arbitrary. By appealing to the 
notion of style of reasoning and way of knowing, I will show that bio-ontologies 
exemplify the rise and success of map thinking as the signature of a new way of 
doing molecular biology, while the theoretical tenets, established more than 30 
years ago, still maintain their epistemic prominence. This is neither to say that 
experimentalism will disappear from science, nor that the experiments power 
will be diminished but rather that experiments will have a new role in the 
architecture of scientific efforts, precisely because of the increasing importance 
of classificatory approaches. Therefore, such a transition within biomedical 
research is indeed radical and profound but it does not involve paradigm shifts 
but rather a change in the practice. In this sense, it is a matter of style. 
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Outline 
 
CHAPTER I 
In this chapter I provide an epistemic reconstruction of the rise of 
classification strategies in biomedical research. In particular I analyse this 
phenomenon through the lens of the map, meaning that most of the projects of 
Big Science are aimed at building “maps”. I analyse the notion of map, its 
features and its relation to models. In particular I sketch how maps can constitute 
tools of surrogate reasoning. Then I show how map is both a well known 
metaphor in biology but also represents a specific style of thinking. Thus I show 
how map/model are connected with map reasoning. 
CHAPTER II 
In this chapter I analyse the peculiar epistemic status of biology in terms of 
laws and theory. I analyse the reasons behind biology’s epistemic disunity, its 
virtues and problems. Then I examine both historical roots and epistemic 
motivation for such a picture. In the end I show how the need for unity has been 
invoked by many researchers in the life sciences and how this fact promoted the 
implementation of bio-ontologies. 
CHAPTER III 
In this chapter, first I distinguish philosophical ontology from computational 
ontologies, highlighting differences and connections. Next, I explore the rise and 
the motivation of bio-ontologies as a response to the need of unification in 
biology. After a general description I focus on GO, the most famous tool of this 
kind in biomedical research, by showing its virtues and limits. Second I describe 
the relation between ontologies and databases as a connection among different 
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types of maps. In this context I specify why GO, by providing a semantic 
synthesis of experimental results, is an orienteering tool for biomedical research. 
Moreover, I also describe how ontologies, born as a descriptive tool, became also 
normative and in which sense they are so. I defend the idea that these 
classificatory tools, neither entirely a theory nor precisely a model, constitute a 
new epistemic category. Ontologies are in a sense a surrogate of theory in 
biology as they unify but in a bottom-up fashion rather than imposed from above. 
CHAPTER IV 
In this chapter I  examine some, selected publications heavily based on bio-
ontologies, to provide an empirical grounding for the increasing success and 
implementation of bio-ontologies in biomedical research. In doing so, I would 
insist on the novelty of these approaches in terms of style, by showing that such 
articles would have not been published 15 years ago. By showing that the 
molecular view still holds, despite the radical change in methodologies, these 
examples show that the actual transformation in biology is indeed a matter of 
style (of reasoning) rather than a paradigm shift. 
CHAPTER V 
In this chapter I will briefly examine the phases of development of 
molecular biology in order to show how map thinking, begun with the Human 
Genome Project, constitutes a new phase of the research. I explain that, contrary 
to common interpretation, bioinformatics should not bee seen as a new discipline 
besides molecular biology but rather as a new moment of molecular biology 
development. I show how such a picture involves several levels of analysis, often 
intertwined, from epistemic reasons to social institutionalisation of scientific 
disciplines. Next I frame this in terms of style of reasoning by showing how map 
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thinking penetrated all the life sciences, thus reshaping the directions of future 
research. Last, I analyse the challenges, the risks and the possible implications of 
such a new order of things. 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years biomedical research has changed. It is still changing. This 
should not surprise anyone. History of science is full of transformations. In the 
last thirty years biology has been shaped by the triumph and penetration of 
experimental methods. The last thirty years were indeed the age of molecular 
biology. The molecular turn redefined and modified the approaches, the scope, 
the practice of the life sciences at any level, from cell biology to ecology. Now it 
seems that we are facing a new venture. It is what we may call the computational 
turn. Again this does not simply mean that biologists moved from the benches to 
the computer screens. What has changed and it is still changing is also, and more 
importantly, the way researchers think, how they prove what they claim, how 
they justify their results. From small laboratories biology went Big.  
Interestingly, the computational turn has not just transformed the 
technological apparatus. Neither simply the methodology. Computational 
methods have surely speeded up the power of analysis and granted higher and 
higher volume of data be examined. However, a more profound transition is at 
stake. An epistemic one. Indeed the very objects, the data that scientists have to 
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deal with have changed. Cell culture is not just what biologists can observe and 
manipulate in their Petri dishes any longer. It is also a codified line within a 
database. Experimental findings are nowadays classified in larger and larger 
electronic repositories. The meaning of local experiments is now directly 
confronted and compared with results coming from other labs. Moreover, 
databases are not just keeping data. They are ordering, classifying, structuring 
data. They establish the scientific meaning of these data. Databases are then 
shaping biological knowledge.  
One may ask what the nature of such mutations is. Is it just a question of 
different models and their application? What does it mean that scientists have 
changed their way of thinking? If it is true that classifications, databases, 
collection strategies, bio-ontologies are all changing the face of science, then the 
very aim of this thesis is to provide a philosophical analysis of how and why it is 
so. 
 
On methodology: a matter of style 
 
Contemporary scientists do not usually debate about the nature of their 
explanations. A group of researchers may dispute on what model should be 
adopted to answer a certain problem, or whether an experimental strategy will be 
either promising or not in order to achieve a particular result. But scientists will 
not address the question about what a model is. Neither they will discuss why 
and how experiments are the right tool to build a scientific evidence. 
Traditionally, this is a task for philosophers. The question then, is how they do 
so. Unlike scientists, philosophers do not have tangible tools, specific materials, 
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experimental apparatuses. Yet they possess methodologies too. Philosophical 
instruments are conceptual. This does not mean they are not technical. The 
ambition of philosophy of science is precisely this: to deal with science through a 
language that might resemble the ordinary one but is indeed technical and yet 
aims at avoiding triviality and oversimplification. 
One may see scientific explanation as a particular way to justify certain 
beliefs about nature. However, there is not just one. In mathematics, if we have 
to justify why we hold that Pythagoras’ theorem is valid for all the right-angle 
triangles, we usually appeal to the notion of formal proof. Yet geometrical 
demonstration is a mode of justification that is very different from empirical 
confirmation. Nevertheless we consider these diverse modes, according to 
diverse contexts, perfectly suitable. Thus one may wonder why such a difference 
actually exists.  
Philosophers have elaborated several conceptual categories to describe and 
represent scientific narratives and cultures. One may see scientific transitions as 
clashes either of different models or theories. For instance, the phenomenon of 
combustion can be seen as the passage from a theory employing certain entities 
(i.e. phlogiston) to another one framed in modern chemistry (thus something 
‘burns’, among other conditions, due to the presence of oxygen). This is more or 
less what W.V.O. Quine (1960) had in mind with his notion of conceptual 
scheme. Different schemes may be ‘logically’ compared so that, allow me to 
simplify, one is true while the other is false. Thus scientific facts are here 
naively, directly, comparable.  
In contrast, Thomas Kuhn (1962) famously proposed that the very same 
models and theories might be embedded in diverse confronting paradigms. 
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Models within the same paradigm can be compared. However between 
paradigms there is a sort of incommensurability. This is due to the fact that 
scientific terms, despite they might have the same name, mean different things in 
different paradigms. Kuhn indeed showed that a comparison between scientific 
theories cannot be reduced to a simple truth-values assignments of the sentences 
held by those theories. Going further, Paul Feyerabend (1975) notoriously 
highlighted the extra-logical, irrational, elements of scientific discovery and 
justification. At first glance one may build a hierarchy of these categories by 
arguing that models are constructed within different paradigms. In this sort of 
matryoshka game, Crombie (1994) and Hacking (1985, 1994, 2004, 2012)1 
formulated the further category of styles of reasoning, or styles of scientific 
thinking. Accordingly, disparate styles arose in different periods of human 
history, and they provide distinct systematic approaches to deal with the real 
world. Compared to other analytical tools, the introduction of the notion of style 
constitutes a novelty both in history and philosophy of science. Indeed it is a way 
to analyse scientific changes through history from a perspective that is 
exquisitely epistemic. It is also an approach to deal with scientific theories and 
claims that is closer to cultural comparative anthropology. Styles, since they are 
overarching categories providing what may count as an explanation, also set the 
problem of scientific objectivity to another level of epistemic investigation. 
Indeed objectivity itself is the result of a particular style of reasoning2. This is 
because it is always the style, through self-authentication, that allows to frame its 
                                                
1  Hacking’s view, although stemming from Crombie, is not entirely reducible to 
Crombie’s. However for our purposes here it is not important, at the moment, to 
highlight such distinctions. 
2 See for instance, Daston and Galison 2007 and Hacking 2009 
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specific rules of truthfulness. Hacking adopts truthfulness3  instead of truth 
because he argues that styles’ epistemic peculiarity rests not just on what facts 
are represented either by true of false statements, but rather on how (according to 
which way of thinking) such a conclusion about their truth or falsehood is 
reached. As Crombie writes styles “introduced new objects of scientific inquiry 
and explanation, new types of evidence, and new criteria determining what 
counted as the solution of a problem” (1994, vol.1, p 83). According to both 
authors it seems it is not clear how to select and establish the number of styles. 
Following Rasmus Winther (2012a), who systematises both Hacking and 
Crombie, styles of reasoning can be grouped and listed as following: axiomatic, 
experimental, hypothetical/analogical, taxonomic, probabilistic and 
historical/genealogical. Let us briefly examine each of them.  
• The axiomatic style, formulated in ancient Greece, deploys the use of 
formal proofs. Although the link between logic and other areas of mathematics 
(i.e. geometry) has been rationally reconstructed only a posteriori after Frege’s 
turn, both disciplines rest on the power of formal demonstrations.  
• The experimental style questions nature through observation and 
measurements and also by constructing artificial devices in order to elicit natural 
phenomena.  
• The hypothetical/analogical style adopts theoretical idealisation to 
uncover real properties of the world. 
• The taxonomic style makes distinctions in terms of hierarchies and 
similarities. 
                                                
3 Following Bernard William’s distinction (2004) 
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• The probabilistic style provides a decision criterion when facing 
uncertainty. 
• Finally, historical/genealogical style gives reason to natural phenomena 
by building their historical roots and development. 
Surely, such a list is not exhaustive but it definitely grasps the most 
important ways of thinking in the history of science. Each style can also be 
associated with iconic figures (e.g. Galileo, through his mathematisation of 
nature, as the exemplar of the hypothetical/analogical style) or objects (e.g. 
Boyle’s air pump for the experimental style), which show how the style 
crystallises a specific way of thinking and doing. 
However it should be clear that these analytic categories such as models, 
theories, paradigms and styles are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as 
argued by Winther (2012a), although certainly distinct, they are definitely 
mutually intertwined. For any category runs the risk to impose a unique, or at 
least, privileged, epistemological account of what science does, both in theory 
and practice. Indeed science is complex because the world is so. I agree with 
Winther (2012a) that a proficuous approach would be to adopt more than one 
category at the same time. The task is ambitious but has the merit to elicit aspects 
of scientific cultures that, otherwise, would be neglected. Following Hacking 
suggestions, Winther examines the different dynamics of these “interweaving 
categories”. Such an interaction involves multiple levels of perspective and 
different types of relations. The first is the so called “realization relation”, 
affecting models, paradigms and styles so that “the latter member […] instantiate 
and implement the former member” (Winther, 2012a, p 632) thus meaning that 
the “three categories are nested in an abstraction hierarchy” (ibid). In contrast 
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“the three categories exist on the same level of abstraction” (ibid). The “guidance 
relation” describes how “higher level categories constrain the properties and 
parts of lower level categories” (ibid). In the end, “inheritance relation” 
highlights how properties and parts of ‘objects’ at a higher level can be 
transmitted to lower levels. This does not mean that an analysis based on 
interweaving dynamics would be just combining a particular style with that 
peculiar paradigm which in turn shows certain models. Forms of combination 
can occur also within such categories. As Winther puts it “[t]he actual working 
of science include multiple realization among category levels and hybridization 
within a level” (ibid). Accordingly, he provides, as an example, an analysis of 
biological systematics by using different “interweaving categories”. To briefly 
sum up Winther’s work, he reconstructed (2012a) the development of naturalistic 
classification by showing how such one discipline presented different styles of 
reasoning (naturalists surely began using taxonomic and genealogical styles but 
nowadays molecular mechanisms regarding phenomena such as gene duplication 
are considered fundamental, as well as mathematical modelling, for any 
scientific phylogenetic enterprise). The very same discipline oscillated among, at 
least, three paradigms (from a Linnaean perspective, via an evolutionary 
approach, to algorithmic framework of gene distribution frequencies) and 
employed different scientific representations (either mathematical ones or 
metaphors) of the structure of the living beings (from the chain of being to the 
tree of life, to the network of life). 
My idea is to provide a similar philosophical analysis, framed into a general 
scheme that takes into accounts the dynamics of diverse interweaving categories, 
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for the current situation in molecular life sciences, after what I called the 
computational turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
CHAPTER I 
From molecular biology to bioinformatics: the map thinking 
 
 
A shift? 
In 2008 the famous American magazine Wired  had on its special issue’s 
cover a provocative title: “The End of Science”. Chris Anderson, the former 
editor in chief of Wired, explained that sentence by arguing, more in details, 
about the “end of theory” in science. According to Anderson the image of 
scientific disciplines, still guided by theoretical hypotheses, should be considered 
obsolete, and thus be abandoned in favour of a new picture. This means that the 
new face of science will be shaped by different approaches, new ways of doing. 
More precisely, such a novelty should be understood bearing in mind the new 
challenge provided by so called Big Data Science. The label of Big Data does not 
mean just a big volume of data4. Despite the lack of a precise definition, it is 
certainly possible to select certain features of Big Data Science as they were 
‘hallmarks’ for such an approach. Following Kitchin (2013, 2014) Big Data 
Science consists certainly in the quantity of data (e.g. petabytes), in the speed at 
which these data are obtained, in the variety in which they are ordered and 
displayed, in the global/holistic aim (in contrast to more traditional statistics), in 
standardised procedures both regarding resolution and identification, in their 
relational format which can be easily expanded or increased in magnitude. 
Examples of big data projects are now easy to find within the context of 
                                                
4 If just the amount of data counts, also taxonomy and astronomy could be seen as Big Data 
Science. Other features then seem to be required to establish what contemporary scientists mean 
by Big Data Science. 
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biomedical research. Let us mention some of them. The ENCODE project, aimed 
at providing a comprehensive map of all regulatory elements of the human 
genome, is certainly one of the most famous (and controversial one, see for 
instance Germain et al. 2014). Another good case is represented by the NIH 
Roadmap Epigenomics Project, funded “with the goal of producing a public 
resource of human epigenomic data to catalyze basic biology and disease-
oriented research. The Consortium leverages experimental pipelines built around 
next-generation sequencing technologies to map DNA methylation, histone 
modifications, chromatin accessibility and small RNA transcripts in stem cells 
and primary ex vivo tissues selected to represent the normal counterparts of 
tissues and organ systems frequently involved in human disease” 
(http://www.roadmapepigenomics.org/, emphasis is mine). Again, there is the 
1000 Genomes Project, whose purpose is to sequence the genomes of a large 
number of people in order to provide a more exhaustive map of human genetic 
variations. As written on its webpage, “[t]he goal of the 1000 Genomes Project is 
to find most genetic variants that have frequencies of at least 1% in the 
populations studied. This goal can be attained by sequencing many individuals” 
(http://www.1000genomes.org/about).  
Of course, Big Data Science is not feasible without computer science. In the 
last years, due to the development of powerful computational tools, many studies 
in the life sciences are now possible just because of a discipline called 
bioinformatics. As a matter of fact, defining what bioinformatics is, is not an 
easy task. As for many disciplines (for instance, where the boundary between 
biochemistry and molecular biology actually lies?) bioinformatics is a 
combination of different methodologies. For our purpose it could be sufficient to 
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claim that bioinformatics “is conceptualizing biology in terms of 
macromolecules (in the sense of physical-chemistry) and then applying 
“informatics” techniques (derived from disciplines such as applied maths, 
computer science, and statistics) to understand and organize the information 
associated with these molecules, on a large-scale” (Luscombe, Greenbaum and 
Gerstein 2001). 
The rise of such a field should not be read as meaning that a change in the 
practice of biological research can be explained due to the mere introduction of 
computers in biological studies, beside and beyond the bench work. As a matter 
of fact, computers have been part of biological research since years. It is rather 
the practice according to which computational resources are used and how they 
foster a transformation in the way research is done and justified, that makes the 
real difference.  
This is not just an epistemic claim. The wind of change is perceived and 
promoted also at more mundane level. Since the last decade more and more 
funding agencies have supported the so called data-driven approaches which 
have been sold (certainly, also for economic purposes) as capable to 
revolutionise the entire scientific enterprise by reforming the nature of science 
itself. Data-driven is a term used to designate a particular way of doing scientific 
research. Accordingly, science should move from hypotheses testing, lab 
exploratory experimentations and theories formulation, to the direct address of 
raw data. Data should primarily guide research. However the picture portrayed 
by media might appear quite fuzzy. Despite the ease of their use (also by 
professional scientists), data-driven and Big Data Science are not 
interchangeable. Data-driven approaches denote a methodological stance that 
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privileges data collection and pattern recognition over theoretical hypotheses 
formulation. This does not mean that data-driven cannot be implemented in a 
small lab. On the other hand, the description of such techniques seems to 
perfectly suit large scale experimental endeavours suggesting how data-driven 
would be tailored for Big Science. Thus it is the combination of these two 
aspects that is often invoked as the key feature of a new scientific era. 
Indeed, several publications (e.g. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2012) 
have supported the argument that in contemporary research, the very idea about 
the centrality of hypotheses will be replaced by a new way of doing, towards a 
perspective completely centred into the analysis of patterns coming from pure 
data. Such a popularised view describes this turn as just the emergence of a new 
scientific endeavour meaning that, after the rise of molecular biology in the 
1960s and 1970s (see for instance Morange 2000, 2006) which implemented 
experimentalism5 within the life sciences, now a new transformation comes from 
a supposed computational revolution. 
 
The philosophy within 
However, despite the abundance of reviews and descriptions, few attempts 
have been made to provide a philosophical analysis for such a change. Setting 
the epistemic primacy of concepts and technologies regarding these phenomena 
is not an easy task. Once one enters the historical path of bioinformatics, the first 
impression is to face a vicious circle. On one hand, the rapid development of 
computational instruments allowed the analysis of larger and larger datasets. On 
                                                
5 Roughly speaking, the idea that ‘truths about nature’ can be discovered and justified 
through specific tests conducted under particular and controlled conditions (for a 
panoramic overview concerning the discussion of the experimental dimension in biology 
see, among the others, Mayr 1982, Rheinberger 1997, Weber 2005) 
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the other hand it is precisely the increasing relevance of large databases that 
pursued the need for more adequate instruments.  
This might suggest why Big Data and data-driven, even if they do not mean 
the same thing, are often coupled together. If it is true that science is going Big, 
data-driven are invoked as the right tool to deal with it. Next Generation 
Sequencing (NGS) technologies are now capable of accessing information 
coming from whole genomes in a single run and are able to critically analyse 
these data to infer potential features of genome’s behaviour. The power of these 
tools opened the doors to the so-called data deluge or the fact that the amount of 
data produced oversteps the possibility of their analysis. However, some scholars 
(e.g. Strasser 2008, 2012a, 2012b) argued that data-driven is not a novelty in the 
history of biology. Natural history also relied on collections and data comparison 
to build scientific claims. Thus the computational turn in the life sciences, if we 
want to call it so, it is certainly in the methods employed, but also in the kind of 
technological devices adopted and, more importantly, in the justification 
strategies provided for such a practice.  
However, the current status of biological research cannot be described 
simply as the revival of classificatory reasoning. Indeed, if it is true that genomic 
libraries of DNA fragments can be seen as a molecular version of naturalistic 
collections, contemporary electronic databases, unlike material collections, allow 
faster and more precise procedures in gathering, organising, using and re-using 
data. Moreover these collections are still embedded in the conceptual framework 
that has shaped biology since now, namely molecular revolution. Regardless of 
its historical novelty or not, such an information explosion could be also a 
potential harm for research as it could, both theoretically and practically, impede 
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the accessibility to data. Thus, data curation and organisation became an 
indispensable and yet ordinary task for current science. Such an effort is 
definitely eased by informatics tools as it has to be standardised and uniform for 
the entire scientific enterprise. In other words, once different databases are 
settled, then a sort of meta-database (a structure to order, compare and integrate 
information coming from diverse databases) is required. One approach in this 
direction is constituted by semantic instruments, developed in the field of 
information management, namely applied ontology. It should not be a surprise 
then, to ascertain how this field of research is getting more and more relevance. 
Indeed if someone searched for the term ‘ontology’ on Google he/she could be 
surprised to realize that the first entries mainly refer to applied ontology. In this 
battle for notoriety, ‘ontology’ in a more traditional and philosophical sense is 
defended just by Wikipedia and a few of other websites. While philosophical 
ontology was devoted to pure speculation, engineers and computer scientists 
revitalized such a notion in the light of its possible applications. Indeed, in 
modern computational jargon a computational ontology is a way to model and 
represent a domain of interest or a particular area of knowledge so that a 
computer can process it. As Gruber pointed out (Gruber 2009) “an ontology 
specifies a vocabulary with which to make assertions, which may be inputs or 
outputs of knowledge agents (such as a software program)”. Here lies the 
difference. If philosophical ontology was pursued as a way to establish on pure 
speculative ground ‘what there is’ or the fundamental entities or things of the 
world, applied ontology is a subfield of informational research devoted to 
knowledge representation and data integration. To make a slogan from 
‘ontology’ we came to ‘ontologies’. Again, as Gruber writes “ontologies are 
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typically specified in languages that allow abstraction away from data structures 
and implementation strategies; in practice, the languages of ontologies are closer 
in expressive power to first-order logic than languages used to model databases” 
(Gruber 2009). In other words, ontologies constitute a tool that allows 
comparison among data that were originally produced and stored in different 
manners. In addition, ontologies are conceived as the mode to translate a specific 
knowledge at a certain level of description to other levels. This is why ontologies 
are also said to be the “semantic level” of scientific modelling.  
Biomedical research is one of the leading areas of inquiry for the 
implementation and application of these semantic instruments. Bio-ontologies (as 
they are called) are now proliferating in the management of many biological 
databases. Among them, the Gene Ontology (from now on GO), developed by 
the Gene Ontology Consortium, represents a promising project greatly employed 
by many different institutions and laboratories in all the life sciences. The 
semantic dimension of this enterprise is clear in its own mission. The aim of the 
Gene Ontology project is to provide a representation of the features of gene 
products across different species and databases through a controlled vocabulary 
of different “biological categories”.  
Nevertheless, the centrality of databases for contemporary biological 
research does not rest on pure technological innovation. Indeed, putting data 
together, just in quicker or more efficient ways, cannot constitute, per se, a 
genuine form of conceptual change. If, following Strasser, we can agree about 
the existence of a fil rouge connecting natural history with contemporary 
biology, then we have also to specify in what do they differ from each other. 
Surely the implementation of specific computational tools in biology cannot be 
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described as just a technological advance. Thus, if collection (e.g. see the 
Harvard Museum of Natural History or the Natural History Museum in London) 
has been a prominent style of reasoning in natural history, this should be 
examined also in the cultural context of its practice and in relation with the 
relative theoretical paradigms. Understanding electronic databases, or tools like 
Gene Ontology, requires that contemporary collection strategies must be set in 
the new framework of molecular biology. Here lies the limit of the adoption of a 
single analytic category representing scientific cultures. Instead, given the 
peculiar epistemic status of that framework (see for instance Rheinberger 1997), 
a combination of interweaving categories seems to be unavoidable. 
 
The map thinking 
In this chapter I try to frame all these categories around the map notion. The 
idea is to characterise the epistemic culture of contemporary biomedical research 
in relation to the idea of the map. Indeed, maps can stand for particular kinds of 
scientific models (see further), they can also be seen as paradigmatic conceptual 
metaphors driving the research (e.g. the search for the map of DNA regulatory 
elements in order to better understand genome’s behaviour), and they can be 
thought as a particular way of doing, namely the map thinking as the regulatory 
ideal of how scientific research should be pursued. All these different levels must 
be kept together. 
In this section I will discuss what a map is, what are its features and 
limitations and why its adoption is central for the understanding of the practice of 
contemporary biological research. My argument is that the notion of map, as a 
key concept of current research, serves, at least, two purposes. First, it debunks 
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the idea that scientific efforts can be clearly distinguished in terms of hypotheses 
versus data. Map thinking does not ban hypotheses from science, it rather 
changes the relations between data gathering and hypotheses formulation. 
Second, map thinking embeds a specific way of reasoning which has a long, 
although often neglected, tradition in the life sciences. A philosophical and 
historical analysis of the notion of map would help to better frame and 
comprehend the practice of contemporary research.  
Despite the efforts of depicting science as a unified, yet articulated, 
enterprise by prominent members of the scientific community, the rise of 
computational data-driven approaches fostered heated discussions about the 
nature of research itself, the way science is defined (Weinberg 2010, Golub 
2010, Brenner 2010). These discussions, wittingly or not, revealed a deep 
disagreement concerning the epistemic hierarchies within scientific 
methodologies, thus regarding hypotheses generation, experimental strategy and 
design versus data production and collection. If, on the one hand, big data 
projects (e.g. the ENCODE project6) have promised to change the face of 
research, on the other hand more traditional biologists contested the very 
theoretical foundations and the methodological approaches of such findings. If it 
is true that the mechanistic understanding of traditional molecular biology is still 
the unavoidable mode of explanation to claim the presence of causal 
connections, it is also true that new methodologies allow a “30,000-foot view” 
(Vogelstein et al. 2013) to highlight connections and relations which are not 
detectable from “the ground”. 
                                                
6 The aim of ENCODE is to provide a comprehensive map of DNA’s functional elements  
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Nevertheless, such discussions have also highlighted a possible change in 
the aims of the research itself. The need for and the creation of biological maps 
(the map of the genes, the map of the proteins, etc.) is often described as the 
primary interest of contemporary biologists. However, this way of doing science 
is sometimes accused (e.g. de Chadarevian 2009) to miss the very nature of 
scientific endeavour. According to some detractors, global maps are surely more 
comprehensive than traditional approaches of molecular biology and certainly 
they provide insights on global behaviours, but they lack understanding of 
biological mechanisms, they lack causality. The tone of the controversy has been 
sometimes vitriolic (see for instance Graur et al. 2013 in which scientists 
involved in the ENCODE project are defined as “genomic clochards”) revealing 
somehow that the question is not just about technological advance, but more 
profoundly about conceptual changes in scientific research.  
Despite the emphasis, I argue that the core of discordance is not in 
construction of biological maps. The notion of map is, on the contrary, what 
actually unifies these perspectives. It is not the map itself, it is how scientists 
build (and should build) the map and what do they think counts as a map. It is the 
style of reasoning. In a recent interview about Big Data in molecular research, 
Sydney Brenner precisely worries that “[n]obody understands what proof is in 
biology” (de Chadarevian 2009, p.68). Brenner thinks that the way certain claims 
are supported in that type of research is not justified. More precisely that way 
does not count as a legitimate justification. Here Brenner is involuntarily 
adopting Hacking and Crombie epistemic tools, as he is practically saying that it 
is indeed a matter of style of reasoning. Again, I think that the important 
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differences here lie not in what scientists are doing but rather in how they are 
doing it.  
Let us consider the endeavour of understanding the genome’s behaviour. 
Molecular biologists too used the expression “mapping” to explain the meaning 
of their efforts. Since an overall approach for a global comprehension was not 
feasible and probably not even conceivable, the main strategy was to reconstruct 
it in an additive stepwise fashion. Ancient explorers did not have satellites. They 
constructed their maps piece by piece. 
The problem thus is not the map, the metaphor/model adopted by both 
molecular and computational biology, but rather the way map reasoning is 
justified. The change, in my opinion, lies at a different level, in what counts as a 
map and what are the right modes to support certain claim on and of a biological 
map. Thus the epistemological challenge here is then to explain how and why a 
distinct way of reasoning is so problematic (or at least, why it is perceived so) 
and nevertheless rapidly succeeding. To do so, it is arguable also to follow 
Rheinberger’s recommendation in defining epistemology: “the concept is used 
here […] for reflecting on the historical conditions under which, and the means 
with which, things are made into objects of knowledge. It focuses thus on the 
process of generating scientific knowledge and the ways in which it is initiated 
and maintained” (Rheinberger 2010 p 2-3).  
In reconstructing the history of the rise of this aspect of computational 
biology my focus will be on map building. Surely one may ascribe maps to the 
taxonomic style of reasoning. Maps are ordering, under a common dispositional 
rule (i.e. a form of classification), dispersed and fragmented knowledge. But then 
it is fundamental to analyse how this style embeds a different Weltanschauung in 
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diverse historical moments of the life sciences. I mean that even if the map still 
holds as a successful picture representing past and present-day scientific efforts 
in the field of biological research, the notion of map itself, of what a map is, has 
instead changed. Epistemic intersections happen diversely at different levels. 
Naturalists were surely mapping things as contemporary biologists are doing 
now. However computational classifications rest on a theoretical framework that 
has more in common with molecular biology than with natural history. If the 
molecular revolution constitutes a paradigm shift, this does not mean that 
previous styles of reasoning have been replaced. On the other hand, the nature of 
such a scientific enterprise and its focus on classification and database 
construction cannot be simply explained as a paradigm shift. These new 
technologies have not shaken down the great overarching assumption that led 
scientific development to the, so-called, molecular revolution. Following 
Morange, it seems that the depiction of such novelties in terms of a transition 
“from a reductionist to a holistic vision of biological phenomena” (Morange, 
2006. p 23) is too simplistic. Rather than rejecting the molecular perspective, 
these new approaches seem to actually reinforce it but putting the emphasis on a 
“different level of organization” (ibid.).  
Let us consider briefly the case of genomics. Genomics (the global study of 
the structure and the behaviour of the genome) has not made genetics obsolete, 
neither the theoretical assumptions of the first are discordant or in conflict with 
the ones of the latter.  Again the passage from traditional molecular studies to 
computational approaches is not so linear, neither explicable just by an 
opposition of contrasting theoretical schemes. Therefore, leaving aside 
oversimplified reconstructions, the building of an epistemic framework for these 
 29 
innovations should take into account “that data-driven science seeks to hold to 
the tenets of the scientific method, but is more open to using a hybrid 
combination of abductive, inductive and deductive approaches to advance the 
understanding of a phenomenon” (Kitchin 2014). Again, a single category seems 
being reductive. Indeed other scholars claimed that the real innovation of these 
approaches does not rest on a new capacity for providing explanations but rather 
on a diverse, and more structured way to generate hypotheses (see for instance 
Ratti 2015).  
To sum up, the tension between these approaches is definitely more 
complex. Let us just consider the case of the Human Genome Project (HGP). The 
HGP is an international research project aimed to establish the DNA sequence of 
the entire human genome. “HGP researchers deciphered the human genome 
using three tools: producing what are called linkage maps, complex versions of 
the type originated in early Drosophila research, through which inherited traits 
(such as those for genetic disease) can be tracked over generations; making maps 
that show the locations of genes for major sections of all our chromosomes; and 
determining the order, or "sequence," of all the bases in our genome's DNA” 
(https://www.genome.gov/11511417, emphasis is mine). Therefore, one may 
rightfully claim that HGP constitutes the exemplar of map thinking. However the 
HGP, unlike current projects, has not been pursued, albeit it required a profound 
computational power, through new Next Generation approaches. Indeed it was 
certainly a map. It seems definitely to constitute a conceptual ‘rupture’, the first 
example of a new way of thinking but, given the technology through which it has 
been conducted, it is also the link between traditional molecular biology and 
current research. 
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In order to better grasp this point, let us briefly focus on two recent 
examples. These two cases are settled at two different levels of research. The 
first case, a project highly framed on contemporary efforts towards translational 
research and personalised medicine, is represented by a recent venture developed 
by the University of California that, by combining patient information, clinical 
data and scientific findings, aims at building the first “Google Map for Health” 
(Leuty 2015). The emphasis on map reflects the idea that deeper comprehension 
of complex biological phenomena (in this case also involving social factors) can 
be better and more genuinely achieved through the construction of maps. The 
second case comes directly from cancer research. The study addresses the 
problem that biological knowledge coming from molecular biology is dispersed 
(I will focus on this aspect in second chapter). Indeed scientists argue that [m]ost 
existing pathway databases provide a view on molecular mechanisms as 
disconnected processes, splitting their content into ‘canonical pathway’ 
representations. However, cancerogenesis affects simultaneously multiple 
cellular processes and their crosstalk. Therefore, cancer research can benefit 
from the reconstruction of cellular signalling in the form of a comprehensive 
map, representing the complexity of pathway crosstalk manifested by co-
participation, interaction or co-regulation of molecular entities in several cell 
signalling processes. Understanding connections between molecular mechanisms 
is important for determining potential therapeutic intervention points” 
(Kuperstein et al. 2015, p 1, emphasis is mine). As a result, researchers have built 
an interactive and dynamic database, the Atlas of Cancer Signalling Network 
(ACSN)7 which provides (also in a graphically fashion display) the entire current 
                                                
7 Note the semantic choice of ‘atlas’ that clearly refers to the geographical dimension 
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map of signalling processes in non cancerous cells but often disrupted during 
tumorigenesis. Such an effort shows very well the virtues ascribed to maps in 
developing biological research. First, the ACSN is the most comprehensive map 
of cancer mechanisms (due to the fact that it is database is based on the most 
recent literature that can be easily updated). Second, it presents such information 
through a graphic display that can be browsed via Google Maps itself. Third, 
there is a related discussion forum in which scientists can debate results and 
configuration display. Last, from the map it is possible to directly access the 
primary information coming from other related databases. 
Arguably, map thinking is a way of reasoning that overarches different 
technological approaches and it is not reducible to any of them. It is also a mode 
to do science that does not represent a precise theoretical framework as a 
Kuhnian paradigm. As a matter of fact, the practice of building maps in the life 
sciences is older than computational biology. I suppose it is a matter of style. A 
style of reasoning wavering between different paradigms, employing several 
models. 
 
Maps as styles, models and images 
By following Hacking’s scheme, mapping activity can be definitely linked to 
taxonomic style. Natural history begun with collecting and classifying. 
According to Pickstone (2001 p.60) the expression natural history should be 
intended as the “register of facts” of the natural world. Thus in contrast with 
natural philosophy which was rather involved in the searching for an explanation 
for those facts. Two different styles of reasoning indeed.  
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Taxonomic style is not just listing what is out there. Collecting things 
presupposes a collection design, meaning it requires to set up what these 
collected ‘things’ are. It also involves comparison criteria, what should count as 
similarity, where to put boundaries. Indeed classifying does not mean just 
‘grouping together’. Unlike experimentation, whereas claims and results are 
local, collection shows a broader epistemic horizon. The laboratory of collectors 
and classifiers is the world itself. The analogy with geography is not accidental. 
The word ‘map’ comes from the Latin mappa, which seemed designating a 
napkin on which maps were drawn. Yet etymology is not of great help. In the 
Renaissance ‘map’ was the short version of mappaemundi or ‘map of the world’. 
Thus a map is a graphical representation of geographical areas. It is then an 
image, a description. In a figurative sense a map is a detailed representation. 
Moreover, a map is an ordered representation. It is so because it reveals the, 
supposed, hidden order of things. Maps represent relations and connections 
virtually invisible to empirical observation. In turn, representation is neither 
reducible to depiction nor comparable to simple description. Representations 
work due to their idealized content. World’s facts are complex and noisy. Many 
factors are at play at the same time. It is very hard to discriminate among all 
these components just by looking at them. Maps, by exalting certain features 
rather than others, provide an idealized situation in which important elements 
and traits are revealed. A map serves its task when it allows someone to orientate 
himself/herself. A map as big and detailed as the land it represents would have an 
undesirable feature: its uselessness. On the contrary, maps are effective precisely 
because they display some kind of information and neglect the other. Of course, 
different maps fulfil different purposes and thus select different information to be 
 33 
shown. The map of The London Underground is not respectful of the distances 
between stations. However it perfectly satisfies its scope, that is to guide 
Londoners and millions of tourist navigating in one of the biggest metropolis of 
the world without paralysing it. As Jacob argues “a map has the power to create 
in a given space […] ‘window’ that opens onto another space, suited to a form of 
intellectual mastery different from everyday empirical perception” (Jacob 2006, 
p.99). Moreover a map constitutes a very peculiar type of representation. A map 
stands for what it represents, but also involves ‘creation’ of something that is not 
present in its referent and allows theoretical conjecture, expectations, predictions. 
Again “[…] the map is no longer simply a record of cumulative knowledge. It is 
also a heuristic mechanism that lends itself to interrogation, hypotheses, a quest 
for explication, and the testing of numerous correlations between human 
phenomena and natural settings” (Jacob 2006, p.370).  
In this perspective a map acts as a model. Models constitute a hot topic in 
both science and philosophy. To sum up, contrary to the Syntactic View, that 
privileges logical axiomatisation as the main grounding of theories, the so-called 
Semantic View (see for instance Van Fraassen 1980) gives more credit to 
models, even suggesting that theories are sets of models. Moreover, from 
considering just mathematical models, philosophers and scientists now 
acknowledge that models constitute a plurality of ‘entities’. Beside mathematical 
models (as the over-quoted Lotka-Volterra model of predation) now we can 
count concrete models (as the DNA scale model of Watson and Crick), pictorial 
schemes (as pathways representations in molecular biology), computational 
models that simulate the behaviour of a phenomenon by focusing on the actors of 
the process depicted and their interactions. The list can be easily extended. This 
 34 
attention to modelling as the core of the scientific practice, had deep 
consequences on epistemology. Thus the focus of philosophers has gradually 
moved from formal consistency to empirical adequacy meaning that the relevant 
thing to explain is the determination of the type of relation intercurring between 
the world and the model itself. However there is nothing new under the sun. How 
models stand for real things, or how do they accurately describe phenomena, is 
just a restating of the problem of similarity (for a more detailed discussion see 
for instance Suàrez 2003, Weisberg 2013), which is central to philosophical 
investigation since Plato. Among different philosophical accounts, there is, to a 
greater or lesser extent,  a consensus view on the fact that models represent 
aspects of the world. The question then is what the meaning of ‘representation’ 
is. Such a topic is directly intertwined with the problem of scientific realism. The 
debate is then endless and ramified in more or less sophisticated positions (see 
for instance Giere 2006, Fraassen 2008). It is not of my interest to address this 
problem here. It is more relevant to me trying to examine how scientists use 
models and why, rather than tangling up with the formulation of a universal 
account of scientific representation. Indeed, after the ‘pragmatic turn’(see for 
instance Hacking 1983, Cartwright 1983), many philosophers have started to 
concentrate their attention on the practice of science, meaning that a more precise 
analysis of what scientific research is, should start from a comprehension and 
description of scientists’ activities. In other words understanding science should 
begin by looking at what scientists do rather than establishing what science 
should be. According to this perspective, the question about models turns on 
what models grant and allow. Thus “[t]o explain a phenomenon is to find a 
model that fits into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to 
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derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws which 
are true of it. The models serve a variety of purposes, and individual models are 
to be judged according to how well they serve the purpose at hand” (Cartwright, 
1983 p 152). In sum, the fact the models represent, means that they are a device 
through which one may learn about the object represented. In other words, as the 
model stands for the object (or the process) represented, it is possible to 
understand some properties of the object itself precisely by acting on the model. 
Models allow then forms of surrogative reasoning (Swoyer 1991). Surrogative 
reasoning means that building and studying a model allows scientists to reason 
about features regarding the system the model stands for. Scientists can learn, 
make hypotheses and design experimental strategies through models. In addition, 
a model is more than a visual representation (meant as a detailed picture) since it 
is a dynamical entity. The very process of model building and the constant 
interaction between the scientist and the model are two key components of this 
type of surrogative reasoning. It is the manipulation of the model (Morgan 
1999), the possibility to intervene in the model, that allows researchers to make 
predictions and to devise possible explanations about phenomena. Precisely 
according to such a pragmatic view of models (Winther 2012b), maps can be 
definitely seen as a particular type of models. As for other scientific 
idealizations, map’s generalisation acquires a meaning in a given context and 
with given purposes.  
Like models, maps should be used in order to be understood. Unlike certain 
kinds of models such as tables and schemes, maps have distinctive formal 
constraints. First, maps are highly dynamical. Second, maps are not simply 
depictive, they rather share common characteristics with so called constructional 
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drawings, that are graphic representations of the constructing procedures in the 
design of a project (see for instance Maynard 2005). Moreover, as proposed by 
Valeria Giardino (Giardino 2013), maps can be classified as particular kind of 
models, specifically concerned with a type of representation that privileges 
spatial correspondence and structural features. Indeed, among models, maps have 
peculiar construction rules that favour measuring procedures. It is in their 
structural properties that also lies the understanding of what types of 
manipulations are allowed or not. Contrary to models of mechanisms, a map 
normally does not involve the possibility of adding/removing elements in order 
to observe alternative configurations. It rather grants to select a precise point or 
an area on itself and to examine its relations and dispositions with the remaining 
parts. In this sense maps provide a sort of standardisation of representation by 
creating a common, shared frame. As reported by Winther (2014) a map can 
perform distinct forms of generalisation/idealization. A map can simplify the 
messiness of the represented target, aggregate different elements under the same 
label, exaggerate features in order to highlight them, enhance some details over 
others, displace or hide certain sorts of information, create types by constructing 
relations and connections etc. As argued by Winther (2014) these idealisation 
procedures often result in the production/discovery of certain kinds. However 
this must not be taken as a strong metaphysical turn. Such kinds are deeply 
epistemic. “Geographic features, processes and objects are of course real. Yet, 
we must structure them in our data models and, subsequently, select and 
transform them in our maps” (Winther 2014 p.15). These kinds are thus the result 
of an idealization. However, this again does not mean that they are imposed a 
priori. One can just start building a map from (supposedly) unrelated information 
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and then observe connections and patterns ‘emerge’. Moreover such a mapping 
activity does not always require a graphical display.  
In this sense maps are not just physical objects. Mapping is definitely an 
activity that refers to a way of doing. Indeed, in terms of knowledge production 
and intervention mapping gives also a tremendous power. In his masterpiece 
Guns, Germs and Steel (1999) Jared Diamond wonders how Francisco Pizarro 
and a few other Conquistadores were able to conquer the Inca Empire and defeat 
its 80.000 soldiers. More provocatively, one may ask why Incas did not try to 
conquer Spain. Of course Europeans had a better technology (firearms, armours) 
and invisible allies (germs of diseases unknown to native Americans) but their 
success, according to Diamond, depended on another fundamental factor. “A 
related factor bringing Spaniards to Peru was the existence of writing. Spain 
possessed it, while the Inca Empire did not. Information could be spread far more 
widely, more accurately, and in more detail by writing” (Diamond, 1999 p.78). 
In other words, writing allowed the Conquistadores to map their knowledge 
against the magnitude of natural phenomena. No one could have all the possible 
experiences about the world in his or her life. However one could read and learn 
from books. Writing is a way to map knowledge coming from different sources 
in order to make it reusable. A map then is a tool to observe and represent certain 
features of the world without the need to start every time from scratch. Thus, if 
maps are a useful way to find directions, to orientate in the complexity, they 
provide also an image to deal with such a complexity. Maps have a metaphorical 
power too. 
The map metaphor is not new in biology. It is one of the famous images of 
nature along with the chain of being and the tree of life (see Barsanti 1992, 
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2005). The father of modern taxonomy, Linnaeus, by criticizing the older image 
of Scala Naturae (literally, the ‘ladder of nature’), a mode of classification 
considered too linear, in his Philosophia botanica writes that living beings 
“dispose themselves as the Territory on a Geographical Map” (Linnaeus 1751, p 
77, English translation is mine). The representation of Life was changing. 
Natural affinities were recognized as too complex to be portrayed linearly. That 
is why Linnaeus had in mind that species should have been represented as 
circles, blending into one another. Paul Dietrich, one of Linnaeus pupils, actually 
drew that map. The map was then not just a theoretical assumption in Linnaeus’ 
mind. It was a real picture of the natural world. And the new image of nature was 
efficacious as it precisely responded to a new comprehension of nature itself. As 
Barsanti writes, unlike the Scala, “the Map presents […] a two dimension 
territory that is virtually possible to go through in any direction and from which 
[…] it does not emerge any tendency” (Barsanti, 1992, p 50, English translation 
is mine).  
However, in this battle of images, the map progressively lost ground in 
favour of the tree of life. Evolutionary thought imposed a different style of 
reasoning. Living beings have a history that should be reconstructed 
genealogically. Again, another style of reasoning. This turn has not been 
painless. Such an change still has consequences on debates about natural 
classification 8 . More interestingly, the rise of experimentalism condemned 
mapping activities to oblivion. Biology, after the molecular turn, is now a science 
as physics, not stamp collecting any longer.  
                                                
8 see for instance In Defense of Classification by John Dupré, 2001  
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Map thinking regained consideration with the Human Genome Project. 
Before the HGP, molecular biologists, like sailors and explorers discovering 
specific geographical loci, have studied single genes and molecular circuits. With 
the HGP these genomic loci needed to be considered together. It was the time for 
“mapping the code” (Davis 1991). Next Generation Sequencing was far to be 
achieved. However this is the period in which databases started to gain the more 
and more influence. Nowadays no-one could think to do research in biology 
without relying on at least one database. This ‘trend’ is perfectly represented by 
the increasing importance of the Omics. Such a suffix nowadays usually refers to 
a set of disciplines sharing both epistemic and technological similarities. Omics 
are mainly aimed at the global analysis of genes, gene expressions, proteins, 
metabolites, biologically relevant interactions in a given sample. Thus from 
genomics (aimed at providing a comprehensive list of genes), a term invented in 
the late 80s just before the design of the Human Genome Project, now we have 
transcriptomics (profiling mRNA) and epigenomics (looking at global epigenetic 
modifications), proteomics (proteins), pharmacogenomics (at the intersection 
between genomics and pharmacology) and interactomics (the set of molecular 
interactions). The list is not exhaustive indeed. From a technical point of view, 
all the Omics adopt so called high-throughput (HT) screening techniques to 
generate large amounts of data, which are in turn thought as fundamental to 
permit a system-level comprehensions of interactions and relations between 
different elements. The classificatory reasoning is at the foundations of this way 
of doing. “In high throughput research, knowledge discovery starts by collecting, 
selecting and cleaning the data in order to fill a database” (Schneider and 
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Orchard 2011). Once again from the time of natural history mapping is part of 
scientific endeavours. 
Some prominent scientists have argued (e.g. Gilbert 1991) that, in the years 
of the HGP, biology was undergoing a paradigm shift. The terminology, as I 
tried to previously defend, in my opinion is not correct. Surely, as I have shown 
before, biology changed, but the centrality of the molecules (e.g. DNA, RNA, 
proteins) as the right level of both investigation and explanation was not 
contested by the new approach. Interestingly the mere implementation of 
techniques does not constitute per se an unavoidable move towards data-driven. 
Maps are not enough to call for the end of hypotheses. Biology is a combination 
of styles. Contemporary biological maps are also and still embedded in an 
experimental way of doing. In confirmation of this consider that Gilbert also 
claimed that such a turn would have transformed molecular biology, from a set 
of techniques, to a more intellectual enterprise. “[A]ll the genes will be known 
(in the sense of being resident in databases available electronically), and that the 
starting point of investigation will be theoretical. An individual scientist will 
begin with a theoretical conjecture, only then turning to experiment to follow or 
test that hypothesis” (Gilbert, 1991, p 99). This is precisely the opposite of what 
the advocates of computational biology claim nowadays and what makes people 
like Sydney Brenner upset.  
 
Map thinking and contemporary biology 
Certainly, as for natural collections of the past, the building and the use of 
maps put scientists into a different level of abstraction (the wrong one according 
to Brenner) which is not the single cell examined in a lab. Indeed the horizon of 
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possible conjectures and inferences is broadened. This is because the map 
reasoning allows to count as a fact what was hidden before or even 
unconceivable. In molecular research an experimental result can be grounded on 
the consistency of the methods adopted and on the locality of its production, 
namely, the experimental conditions. As also remarked by François Jacob “in 
biology, any study [...] begins with the choice of a ‘system’. Everything depends 
on this choice: the range within which the experimenter can move, the character 
of the questions he is able to ask, and often also the answers he can give” (Jacob 
1988). Thus biological findings seem to be strictly dependent on the locality of 
their production. Contemporary biological maps were built and thought to 
overcome such a locality. Let us consider, as an example, the case of ENCODE. 
ENCODE’s aim is to provide an encyclopaedia of DNA elements, such as 
transcripts (coding or not), binding sites, enhancers, insulators of the human 
genome. ENCODE can be seen as the further step of the Human Genome Project 
in terms of both techniques and mapping efforts. However the two projects rest 
on slightly different intellectual accounts concerning the nature of the genome. 
Indeed, before the HGP the view among the majority of biologists was that once 
the complete ‘code’ had been ‘cracked’, this would have granted a global 
understanding of all relevant biological phenomena. Lewontin (2001) has nicely 
shown how the language adopted to explain and promote the HGP was full of 
colourful expressions, even towards sort of mystical tones, regarding the 
challenge of revealing the “secret of life”.  
Nowadays the genome is pictured differently. The completion of the 
genomic map, rather than a conclusion, fostered entire new areas of investigation 
and provoked profound discussions. The image of the genome itself has changed. 
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The complexity of the genome requires not just mapping ‘objects’ as loci, but 
also relations, e.g. how these elements behave and interact. I would argue then 
that it is the new way of doing, that introduces new things and categories, that 
can, and should, be mapped. The molecular paradigm is still there, slightly 
modified by the increasing relevance (now also ‘molecularised’) of non genetic 
factors. The map metaphor holds. But the style seems to have radically changed. 
The key word here is regulation. ENCODE is thought of as a map of DNA 
regulatory elements. This does not mean that regulation is something new (even 
within the genocentric framework scientists know that genes are regulated 
somehow). It rather means that regulation is the cornerstone of the new way of 
doing research. It is what to look at. From being marginal, regulation became 
central. Such a change is not caused by ENCODE, it precedes it.  
This transformation of perspective should be intended as framed into the so-
called epigenetics revolution (Carey 2013). A unique definition of what 
epigenetics is still lacking. Some people may refer to DNA methylation, others 
may extend it to the environmental contribution to genome’s behaviour, others 
again, by following Waddington as the “whole complex of developmental 
processes that connects genotype and phenotype” (Waddington 1942, 2012 
reprinted). As a working definition I can stipulate that epigenetics is the study of 
those non-genetic factors that regulate gene expression and that can be 
preserved/transmitted through both mitosis and meiosis. However, I will not 
delve into the complexities required for disentangling the semantic ambiguity 
traditionally attached to ‘epigenetics’ (see for instance Jablonka and Lamb 
2014). Sometimes, in science, concepts work precisely because of their fuzziness 
(see for instance Rheinberger 1997). I rather want to consider the epigenetic 
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contribution in terms of styles of reasoning. In other words, I am interested here 
in examining what epigenetics pushed scientists to do, consider and experiment 
on. The rising importance of epigenetics (Heijmans and Mill 2011, Mill and 
Heijmans 2013, Landecker and Panofsky 2013, Meloni and Testa 2014) 
redefined what to look at in many areas of biological research. As a result, even 
if the exact relevance of epigenetic phenomena is still debated and a consensus 
view on the contribution of such phenomena compared with genetic ones lacks 
yet, few scientists disregard epigenetics as such. ENCODE is definitely a project 
plunged into a different understanding and image of the genome. 
Surely, ENCODE efforts are, like the HGP, on mapping. But, in some 
respect, ENCODE is a different map. First, it reflects the theoretical move from a 
structural/topological conception of genes to a functional one (Gerstein et al. 
2007, Stamatoyannopoulos 2012). It also promoted a heated debate on what a 
function is in biology (see Germain et al. 2014). Second, it completely embeds a 
new way of addressing and representing what is considered important. If we 
want to adopt Brenner’s words, ENCODE is mapping another level of 
abstraction. This also explains why people like Brenner think it is the wrong 
one. Such a map, according to them, portrays simply the wrong way to reason, 
the wrong things to look at. Other scholars (Graur et al. 2013) went further and 
despised the entire project by claiming that maps like that are not science, since 
they are just piling data. In my opinion this is also because people like Graur are, 
more or less consciously, defending an image of biological research as anchored 
to and defined by a precise style of reasoning. Accordingly, a map like that is not 
science, it is stamp collecting. On the contrary, as I recently wrote with two 
colleagues, “[j]ust like ‘collections’ maps are different from a simple 
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accumulation of data: they are rather ways of organizing data according to 
specific aims, in order to make specific contrasts emerge and to enable specific 
kinds of investigations. As we have argued […], the mapping of the biological 
activity of DNA elements produced by the ENCODE project is indeed a 
‘collection’ in that sense, that allows biologists to generate precise hypotheses 
about the biological role of certain DNA elements” (Germain et al. 2014, p 828).  
A consequence of such a different way of doing is mirrored also by changes 
in the social practices of science. Indeed, it is fundamental to note that such 
‘mapping’ could not be achieved by a single lab. These efforts must come from 
network activities thus suggesting another analogy with natural history. Natural 
history has always been a collective enterprise. Müller-Wille (2007) has shown 
how, at the time of Linnaeus, the correspondence between botanists and 
naturalists was thick and widespread.  Ariane Droescher (2008, p 152) argues 
that when Linnaeus in 1742 received a sample of Linaria (a genus of plants 
commonly known as toadflax) which showed a radial symmetry instead of 
bilateral one, he deduced in 1744 that he had a specimen of a new species and 
not simply a new variety. Linnaeus was able to do all of this by considering just 
one sample and without conducting any kind of experiment. Linnaeus did not 
make experiments as he was adopting a different style of reasoning. His results 
were possible because of the power of naturalistic collections. More importantly, 
he did not base himself just on his own data. The horizon of his investigation has 
been broadened by the capacity of referring to other collections. Indeed Emma 
Spary (Strasser 2006, p 113) has defined natural history as “a science of 
networks”. Considering the appropriate, historical differences, systematics was a 
form of Big Science too. The potential of this science of networks should be 
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intended as both at practical and theoretical level. From a practical point of view, 
such a cooperative research allows technical possibilities that a single lab or 
group could not achieve (in terms of available instruments, raw material and 
financial support). From a theoretical perspective, this capacity of going ‘global’, 
beyond the locality of the single experimental context, is precisely what allows 
forms of unification and generalisations that a single lab or group could not 
accomplish. Thus “[…] ENCODE is an instance of ‘big science’, involving 442 
members from 32 institutes and a budget around 288 million USD. In late 2012, 
this effort led to the simultaneous publication of 30 papers in Nature, Genome 
Biology and Genome Research. […] ENCODE is also a massive amount of 
publicly available data, with a total of 1,649 high-density experiments on 147 
cell types (at the time of the 2012 round of publications). The project’s 
contributions also include technical standards (both in ‘wet’ protocols and 
computational analysis), novel tools or algorithms, and a careful assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of different technologies” (Germain et al. 2014, p 
809).  
Yet ENCODE only refers to the human genome. It says nothing about other 
organisms. It is not its fault. The human genome is its scope. Moreover 
ENCODE purposes are mainly directed to biomedical applications. ENCODE 
has not been thought to unify biological knowledge or perspectives. Surely, 
ENCODE puts together insights coming from various sources, but it does not 
build a unified picture of biological phenomena. ENCODE is a map but not of 
that kind. Thus, albeit comprehensive in its context and scope, ENCODE is still 
just a tiny drop in the ocean. 
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This situation is not fortuitous. From a physicist’s perspective, biology is a 
science sui generis . Unlike physics, biology does not present a clear, well 
defined theoretical unity. This is due also to the absence of general laws and 
principia. Besides, despite the praise for a unified experimental approach, many 
areas of biology developed independently from each other by adopting different 
models, jargons, vocabulary and implementing diverse methodological protocols 
and standards. In this sense maps proliferation did not help. On the contrary, the 
vast majority of biological databases are built in different manners and the 
information provided cannot be easily compared or/and integrated. It is 
biological knowledge here that has to be mapped. 
Indeed, biological knowledge looks like a Babel Tower. “For the most part, 
the current systems of nomenclature for genes and their products remain 
divergent even when the experts appreciate the underlying similarities. 
Interoperability of genomic databases is limited by this lack of progress” 
(Ashburner et al. 2000). Biology needs unification. This is what bio-ontologies 
are thought for. 
To sum up, in this chapter I argued that contemporary biomedical research is 
shifting towards the map thinking (the return of collection strategies beside the 
experimental practice), picturing an idea of knowledge grounded on the image of 
the map (biological knowledge should look for more generality) and producing 
many maps of data (e.g. ENCODE project, Cancer Genome Atlas, etc.). In doing 
so, I have also specified how collecting is a genuine (and not entirely new) form 
of scientific enterprise along with experimentalism and how maps can be 
considered as a legitimate type of models. In the end, I have anticipated that all 
these efforts try to cope with the fact that biological knowledge is epistemically 
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dispersed. The image of biology as a Babel Tower is more than a joke. It is a real 
problem. In the next chapter I will try to provide an answer for such a situation 
(i.e. the, sui generis, epistemic status of the life sciences) and I will describe a 
possible solution both from a practical and theoretical point of view. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Biology: its epistemic status and its disciplinary unity 
Biology began its history struggling a lot to be allowed among the other 
sciences. The shame of just being stamp collecting loomed over it for decades. 
Nevertheless it became one the of most proficuous ones, and nowadays it has 
probably the strongest and most significant implications on human life, culture 
and society. The epistemic status of biology itself, its autonomy within sciences, 
its disciplinary boundaries, are all problematic. Edmund Wilson (1901, p 19), 
reports that, in the late 19th Century, those who nowadays are named biologists 
were rather professional figures performing at least three different ‘jobs’. First 
there were bug-hunters or naturalists. Naturalists were collecting, classifying and 
comparing. The second job was performed by worm-slicers, mostly physicians, 
working on comparative anatomy and morphology. In the end there were egg-
shakers, interested in cell physiology applying methodologies imported from 
chemistry and physics. Three different styles of reasoning indeed. Biology, as we 
know it today, has yet to come. According to Giulio Barsanti (2005) these three 
‘styles’ developed independently one from one another. Anew, in the late 19th 
Century Michael Foster (1899) sadly reports that anatomists, zoologists and 
physiologists behave like strangers and, even if they would like to communicate 
to each other, their disciplines are not mutually intelligible. Indeed a clash of 
styles. Hacking has argued (1985) that sometimes, once a new style replaces 
another, it makes it very difficult for scientists accustomed to the new style to 
recognise the previous objects of investigation.  
 49 
Such a fragmentation was still present in the first half of the 20th Century. 
Natural history and systematics, embedded into a Darwinian framework and thus 
adopting a genealogical style, stood up against Mendelian genetics that took 
advantage of a combination of experimental and statistical way of doing (see for 
example Barsanti 2005). The rise of Modern Synthesis solved some theoretical 
issues but was still far from producing a unified framework for all the life 
sciences. Biology has still many ‘mothers’. 
Indeed these styles kept pervading biology through time. Sometimes with 
strong conflicts. It is the case, for instance, of the so called “molecular wars” (see 
Wilson 1994) whereas the rise of molecular biology in the 1960s and 1970s has 
been perceived as a direct attack to evolutionary biology and natural history. 
Mayr’s (1961) famous distinction between functional and evolutionary biology, 
was also aimed to restate the autonomy of certain ways of doing research in the 
life science, in respect to molecular studies. Later on, despite the final and 
decisive imposition of a molecular perspective in many areas of the life sciences, 
biology was yet to be unified. Cytology and classical genetics survived to the 
molecular turn and it is important to remember the 1980s were definitely the 
“golden age of cell biology” (Morange 2000, p 244). History of science is never 
plain and linear. History of biology, due to its multiple origins and its ramified 
structure, is even more complicated and intricate.  
As also claimed by Morange, the ‘victory’ of molecular biology (see the 
previous chapter) can be seen as the ascendancy of a certain type of 
methodological reductionism. However such a form of methodological 
unification based on reduction was limited given that “the recourse to higher 
levels of analysis is utterly indispensable if the edifice of modern biology is to 
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remain intact. Only such a reference to higher levels will enable the molecular 
biologist (and the biochemist) to understand the finality of the biological 
phenomena they study, and thus to justify their research” (Morange 2000, p 246). 
Thus even if the molecular turn has probably imposed a more unified perspective 
on the way of doing, a strong theoretical unification still lacks. The many 
‘mothers’ of biological research are also present within the molecular view. This 
is perhaps because the objects of biological investigation are many and they are 
very different from each other. The diversity of the living beings is one of the 
primary interests for biologists. Biology, among other sciences, has the merit to 
have put the focus on what is distinct rather than looking just at what is similar. 
This does not mean that this epistemic focus is the right one. Again, I suppose, it 
is a matter of style. Following Wimsatt (2007), the ontology of such a science is 
more a “tropical rainforest” than a Quinean desert.  
 
Biology, theory and laws of Nature 
The peculiar epistemic status of biology is shown also by the issues 
regarding its theoretical dimension. A common, folk view is that scientific truths 
are represented and exemplified by certain laws. The idea that scientific truths 
might be discovered and faithfully represented through laws of nature is a notion 
emerged in the time of the so-called Scientific Revolution (see for instance Rossi 
1997, Giere 1999). Laws of nature were initially originated as a curious blending 
of theology (if there are laws there must be a legislator) and mathematics 
(reflecting Galileo’s claim that the ‘book of Nature’ is written in a mathematical 
language). Following a secularised version of Descartes and Newton ideas, 20th 
Century science generally has conceived laws of nature as true generalisations 
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about world’s phenomena which do not depend on space and time. In addition, 
they are also thought to be necessary, to distinguish them from contingent 
regularities. Newton’s Laws of Motion can be considered a paradigmatic 
example of this kind. However, a more precise investigation shows that such 
laws “[…] are neither universal nor necessary – they are not even true” (Giere 
1999, p90). No thing in the universe precisely obeys to such laws. Natural laws 
present a high degree of idealization. Surprisingly, they grasp aspect of the world 
by distorting it. Indeed representing does not always mean picturing a faithful 
description. Van Fraassen (2008) has nicely shown how distortion played a 
central role in the effectiveness of pictorial perspective during the Renaissance. 
However, when we say that a representation is effective, it is fundamental to 
clarify what does it mean. Efficacy can be spelled out in different terms. As 
Weisberg (2007, 2009) recalls, the activity of theorising displays always 
different epistemic goals or “representational ideals”. Descriptive accuracy, 
completeness, logical consistency, causal explanation can be all considered a not 
exhaustive list of goals for a theory. These aims might not be achieved all 
together at the same time and “trade-offs” (Weisberg 2007, 2009) are 
unavoidable. For example, according to Cartwright (1983), natural laws have 
certainly a solid explanatory power about reality, even if they do not describe 
reality at all. According to many accounts, laws of nature illustrate then ideal 
situations that do not correspond to any actual case but they rather generalise and 
abstract the common features of those different situations in order to construct a 
uniform type of explanation. The literature on what exactly laws should grasp 
about natural world is endless and often intertwined with the debate about 
realism and metaphysics of science (see above all Cartwright 1983, Carroll 1994, 
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Van Fraassen 1989). However, I am not interested here in the ontological debate 
about the nature of laws. Thus, whether laws exist, if they are discovered or 
invented, it is secondary here. I am more concerned (as for models) with the fact 
that in scientific practice, researchers (chiefly physicists in this case) use laws as 
a formalism to make sense of the raw material of their investigation. The most 
important point is to recognise how such laws have been seen as constituting the 
theoretical core of a scientific discipline (namely physics) under which and 
according to which new observations, experiments and explanation must fit.  
By this pragmatic perspective, at first glance, compared to physics biology 
seems very different. For instance “looking at biology […] one of the first things 
people notice is that there is apparently not much role for scientific laws” 
(Godfrey-Smith 2014, p11). Although there have been some disputes on the 
opportunity to describe Hardy-Weinberg principle in population genetics as a 
law (Sober 1993, Elgin 2003), it is also evident that it could be, at least in theory, 
thought to be reduced to its basic physical laws. Thus the question over 
biological laws is deeply intertwined with the problem of reductionism. In this 
sense one may also read Ernst Mayr’s (2004) famous defence of the epistemic 
autonomy of biology from physics. Moreover, while some efforts have been 
done in order to determine whether there are laws in a particular biological 
subfield (e.g. population genetics or ecology), fundamental laws unifying all 
biological realm seem to lack yet. In addition, most of the debate has been 
influenced by the treatment that logical empiricism has given to the notion of 
law, and its connection with an a priori status, sometimes very distant from 
everyday scientific practice. Indeed, the absence of clear biological laws can be 
maybe attributed, again, to the differences among practices in the life sciences.  
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First of all, despite all the philosophical debates, biological regularities seem 
to lack the feature of necessity (in a sort of Leibnizean sense9) which is often 
invoked for the fundamental laws of physics. The suggestive (albeit 
epistemically naïve) picture is that Newton’s space is empty and universal, while 
Darwin’s world is blooming, full of exceptions, and teeming with different 
creatures. Physics is universal (in the sense that its laws are valid anywhere in the 
universe) and necessary, biology local and contingent (however on the role of 
contingency of biological phenomena see Gould 1996, 2002). Although both 
philosophically and scientifically imprecise and inaccurate, such view has 
historical reasons that can be found in the different roots of the scientific 
practices. Again, following Pickstone (2001), while philosophia naturalis (i.e. 
physics) looked at ‘how the world goes’, historia naturalis (i.e. biology) was 
concerned on ‘what is there in the world’. As argued before, these different styles 
of reasoning shaped also the epistemic goals of these disciplines thus promoting 
one aspect over the other (e.g. the top-down search for laws over the bottom-up 
quest for classificatory schemes). 
Second, the introduction of mathematical formalism, despite its growth in 
the recent years due to the development of systems biology and its efforts on 
producing a ‘theory for biology’, has not been really directed to the discovery of 
‘laws’ but rather on the building of models. This aspect must be framed in the 
specific logic of discovery of molecular biology. Indeed, as famously argued by 
Machamer, Craver and Darden (2000) the fundamental aim of molecular biology 
is to discover mechanisms (and thus the models of them). The meaning of the 
term ‘mechanism’ in biology is not easily assessed. Craver and Darden define 
                                                
9 In contemporary debates such a position is advocated, in different ways, by so called 
necessitarians (see for instance Swoyer 1982 and Bird 2007) 
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mechanisms as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (2013, p 
26). Such a definition reflects the philosophical enterprise of providing a general 
account of mechanism for biological practice thus aiming at unifying biology 
under the search for mechanisms. However science is not always more precise 
than philosophy and often scientific terminology is (intentionally or not) vague. 
A general account is far from being defined. Daniel Nicholson (2011) has shown 
how ‘mechanism’ can be spelled out differently in biology, waving from 
philosophical stances about the nature of living matter to the account for a 
particular type of molecular explanations10. The roots of such a situation are not 
simple to explain. Surely, the rise of the notion of mechanism in the life sciences 
has a long and complex history that cannot be addressed here. Yet, it is certainly 
true that, despite the semantic fuzziness of the term, mechanisms are, depending 
on the context, often invoked by contemporary biologists as way to certify their 
distance from several forms of vitalism and at the same time they are usually 
mentioned as the main explanatory tool of molecular biology 11 . Whether 
mechanisms actually stand for something real or they just constitute a profitable 
heuristic tool, again it is not strictly relevant to our discourse. It is not of my 
interest here to deal with the debate about mechanisms, their historical roots, 
what are they and how do they work. The central aspect to me is mainly on the 
epistemic use of mechanisms. It is a matter of style concerning the scientific 
practice. For instance, in the aims and scopes of one of the most important 
journals in the molecular field, Molecular Cell, it is clearly stated that the “[t]he 
                                                
10 This last one is the sense according to which Craver and Darden argue in favour of when they 
claim that biologists are above all concerned with mechanisms. 
11 Albeit different, these attitudes reveal a general will of biologists to put themselves close to 
physics. On the relation between physics and biology in relation to mechanisms see also Boniolo 
2013. 
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journal focuses on analyses at the molecular level, with an emphasis on new 
mechanistic insights” (http://www.cell.com/molecular-cell/aims emphasis is 
mine). Molecular biologists are seeking for mechanisms not for laws.  
Let us briefly consider an example of a paper by Robert Weinberg lab 
recently published on Cell (Chaffer et al. 2013) that can be genuinely considered 
as a paragon article for molecular biology. Leaving aside technical details, the 
article aims to show that the way a particular gene is expressed enables to 
explain a ‘switch’ in the behavioural state of certain groups of cells in breast 
cancer. The article is a very well reasoned set of precise investigations aimed at 
testing all the conditions of interest (e.g. what happens when a gene is knocked 
down or the identification of distinct cell populations through molecular markers 
etc.) within the experimental system. From a methodological point of view an 
article like that is often seen as exemplar by molecular biologists. But let us give 
a look at its conclusions. The authors write that “[t]he present work reveals that 
the dynamics of interconversion between epithelial non-CSC and 
mesenchymal/CSC states are important determinants of normal and neoplastic 
epithelial tissue behavior” (Chaffer et al. 2013 p 71). In other words, the 
researchers are saying that, in those specific experimental conditions, they were 
able to observe (an observation, nota bene, made possible by the experimental 
setting) a ‘wavering conduct’ or ‘a back and forward transition’, between groups 
of cells affecting the behaviour of the epithelial tissue. Then they claim to have 
shown that such a conversion of state in specific cells is demonstrated (obviously 
not in a logical sense) to occur “in certain carcinoma subtypes – notably, basal 
carcinoma of the breast” (ibid). These results are presented not just contradicting 
any supposed biological law but rather as contrasting a widely accepted model of 
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conversion of state which was mainly unidirectional. The ‘solution’ shown is 
indeed a mechanism. Finally the authors state that “this plasticity is not a 
universal property of all breast carcinomas” (ibid, emphasis is mine). The 
mechanistic model presented in the paper is not generalised nor precisely 
generalisable. As recently argued “there is no molecular biology paper that offers 
a description of a mechanism in terms of all of them. Actually, each paper is 
devoted to answer a different subset of questions, and such subset depends on the 
authors’ interests and on the issue faced” (Boniolo 2013, p 264). Thus the virtue 
and the value of such a model of a mechanism are not in the provision of a 
ground for the construction of an overarching, formal, scheme which should 
encompass all possible instances, but rather in the fact that a mechanism 
constitutes a practical guide to be adopted for further investigations. These new 
inquiries will probably not use the mechanism as it is. Researchers will adapt and 
modify it according to the new experimental system, possibly adding some parts 
or removing others. 
The emphasis on mechanisms over laws reveals also a lot about the 
problematic role of theory in biology. The search for mechanisms can be seen as 
unifying but they are more providing a collection of different techniques than a 
general conceptual groundwork. What is a theory in biology? Certainly, the 
Darwinian account of evolution and especially the so-called Modern Synthesis 
are often addressed as a “theory” but not really in the sense adopted for other 
scientific theoretical frameworks12. Evolution is definitely central to many 
biological efforts but it constitutes more a common stance or a background 
assumption than an overarching theory for biological world. Dobzhansky 
                                                
12 Mayr (2004) even argues that the theory of evolution is in reality a conflation of five different 
and epistemically distinct theoretical claims 
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famously stated that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution” (1964, p 449) but many areas of research in the life sciences were 
pursued and still are with not direct remark on evolution itself (see for instance 
Germain et al. 2014). Thus when biologists and philosophers started to think 
about the role of theories in their work they first looked at what a theory is in 
other sciences.  
Moreover, in biology, an attitude against ‘theory’ in favour of ‘experiments’ 
has a long and widespread tradition (see Lewontin 1970 and Callebaut 2013). 
Indeed, 20th Century biologists generally neglected the impact of conceptual 
work to their discipline and forgot how much it shaped the very beginning of the 
life sciences (e.g. consider the debates prompted by the hypotheses advanced by 
Lamarck and then Darwin). Thus ‘theorizing’ has been sometimes spelled out as 
‘speculation’ which, in this context, has very often a pejorative sense (Callebaut 
2013). Part of this view is certainly due to a general envy towards physics, seen 
as the paradigmatic example of how a science should be. Biologists then have 
tried to show that their discipline is as much ‘scientific’ as physics but 
nevertheless presents some irreducible features (Mayr 1982, 2004). In this sense 
it is important to recall the role of early philosophy of science (the Vienna Circle 
and Popper in particular) in shaping the image of physics itself and more in 
general of science (what is science and what it should be). Indeed, most of the 
debates among the nature of theories in philosophy of science stemmed out from 
reflections on physics and by people with, mainly, either physical or 
mathematical background. As recalled by Conrad Hal Waddington while 
“theoretical physics is a well recognized discipline […]” and “it is widely 
accepted that theories of the nature of the physical universe have profound 
 58 
consequences for problems of general philosophy”, on the contrary “theoretical 
biology can hardly be said to exists as an academic discipline” and “[t]here is 
even little agreement as to what topics it should deal with, or in what manner it 
should proceed” (Waddington 1968, p 525). No matter whether we adopt a 
syntactic or a semantic view, theories are thought to have a unification power. 
More, they are generally conceived as the main way to put order (an explanatory 
order) into the messiness of common experience. Thus it should not surprise that 
Waddington himself thought about theoretical biology not just as the 
systematisation of a particular biological process but rather as “an attempt to 
discover and formulate general concepts and logical relations characteristic of 
living as contrasted with inorganic systems” (ibid). The specificity of such a 
distinction is quite interesting as it is intertwined, in a different manner, with 
different forms of reductionism. On the one hand, Waddington seems to envisage 
the necessity of a theoretical apparatus specific to biology and its peculiar object 
of inquiry: life. On the other hand this move should bring biology closer to 
physics, at least in terms of its epistemic structure. Indeed the relation with 
physics is quite peculiar in itself. Surely physics played a decisive role in the rise 
and development of molecular biology (see for instance Morange 2000) by 
fostering the idea of the chance of ‘explaining life’ through its formidable 
theoretical apparatus. However the contact with biology challenged some 
theoretical physicists till positions like Bohr ones on the necessity of extending 
natural laws in order to give a scientific account of life (see for instance the 
volume edited by Sloan and Fogel 2011). In any case it is manifest that 
“theoretical biology is a highly heterogeneous type of enterprise, not only 
because it applies to widely divergent sub-fields of investigation – from genetics 
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and molecular biology to ecology and evolution – but because it proceeds via the 
application of a panoply of methods, which in some cases yield contrasting 
insights or highlight fundamental conceptual differences in the ways different 
theoretical biologists think of their subject matter” (Pigliucci 2013, p 291).  
 
Biology and the problem of theoretical unification 
Despite all these distinctions, many scientists themselves express the need 
for theoretical unification in the life sciences (see for instance Brenner 2010). 
The urge for theory is generally motivated by some considerations about theory’s 
features. As already mentioned, theory should indeed have a unification power 
over a discipline, giving sense and order to the diversity of empirical findings. 
Moreover it should provide a general explanatory framework in which single 
results take place in a structured way (in this sense see also Kitcher 1989). 
However, on the other hand, some philosophers (see for instance Dupré 1983, 
1993 and works of other scholars of the so called Stanford School) have argued 
against the unity of science, precisely claiming that such a unity is both a 
posteriori reconstruction and a misrepresentation of scientific practice itself. I 
suppose that, proverbially, the truth lies in the middle. Disunity of scientific 
practices is certainly evident in many areas of research. But it is also honest to 
recognise that unification attempts have been made throughout the entire history 
of scientific disciplines (again, in the life sciences, let us think about Modern 
Synthesis as a way to put together, consistently, Mendelian genetics and 
Darwinism). In addition, the very notion of unity of science can be spelled out in 
different ways (often interweaving ontological and epistemological levels). In 
ancient times, while Plato argued for a general theory of knowledge that should 
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have unified different branches, Aristotle claimed for a structural harmony of the 
different disciplines which should be connected to each other but cannot be 
reduced one to another. In modern age, Kant argued that the unity of different 
scientific practices would occur at the epistemic level: unity is a priori principle 
of reason guiding the process of scientific discovery by setting its conditions of 
possibility. Later on, logical empiricists put the question of unity of scientific 
knowledge on the top of their research agenda thus arguing for a methodological 
unification and vindicating the commitment to a united and consistent logical 
form. Since the aim of logical empiricists was profoundly foundational, they did 
not claim however that the content of different and specific theories and concepts 
should be unified but rather they thought about mathematical logic as the way to 
highlight the common formal structure in which all the sciences, hierarchically 
depicted, would be embedded. The debate is vast and other distinctions can be 
made. For instance, Popper has in mind the notion of unity as a tool to identify 
science from non-science, he argued in favour of unity of a unifying 
methodological stance: falsificationism. On the contrary Carnap was more 
concerned with a notion of unity that aims at building a general and 
comprehensive system of science. Recently Margaret Morrison (2007) has nicely 
argued that theoretical unification and explanation are not necessarily coupled 
together, thus meaning that a common, encompassing conceptual structure does 
not provide, per se, a general explanatory framework.  
Therefore, the problem that scientists are facing now, is then how to define 
and then arguably to build, a unifying tool, given also the fragmented picture of 
biological research I have sketched so far. In this aspect, I think, lies the 
connection with the implementation of classificatory tools and computational 
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methods building general maps of biological data and biological knowledge. If 
some argued, especially within scientific journalism, that such practices would 
have decreed the end of theory (Anderson 2008), other scholars have claimed, on 
the contrary, that these approaches would have actually build, finally, a common 
theoretical ground for the life sciences (Ashburner et al. 2000). Of course these 
proponents had in mind, more or less explicitly, a different, compared to 
previous attempts, account of theory itself. Again, I would argue that it is the 
practice that shaped the way ‘theory’ has been addressed in this context. 
Speaking metaphorically, as in polytheism, there is not a single event generating 
all the deities. Each divinity has its own origin, story, myth. The many ‘mothers’ 
of contemporary biology urged to be treated equally and, in a sense, 
independently. After more or less three centuries since the release of the Systema 
Naturae by Linnaeus, the question is not just about building a new, updated 
version of the system but also whether the system itself is the right intellectual 
tool to forge such a unity. The ramification of biology itself and diversity of 
biological objects have probably a strong responsibility in the development of the 
taxonomic style. Such a tropical rainforest seems to resist to any form of 
overarching unification. Surely there is evolution as a general background stance. 
But, again, a precise theoretical unification is far from being achieved. Forms of 
life came to be so different that cannot be completely reduced one to another (see 
Carroll 2006). The inner diversity of the living things must be kept rather than 
neglected in any unification attempt. Thus, following Linnaeus’ inspiration, if a 
unification is to be found for biology, it seems it must be from the bottom, from 
the collection of such diversities. On the other hand, contrary to Linnaeus, it is 
not clear whether such a bottom-up theoretical work would create a system.  
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Probably, classifying as a style of reasoning requires its own stance on what 
theory is. Actually, as Mueller-Wille (2007), Strasser and Chadarevian (2011) 
and Leonelli (2012) have shown, the classificatory practice in biology was and is 
not theoretically neutral. It is a matter of style. A question of how things are done 
and thought they should be done. Indeed “[t]he way scientists collect and order 
data is shaping their research since it is shaping the type of questions they pose 
and how they pose them” (Boem, Boniolo and Pavelka, 2015). Again, following 
Werner Callebaut suggestions, to understand what theory is in this context, we 
should not focus on a particular conceptual account, but rather concentrate on the 
practice of making theories by scientists (Callebaut 2013). In other words we 
should shift from ‘theory’ to ‘theorizing’. Therefore the point is not to develop a 
particular account of theory and then trying to verify whether it would fit with 
the practice of research but rather to examine what counts as theoretical for 
practising scientists. According to such a perspective, it is central thus to 
evaluate the contemporary need for mapping as how it stimulated researches to 
look for links among different areas of research in a way that preserves a kind of 
uniformity. “Progress in the way that biologists describe and conceptualize the 
shared biological elements has not kept pace with sequencing. For the most part, 
the current systems of nomenclature for genes and their products remain 
divergent even when the experts appreciate the underlying similarities. 
Interoperability of genomic databases is limited by this lack of progress” 
(Ashburner et al. 2000, emphasis is mine). In other words it seems that due to its 
fragmentation, contemporary biology is facing a situation in which research is 
pursued by adopting many different languages but no translation devices. 
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Contemporary databases, are indeed maps of specific aspects of biological 
understanding but it is not clear whether they should be situated in relation one to 
another and thus in the general fabric of knowledge. If map thinking is employed 
to build biological maps dealing with specific empirical data, then maps of maps, 
metamaps, are needed to situate those data in relation to phenomena of interest. 
To put it differently, if this context knowledge can be often coupled with 
ordering. Given such circumstances, the adoption of a normalised, 
computationally controlled vocabulary, able to bridge the boundaries between 
distant areas of investigations, has been invoked as an effective way to integrate 
the results coming from disparate experimental settings, model organisms, 
technical devices, practical and theoretical aims. The problem of integration has 
not been addressed so much within the philosophical literature with few 
exceptions (see for instance O’Malley and Soyer, 2012). However a precise 
taxonomy of what is integration in computational biology is still unclear. Data-
integration is generally considered as a technical problem due to the intrinsic 
differences among the procedures of data production and collection. However, 
given the heterogeneity of data, especially in biomedical research, not just one 
approach has been provided. Some scholars suggest that, generally speaking, 
integration “encompasses the combination of methods and methodologies [...], 
the process of making data-sets comparable and re-analysable, and the variety of 
ways in which explanations are brought together in a particular inquiry” 
(O’Malley and Soyer, 2012).  
Data-integration should also be distinguished from methodological and 
explanatory integration. While methodological integration is generally applied to 
the context of systems biology as the way to obtain a “multidimensional 
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understanding” of a particular network or system by integrating different 
techniques, explanatory integration concerns the unification of different 
theoretical contributions in order to explain a phenomenon or a set of phenomena 
and the use of models in a specific field from another area of inquiry. On the 
other hand data-integration “refers to the process of theorizing and modelling 
databases, quantifying data accurately, developing standardization procedures, 
cleaning data, and providing efficient and user-friendly interfaces to enable data 
not only to be reused, but also reanalysed and combined in novel ways” 
(O’Malley and Soyer, 2012). On this aspect Sabina Leonelli (2013) has recently 
proposed a further distinction among different kinds of data integration. The first 
one is what she calls “inter-level integration” which concerns data representing 
different aspect of a single species in order to develop a multidisciplinary and 
whole-oriented understanding of such a species. The second one is named 
“cross-species” integration which compares data coming from different 
organisms in order to clarify the common biological ground of certain 
mechanisms shared by several living beings. In the end the third one, 
“translational integration”, which refers to data of different sources (not only 
those coming from academia but also those ones from scientific institutions, 
companies etc. etc.) in order to provide “interventions to improve human health” 
(Leonelli, 2013). 
In order to provide an epistemic analysis of these ways of integration and 
unification it is necessary to briefly reconstruct the origin of biological databases 
and their conceptual roots. 
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Unification in biology: from databases to bio-ontologies 
The molecular revolution and the subsequent increase of information 
boosted the creation of repositories and databases. However, the creation of 
databases is independent from their adoption in biological research. Very often 
their origin is traced back to developments in computer science and the need of 
data management: namely how to label and display, in an ordered and easy to 
retrieve manner, the information of interest. As claimed in a quite recent 
handbook of computational biology “[b]iological knowledge is stored in global 
databases. The most important basis for applied bioinformatics is the collection 
of sequence data and its associated biological information” (Selzer, Marhöfer and 
Rohwer 2008, p 45, italics is mine). According to the type of data stored, it is 
possible to distinguish several kinds of biological databases. “Primary databases 
contain primary sequence information (nucleotide or protein) and accompanying 
annotation information regarding function, bibliographies, cross-reference to 
other databases” (ibid). Famous primary databases are GenBank (an American 
database for nucleotide sequences), EMBL and DDBJ (which, respectively, the 
European and the Japanese counterparts to GenBank), SwissProt and UniProt 
(both are repositories of annotated protein sequences, but the latter combines info 
coming from the former with other databases). On the contrary, secondary 
databases display a second-order information, summarising findings and analyses 
based on information kept in primary databases. Databases keeping information 
about literature (research articles and other publications) are also considered 
secondary databases. Examples of secondary databases are Interpro (that 
integrates different secondary information in a uniform system) or PDB (which is 
a repository of crystal structures of macromolecules). Biological databases are 
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often built and structured according to relational models which are in turn based 
on first order logic and notion of relation13 in set theory. The basic assumption of 
relational models is that data can be represented as relations. In order to do so, 
specific tables are constructed and linked one to another via unique key words 
connecting data across different tables. For example, by taking the fiscal code of 
a person as a common key for different tables, it is possible to display 
information both on the physical domicile and on the health profile of that 
person. 
Despite its technological novelties and contrary to naïve intuitions, the 
source of this practice is ancient. Behind modern database there is a precisely 
traceable philosophical vision. Collecting the world in order to understand it is an 
old, powerful idea. It is a style of reasoning. In the 17th Century the problem of 
classification was not just and simply to attribute names to plants and animals, it 
also involved the creation of specific instruments to pursue such achievements. 
As I said before, any classificatory effort is loaded with conceptual stances. Let 
us examine them more in details. 
First, as Paolo Rossi recalls (1997), the issue of classification implies, 
explicitly or not, that a theory about the structure of nature is put in relation with 
a theory about the structure of language. This should not be intended naïvely as if 
knowledge simply stems out from naming. Rather, it represents the theoretical 
stance that a precise and consistent way of labelling things would be capable to 
grasp the actual classification in nature (to carve nature at its joints). Again this 
would not be achieved in virtue of the choice of this or that word, but according 
to the way and the coherence terms are in relations to each others. This aspect is 
                                                
13 Roughly speaking, a relation is a subset of the Cartesian product between two or more sets 
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somehow crucial as it sets up the basis for a philosophical perspective in which 
semantics and ontology are coupled together (see for instance Kripke 1980 and 
his notion of rigid designator). I will discuss the implications of such a stance 
further in this study. Second, by classifying scientists do not just deal with 
knowledge, they also cope with mnemonic concerns. Third, the language adopted 
by classifiers is able to grasp and elicit what is important over a myriad of 
details. All these dimensions are intrinsic features of the taxonomic style. All 
these points fostered the request and creation of artificial, universal languages, 
that should overcome the intrinsic limitations of natural one. The quest for a 
Lingua Philosophica can be seen as a very structured attempt to provide a 
unification tool for science. The fact that it is deeply related to the taxonomic 
style is not by accident. For instance, Leibniz’s idea of a Characteristica 
Univeralis (a forerunner of modern logic) as formal and complete language to 
describe mathematical and scientific concepts goes precisely in this direction. By 
the second half of the 17th Century, scholars of various interests (from 
philosophers and mathematicians to linguists and taxonomists till polymaths as 
Leibniz himself) began to develop different proposals on artificial languages and 
formal tools precisely to cope with the issue of the classification of nature. The 
formal aspect here does not always mean that all these approaches were 
formalised. Contemporary formal logic is not as such because it has symbolic 
formulas, but rather because it highlights the form, the structure of a sentence. It 
grasps its ‘essence’. Thus even if, for instance, Linnaeus adopted Latin, it is the 
way the terms were structured, their formal relation, that granted the 
effectiveness of its classificatory power. 
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All these artificial languages, in spite of differences, show some common 
important features (see Rossi 1997). First, the terms do not correspond directly to 
things in the world, but to the concepts that refer to those things. Second, the 
connectives and symbols of formal languages should highlight relations and 
connections among the objects represented. Third, exactness is demanded so that 
semantic ambiguity is avoided. Fourth, such a universal language should imply 
the realisation of a universal knowledge, meaning the complete enumeration and 
classification of all those entities that have a term referring to them. This means 
also that this completeness must be intended in a strong epistemic sense, given 
that the limits of such encyclopaedic enterprise are indeed the limits of the 
language itself. According to Rossi (1997) this is also the perspective into which 
one should interpret Francis Bacon’s tabulae. Rossi thinks about Bacon proposal 
as an anticipation of a sort of database, meaning that those tables (think indeed 
about the aforementioned relational models) were actually built as a way to 
display knowledge in an organised way capable to let differences and similarities 
emerge. In this view knowing is precisely naming and ordering correctly. This 
approach is not just a philosophical stance, conceived in principles, but it also 
mirrors itself in the practice. As also claimed by Linnaeus himself: 
“[f]undamentum botanices duplex est: dispositio et denominatio” (Linnaeus, 
1751, 151). Moreover, previous botanical classifications during the Renaissance, 
based on the work of Galen or Dioscorides, usually ordered plants according to 
their medical and pharmacological relevance, thus putting botany as ancillary to 
medicine and, more importantly, bending classification itself to a particular 
interest rather than trying to find the relations among things. New classificatory 
strategies and languages were thought to be able precisely to get the essential 
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over the accidental. Here lies the importance of their capacity to reveal the 
formal structure. At the end of the 17th Century, the great French botanist Joseph 
de Tournefort used 15 words to describe the bulbous bluegrass which is, in 
Linnaeus system, Poa bulbosa. As Rossi (1997) argues, in those 15 words there 
is less information than that in the two ones adopted by Linnaeus.  
It is not a mystery then that the discipline concerned with information, 
informatics, stemmed out of logic. Alan Turing and Von Neumann thought about 
computers precisely as mechanical and automatic replicas of individuals, capable 
of tremendous computational abilities. Thus it should not surprise that computer 
science dealt with data classification and management since its beginning. 
Indeed, ordering and classifying the world is then not just a mode of 
representation but also a heuristic procedure. By collecting and comparing it is 
possible to produce and foster discovery. The implementation of computational 
instruments in biology, as I tried to show in the previous chapter, did start after 
the second half of the 20th Century, many years before the rise of computational 
biology. The development of the first modern biological database, the Atlas of 
Protein Sequences and Structure by Margaret Dayhoff in the 60s (see also 
Strasser 2010) and the discovery of sequencing by Frederick Sanger in the 70s 
can be considered two iconic moments, standing as the first steps to such a 
change of research practices. In the late 80s, once distinct databases started to be 
constructed and implemented (e.g. GenBank in 1982, SwissProt in 1986. Nota 
bene, in the same year the term genomics has been coined) a need for a common 
groundwork became urgent and precisely from a practical point of view. The 
increase of information, due to mapping efforts of molecular findings, required to 
be addressed. “Keeping pace with molecular developments were biological data-
 70 
management efforts” (Lewis 2005). In the end, the complete sequencing of 
several model organisms at the end of 90s furnished the biological basis of a 
common ground for building bridges among research communities. These 
diverse biological maps could finally be compared. In particular, it was necessary 
to find a practical solution to treat gene functions in a consistent manner that 
nevertheless would satisfy the specificities of the diverse organism models. Both 
from social and epistemic point of view, the choice of the experimental model 
shaped the diverse research communities. These communities were not based 
only on organism-specific researchers, but they also incorporate scientists with 
different backgrounds as biochemists or geneticists. Nevertheless the model 
adopted also determined to which community a researcher belonged, framing and 
tailoring his/her research language. This is because “many biological databases 
bloomed, flourished and […] all of them operated primarily autonomously” 
(Lewis 2005, p 103). In order to cope with such a Babel Tower, the development 
of a shared language was perceived as fundamental. Similarly to what happened 
in the 17th and 18th Centuries, one solution proposed was the adoption of a formal 
tool, that should highlight formal structures and relations. Thus, in those years, 
some biologists started to look at the formal work of data managers and 
computer scientists precisely as naturalists of the past, embarked philosophers, 
linguists and logicians in helping them solving their practical and theoretical 
issues. In 1998, Michael Ashburner (professor in Cambridge and developer of 
FlyBase, a repository of information concerning Drosophila) proposed a simple, 
hierarchical, controlled vocabulary for representing gene function among 
different communities. Following his vision, representatives of different model 
organisms databases, (initially FlyBase, Saccharomyces Genome Database, and 
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Mouse Genome Informatics) met together and agreed to a common framework 
for labelling and characterising the functions of genes. This collaboration 
constituted the first basis for the creation of the Gene Ontology (GO) 
Consortium. 
Before exploring GO more in details, analysing its strengths, limitations, 
scopes and structure, it is necessary to examine the relation between 
computational ontologies and ontology in a philosophical sense. Despite the fact 
that several bio-ontologies are built in the total unawareness of what ontology is 
in philosophy, there are both historical and theoretical reasons to support the 
argument that actually ontology played, and still plays, a critical role in shaping 
the work of engineers in knowledge representation. As Daniel Dennett wrote 
once “[t]here is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science 
whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination” (Dennett 
1995). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Ontology and ontologies 
In philosophy the term ‘ontology’ is usually adopted to design that area of 
theoretical speculation involved in the analysis of what there is and the nature of 
being. Nowadays, sometimes the term is equated to metaphysics, while Aristotle 
called it first philosophy as he meant that such a reflection on the more abstract 
categories and relations should come first and prior to any other knowledge 
(since it would apply to any science). Edmund Husserl (1900/1) provides a 
further distinction between formal and material ontology. While the former deals 
with being qua being, the latter is linked to specific areas/regions of reality or is 
concerned with their representations in given theories. Quine (1953) thought that 
the only, genuine, approach to the ontological problem would be through the 
analysis of the ontological commitment of scientific theories. In other words, 
according to Quine “the ontologist’s task is to establish what kind of entities 
scientists are committed to in their theorizing” (Smith 2003 p 3). Quine’s turn 
had a strong influence in the way philosophical ontology has been conducted and 
defined. Since then, many philosophers (especially within the analytic tradition) 
stopped from seeking a priori true principles of reality, and they rather moved to 
look for those assumptions considered as valid according to certain theories or 
field of inquiry. After Quine, it seemed that the formal part of ontology gave the 
way to logic and epistemology and, especially, to science itself. This is also 
because, although often implicit, the determination of the fundamental entities 
and processes of reality rests now on natural sciences. The Quinean approach 
then somehow ‘dissolved’ the classical ontological problem by claiming that the 
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content and the structure of reality would have been revealed by empirical 
sciences while its representation would have been pursued by first order logic.  
However, a return of the pretension of ontology in a more traditional sense 
started with Saul Kripke (1980) who built (or better, restated in a new shape) a 
tight connection between ontology and semantics. Thus he originally argued in 
favour of a link between the structure of the world and the structure of the tool 
we adopt to predicate about the world: the language. Famously, and contrary to 
classical descriptive theories, Kripke proposed a causal theory of reference, 
according to which a name stands for a thing in virtue of a causal connection 
with the thing through a procedure of baptism within the community of speakers. 
Names are then rigid designators. Moreover, identities between terms discovered 
by empirical sciences, such as water and H2O, constitute then a posteriori 
necessary truths. Contra Quine, Kripke has shown how ontology can be put again 
prior to natural sciences. Again, despite Quine efforts against Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s beards, a rigid designator is a modern way to reaffirm the old notion 
of essence. Indeed, Kripke’s legacy favoured the flourish of metaphysics and 
promoted the idea of a genuine ontological research independent from 
epistemology (and maybe prior to it). 
At first glance, all this debate may seem extremely abstract, detached from 
scientific practice, and concerning precisely that type of speculation that irritates 
biologists so much. In a sense, it could be rightfully argued that applied ontology 
seems to follow Quine’s ideas, whereas the disclosure of the ontological 
structure is a task just for natural sciences. However I would argue that the 
picture is more complex and complicated. Indeed, the very choice of the term 
‘ontology’ to designate knowledge representation is not accidental and certainly, 
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the fact that semantic tools were considered adequate to elicit the real structure of 
world, slants on the Kripkean side. Even if engineers and computer scientists 
were not fully aware of the philosophical debate, they somehow bumped into it. 
They were trying to solve a practical problem. However such an issue dealt with 
the relation between the world and the language. Their question was indeed the 
problem of reference. As a matter of fact, in information and computer science 
the “task for the new ‘ontology’ derives from what we might call the Tower of 
Babel problem. Different groups of data- and knowledge-base system designers 
have their own idiosyncratic terms and concepts by means of which they build 
frameworks for information representation. […] Methods must be found to 
resolve the terminological and conceptual incompatibilities which then inevitably 
arise” (Smith 2003 p 6). Thus the very problem is not in naming (which is often 
arbitrary) but in the capacity of a structured nomenclature to grasp fundamental 
relations among things. This is not just a philosophical, speculative question. It 
pertains to real scientific research. In a tit for tat appeared in Genome Biology, 
first Sydney Brenner (2002) engaged the whole project about the creation of a 
computationally controlled vocabulary, claiming that it was a waste of time since 
terms are just words and not things (and things are what a biologist should care 
about). Then Lawrence Hunter (2002) replied by arguing that Brenner failed to 
understand what is at stake. According to Hunter, Brenner misses completely the 
point since the power of bio-ontologies “is not in the list of names they embody, 
but in the relationships they represent” (Hunter, 2002 p 2). Moreover, Hunter 
argues that such a rigid tool is not made for scientists but for machines. 
Ontologies allow computer programs “to accomplish complex inference tasks” 
(ibid). As in a modern Porphyrian tree, computational ontologies are displaying a 
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representation of the world. Once a term had been chosen and fixed, what it 
would stand for? To put it differently, what is at stake here, is the nature of the 
categories implemented in this representational work. Surprisingly, at least for 
modern scientists, the question is a sort of a new dispute on universals. And also 
in this contemporary, scientific debate, it is still possible to envisage nominalists 
versus realists. However, the purpose of applied ontology is not to solve a 
philosophical problem. Nor the aim of computational ontologies, although they 
are created to grasp something which is real, is to carve nature at its joints. This 
is because, paradoxically, the nature represented at its joints must not be 
intended ontologically. Surely many scientists are realist in this sense. Most of 
them believe in the categories and in the objects of their theories. They have 
pragmatic reasons to do so. Nevertheless ontologies pertain to the epistemic side. 
This realism is then always within a specific theoretical setting. Such a thing is 
not just for philosophers. As Gruber clearly states “for AI systems what ‘exists’ 
is that which can be represented” (1993). Thus it is the terminological choice, the 
type of design and format adopted, that shape and determine not only which 
entities exist but also establish that such entities have only those properties 
properly represented. Ontological work is close in this sense to modelling. This 
modelling however, it is not about this or that specific entity, but rather on what 
is an entity, and what should count for it in our domain of interest. As for 
philosophical ontology, computational ontologies come first indeed. They set up 
the objects and rules to any further analysis or research. As both a dictionary and 
grammar book, ontologies establish which are the ‘words’ that can be used in 
research, their meaning and the syntax. This is because for the ontological work, 
the domain of a scientific inquiry is not simply a given. As a matter of fact, 
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experience comes all together. However, knowledge requires distinctions. It is 
necessary to abstract some parts from others. An ontology, in a computational 
sense, is a way to do so. And there are many kinds of ontologies because “reality 
is like cheese: it can be cut in many ways” (Grenon, Smith and Goldberg 2004). 
 
Upper-ontologies and bio-ontologies 
In the field of applied ontology it is common to distinguish between upper-
level ontologies and domain ontologies. Drawing an analogy with the 
philosophical distinction formulated by Husserl (1900/1) between formal and 
material ontology, upper-level ontologies deal with abstract and general notions 
such as ‘object’, ‘process’, ‘relation’, ‘part’ and ‘whole’, while the second ones 
implement specifications relative to particular domains of interest such as (in the 
life sciences) molecular biology, anatomy, diseases etc.  
Bio-ontologies then, are a clear example of domain ontologies. This means 
that the fundamental categories deployed by bio-ontologies as substrate of their 
categories are not directly specified. Although not so much considered by both 
wet and computational biologists, upper-level ontologies are critical to 
understand the structure of bio-ontologies and their rationale. The Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO) developed by Barry Smith is a good and famous example of an 
upper-level ontology. An ontology as BFO is indeed the type of tool to instruct 
the main elements on which one can develop different domain ontologies. First, 
BFO distinguishes all entities into continuants (objects) and occurrents 
(processes). “Intuitively, the big divide in the BFO lies between entities in three-
dimensional space (continuants) and entities in four-dimensional space, i.e., in 
space and time (occurrents). In biomedicine, this is like the difference between a 
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three-dimensional anatomical object such as the heart (a continuant), and the 
physiological functioning of the heart to pump blood (an occurrent). In a sense, 
continuants and occurrents represent two different ways of viewing the same 
objects (Robinson and Bauer 2011). To put it differently, while a continuant is 
conceivable as a snapshot of the world (e.g., an image of the liver), an occurrent 
is more like a movie view of reality (e.g., a video of the hepatic activity). 
Philosophically speaking, BFO is definitely based on a sort of Aristotelian 
framework. Thus it distinguishes between general classes or types, called 
precisely universals, and particular instances of those classes, named particulars. 
The Aristotelian stance is also embedded in the peculiar understanding of 
scientific research adopted by BFO. Following Aristotle’s argument that “there is 
no science of the individual as such” (Met. XIII, 10, 1086 b, 33) and nevertheless 
“our knowledge of the individual precedes our knowledge of the universal” (Nic. 
Eth. VI, ii, 1143 b, 5), such ontologies are constructed by adopting the view that 
scientific efforts deal with individual phenomena in order to construct 
hypotheses, claims, and theories about universal classes. In other words, let us 
consider a lab investigating how, a protein or a family of proteins of interest (as 
the Cyclin family proteins) play a role in a biological process (e.g. cell cycle) in a 
particular organism (e.g. Saccharomyces cerevisiae). Surely the lab would not 
examine all the yeast cells in the world but only a certain number of them (i.e. 
instances or particulars). Nevertheless, the conclusion of that research is that 
Cyclins are involved in cell cycle in yeast. Neither just this particular cell nor 
those cells are considered. Scientific ontologies represent universals. The 
philosopher of science understands pretty well how this view does not require a 
strong ontological commitment. This is a way of representing knowledge. A way 
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that must be effective and useful. Again, computational ontologies are not a 
proposed solution to metaphysical problems.  
Finally, these categories must be connected. BFO display different kinds of 
formal relations, affecting both particulars and universals. Terms in 
computational ontologies normally refer to universals but in some situations 
certain relations regard particulars. The is_a relation denotes a relation between 
universals. For example, “the cofactor transporter activity is_a transporter 
activity” (Robinson and Bauer 2011, p 144 ). Instead the relation instance_of 
denotes a relation between a particular and a universal. For instance this yeast 
cell instance_of yeast. Finally the part_of relation stands for a relation between 
two particulars as this nucleus part_of this cell.  
BFO is not necessary the unique ground on which one could built domain 
ontologies as bio-ontologies. However it provides a very well example of how 
such ground could be constructed. As in any encyclopaedic and classificatory 
effort, the construction of a common, shared, language is considered the first 
condition to be satisfied in order to achieve any progress. Again, history of ideas 
taught us how any effort of building a complete encyclopaedia is doomed to 
failure for its very constitution. However, as already said, contrary to 
philosophical ideals and intellectual agendas such as the Characteristica 
Universalis of Leibniz or the more recent research enterprise concerning the 
foundation of mathematics instructed by Frege and Russell, the theoretical 
horizon of computational ontologies is to fulfil a very specific pragmatic 
purpose.  
Accordingly, especially within the life sciences, in recent years many efforts 
have been made to build a common platform of such a kind. The Open 
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Biomedical Ontology consortium (OBO) has been created precisely to 
implement a common ground for the proliferation of different biomedical 
ontologies. This necessity is critical not only as the sources of biological 
information (databases) are different, differently constructed and displayed, but 
also because their ontological representation is also diverse, concerning distinct 
research needs and levels of granularity. “In 2001, Ashburner and Lewis initiated 
a strategy to address this object level question by creating OBO, an umbrella 
body for the developers of life-science ontologies. OBO applies the key 
principles underlying the success of the GO, namely, that ontologies be open, 
orthogonal, instantiated in a well-specified syntax and designed to share a 
common space of identifiers” (Smith et al. 2007). OBO consists of many 
different ontologies, and is both technically and financially sponsored by the 
NIH Roadmap National Centre for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO). OBO 
provides also a common formal structure. OBO file format is “an ontology 
representation language. The concepts it models represent a subset of the 
concepts in the OWL description logic language, with several extensions for 
meta-data modelling and the modelling of concepts that are not supported in DL 
languages” (http://oboformat.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/doc/GO.format.obo-
1_2.html). Moreover, the rapid increase of “ontological work” in the life sciences 
does not exhaust itself in the production of such a common ground. More 
actively, besides OBO platform, some ontology developers have started to 
assemble OBO Foundry, “a collaborative experiment based on the voluntary 
acceptance by its participants of an evolving set of principles (available at 
http://obofoundry.org) that extend those of the original OBO by requiring in 
addition that ontologies (i) be developed in a collaborative effort, (ii) use 
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common relations that are unambiguously defined, (iii) provide procedures for 
user feedback and for identifying successive versions and (iv) have a clearly 
bounded subject-matter (Smith et al. 2007). OBO Foundry displays ontologies 
dedicated to different aspects of biological research, also cutting reality at 
diverse levels. Beside GO (on which I will spend more time later in this chapter), 
there is OBI (Ontology for Biological Investigation) which models the 
experimental design, research protocols, materials and methodologies, data used 
and the kind of analyses operated, CHEBI (Chemical Entities of Biological 
Interest) which is a standardised and unified classification of chemical substance 
of biological relevance or PATO (Phenotypic Quality Ontology), which is 
devoted to connect other ontologies (e.g. those coming from GO) to phenotypes 
represented as qualities/properties. 
 
GO: an orienteering tool for biomedical research 
Gene Ontology is probably the most famous ontological initiative developed 
for biological research. Gene Ontology aims to provide a standardized 
representation of gene products’ features across different species and databases. 
GO actually covers three domain ontologies which are called Cellular 
Component (the parts of a cell of its extracellular environment), Molecular 
Function (the basic activities of a gene product) and Biological Process (the set 
of molecular events characterized by clear beginning and end).  
GO terms describe gene product characteristics in a single, computationally 
controlled way, in order to provide a common format. Each GO term (Fig.1) has 
a specific name which designates it and which can be a single word or an 
expression (e.g. apoptotic process), a unique alphanumeric identifier (e.g. 
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GO:0006915), a definition (see the note14) with references, and the ontological 
dependence that indicates the domain to which it belongs to (e.g. Biological 
Process). 
 
Fig.1 (taken by QuickGO) 
 
Each GO term has then a set of defined relationships (e.g. is_a, part_of, or 
positvely_regulates etc.) towards one or more terms in the same domain, and 
sometimes in other domains. The GO terminology is designed to be species-
neutral, in order to be exploitable from prokaryotes to eukaryotes and from single 
to multi-cellular organisms. 
GO annotation is “the practice of capturing the activities and localization of 
a gene product with GO terms and it provides references and indicates what kind 
of evidence is available to support it” (GO website - 
http://www.geneontology.org/). Annotations are created on the basis of 
observations of the individual occurrences (i.e. the instances) of the type under 
examination. Hidden in this scientific and technical presentation, the philosopher 
may recognise the Aristotelian mark of such an endeavour. Indeed, while GO 
                                                
14 “A programmed cell death process which begins when a cell receives an internal (e.g. 
DNA damage) or external signal (e.g. an extracellular death ligand), and proceeds 
through a series of biochemical events (signaling pathways) which typically lead to 
rounding-up of the cell, retraction of pseudopodes, reduction of cellular volume 
(pyknosis), chromatin condensation, nuclear fragmentation (karyorrhexis), plasma 
membrane blebbing and fragmentation of the cell into apoptotic bodies. The process 
ends when the cell has died. The process is divided into a signalling pathway phase, and 
an execution phase, which is triggered by the former” 
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terms stand for types, GO annotations are singular evidences (obtained through 
experimental observations) that instantiate the term of relevance. Here lies the 
Aristotelian legacy. Knowledge, biological knowledge, belongs to universals. 
However it is possible to get to the universal through the particular. GO 
annotations display the gene product (e.g. PB1-F2 protein), the relevant GO 
terms involved (e.g. apoptotic process), the reference which provides ground for 
such an annotation (e.g. the Gene Ontology Database references), the type of 
scientific evidence that supports the annotation (e.g. Inferred from Electronic 
Annotation) and finally the author and the date of the annotation itself.  
It is clear that the choice of the three domains is also motivated by reasons of 
convenience. In other words, since GO is meant to provide a semantic 
representation of knowledge in use for molecular biology, the conceptual 
framework adopted clearly refers to the way molecular biologists pursue their 
experimental work, display their information and conceive explanations. This 
illustrates why GO is built to present terms and annotations according to a 
mechanistic description of molecular events. Indeed GO is a technical tool, not a 
metaphysical device. Its application reveals the reason behind the terminological 
choice. However such a choice, given the scope and the hope for generality of 
GO, cannot be grounded just on logical consistency and empirical adequacy. 
Being a tool of knowledge-capture and representation, GO terms must satisfy the 
needs and the desiderata of the scientific community. Accordingly, the process of 
curation is the production of annotations on the basis of findings retrieved from 
experimental work. Thus, since the activity of curation requires a deep scrutiny 
of the relevant literature, it is important (no less than obvious) that curators 
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possess a robust expertise in the related field. Normally, annotations are created 
through a procedure that requires several steps.  
The primary aim of GO annotation is to create annotations based on findings 
obtained from experiments on related organisms. However information coming 
from different model organisms or by sources other than experiments (as 
sequence information in the genome browser) is also taken into account. The 
annotation file provides thus a way to discriminate the sources of annotation and 
to filter out what is not considered important by the researcher. As in a map, the 
single scientist can highlight this or that feature, remove or add elements, in 
order to orientate himself/herself in the topic.  
The second step consists in linking the information captured by the 
annotation within the appropriate term. Some factors should be taken into 
account. Indeed the kind of experiment itself shapes the nature of evidence that 
can be obtained and sets up the resolution and the quality of results. “For 
example, cell fractionation might localize molecules of a protein to the nucleus 
of a cell, but immunolocalization experiments might localize molecules of the 
same type of protein to the nucleolus of a cell. As a result, the same gene may 
have annotations to different terms in the same ontology because annotations are 
based on different experiments” (Hill et al. 2008, emphasis is mine). Last, but not 
least, annotation procedures are usually verified for their consistency. In doing 
so, both computational/logical tools and domain experts are involved. To further 
develop this aspect, it is possible to individuate distinct epistemic moments 
according to which annotations are created. First, information coming from 
scientific publications is captured, extracted and abstracted by annotators and 
then condensed into a unique semantic designation, according to the rules of 
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term composition and the consistency of GO. Thus, even if most annotations are 
manually operated, the process is reviewed both by GO curators and by 
automatic reasoners. Such a product must finally face the judgment of the 
scientific community i.e. the experts of the field. Obviously, the process of 
annotation is not a static given. Both GO terms and annotations are in constant 
evolution and growth since they map the current state of the research. GO 
updates its content according to scientific debates and it is even able to display 
the disagreement among experts (e.g. the NOT annotation). For example, the vast 
part of terms and annotations pertaining to the range of phenomena which 
include the death of a cell are undergoing a revision due to the very last scientific 
finding in the field (see for instance Kaczmarek, Vandenabeele, Krysko 2013; 
Christofferson and Yuan 2010 ).  
Gene Ontology then, is not dictating, in a purely top down fashion, which 
terms are right or not for the research, but it is rather mapping the current use of 
scientific vocabulary trying to standardize it. However such a feature shows why 
GO is also normative too. Indeed the standardization created through GO affects 
the way information in databases and other electronic resources is presented. By 
expanding the experimental context, ontologies allow not just the use but 
especially the re-use of the represented knowledge. Thus a new lab, in the 
definition of its standards and terminology, would not start from scratch, 
following arbitrary criteria, but it would rather rely on a body of knowledge 
which is the more and more organised and unified (I will come back on this point 
later in the study).  
The structure of GO terms and relations among them is also displayed 
graphically (see an example in Fig. 2) 
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Fig.2 (taken by QuickGO) 
 
This shows very well how GO is an epistemic map. A map of knowledge. 
Indeed each chart is highly interactive. Each term can be opened and further 
examined. Ancestors and children terms are thus shown along with related gene 
product annotations. All this information is literally mapped into a wider context. 
Therefore it is possible to navigate GO through its terms and relations, check the 
gene products involved in certain phenomena and link them with other area of 
research out of the given experimental context. Moreover GO is a live map. As 
already mentioned, the content of GO is not static but rather it tracks the changes 
and developments within the scientific community. Let us briefly consider a 
practical case. For a long time the term apoptosis has been considered a synonym 
of programmed cell death, opposed to necrosis which, in turn, referred to the 
death of a cell of accidental reasons. The idea  of programmed cell death has 
been formulated in the 60s and then further developed in the 70s and 80s when it 
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has been labelled as apoptosis, suggesting the presence of a regulated cell death 
process common to all cells usually dependent on a family of proteins known as 
caspases (Vandenabeele, Galluzzi, Vanden Berghe and Kroemer 2010) opposed 
to forms of cell death considered purely passive and contingent. Since the late 
80s new evidences indicated that also some necrotic phenomena should have 
been seen as regulated. In 2005, these new observations eventually led to the 
‘baptism’15 of a new term, necroptosis to designate a form of regulated necrotic 
cell death (ibid). Underlying molecular mechanisms of necroptosis are still under 
investigation but the more and more evidence suggest they are radically different 
to apoptotic ones. The consequences of these discoveries for and on GO are 
crucial. First, the terms programmed cell death and apoptosis can no longer be 
considered synonyms. According to the state of the art, the apoptotic process is a 
kind of programmed cell death. Thus the entire architecture (of the whole cell 
death section of GO) and relations among these terms and the related ones should 
be revised. Indeed, 120 terms circa were introduced, 18 terms became obsolete 
and 200 terms were modified to better represent current scientific knowledge. To 
give an idea, this meant an overall work (mostly manually conducted) on more 
than 7000 annotations. As a result, the term necroptosis, that in 2009 counted 
only 10 related annotations, scaled up to 298 annotations in 2014 (personal 
communication during my vising period at the EBI). 
Of course, such a revision process was not just a technical and automatic 
thing. GO curators had to update the status and the advancement of a particular 
biological knowledge by considering its impact on other areas of biological 
research. This means that the entire process involved several meetings, called 
                                                
15 just remember the Kripkean stance, see page 73 
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content meeting, between GO curators and leading experts in the field (in this 
case cell death), comparing their ideas and, accordingly, either 
promoting/proposing or hindering specific semantic solutions. 
This aspect shows how much GO depends on epistemic interactions between 
different ‘players’. Curators, annotators, computer scientists, researchers, field 
specialists (sometimes even philosophers) contribute all together, bringing their 
different point of view and expertise, to the maintenance and the development of 
the tool. Such a peculiarity is particularly evident when new terms are proposed 
or a revision of existing terms is required. During my visiting period at the EBI a 
researcher in the field of Dinoflagellata (a phylum of flagellate protists) asked for 
the introduction of the term sulcus that should stand for a particular cellular 
component: a cell surface furrow usually hosting one of the two flagella. Such a 
request promoted a debate within GO curators since the term sulcus already 
existed in GO for a completely different context16. Here the appeal to field 
experts can help only partially. As a matter of fact, despite the problem of 
consistency (the same term cannot mean two different things), GO curators have 
also been involved in discussions that, from an external point of view, could have 
seemed almost metaphysical. Indeed they asked to themselves, what a furrow 
precisely is and whether it could be defined as a type of hole or rather as a folded 
surface etc. Although in its purpose this work is purely descriptive, it should not 
surprise that some scholars (as Barry Smith) see this type of effort as a genuine 
ontological work as the GO developers would reveal true natural kinds. As 
already argued, I do not think that this is the case. Again, GO maps biological 
                                                
16 “The series of molecular signals generated as a consequence of a fibroblast growth 
factor-type receptor binding to one of its physiological ligands resulting in the formation 
of the lung bud along the lateral-esophageal sulcus” (QuickGO website) 
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knowledge and not supposed metaphysical categories about nature. In addition, 
GO does not map biological knowledge as such, but rather according to a formal 
structure that is certainly pragmatically convenient but there is not evidence that 
it refers to the ultimate essence of reality. Moreover GO three main ontologies 
are thought and constructed according to the most adopted type of explanation in 
molecular biology: mechanistic explanation. Because of this it should be clear 
that GO is definitely an epistemic tool.  
Of course, despite Smith’s derogatory attitude about epistemology, being 
epistemic does not mean less objective neither less important for science (even in 
its practice). On the contrary, the clarification on what epistemic ground GO 
provides its analysis could contribute, not just to the understanding of GO, but 
also to a better use of it. Indeed, once the nature of GO terms and annotations is 
more clearly specified, scientists would consider GO and its potential in a more 
proficuous way, and they would avoid behaviours that could led them to several 
biases. First of all, since GO is a map of what is already known, it is not, per se, 
a discovery tool. However GO creates the conditions to make discoveries. 
Let us consider one of the most common operation available with GO: the 
enrichment analysis. This type of investigation may allow scientists to map and 
evaluate possible scenarios given specific experimental conditions. For instance 
for “a set of genes that are up-regulated under certain conditions, an enrichment 
analysis will find which GO terms are over-represented (or under-represented) 
using annotations for that gene set” (http://geneontology.org). By doing this, 
researchers can characterise that set of genes under a common functional profile, 
revealing important features of the underlying biological phenomenon. The 
output of such an analysis is then an ordered list of GO terms, with the related p-
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value. For example, due to high-throughput analysis, it is now possible to 
compare the gene expression profiles of an healthy tissue with the cancerous one. 
By examining the semantic discrepancies resulting from the analysis it is 
possible to furnish indications about the differences on the hidden biological 
mechanisms. This kind of work can also be done pursuing different research 
strategies. On the one hand it is possible to check which terms are significant in a 
particular set of genes or the other way round, that is to check if a biological 
phenomenon (such as apoptosis) is over-represented (or under-represented) in a 
particular set of genes. Several tools (such as DAVID, Panther, Ontologizer, 
Onto-Express) have been developed to perform this type of investigation 
deploying different statistical methods and different databases sources. This 
means that researchers should ideally perform different functional profiling 
adopting different tools before interpreting their experimental results. Thus, GO 
does not provide any, stricto sensu, discovery since a map cannot show what is 
not mapped. However a map can let the interpreter to observe connections that 
are invisible without the map itself. This is exactly what GO can do. 
Another kind of common analysis with GO consists in the prediction of 
putative gene function. “Typical approaches tend to be variations of the same 
theme: genes are grouped together on the basis of some criteria such as similar 
gene expression or through a protein–protein interaction network. Enrichment of 
GO terms is detected by methods such as those described above, and the 
uncharacterized genes are presumed to be involved in the same biological 
processes as the genes with which they are grouped” (Rhee, Wood, Dolinski and 
Draghici 2008). It is clear that such an operation pays close attention. By 
propagating a gene function just on the basis of annotations that are neither 
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manually verified nor experimentally validated can lead to many false positives. 
On the other side “[g]ene functions can also be inferred from GO annotations 
without the need for a prior gene grouping, for instance, on the basis of a 
semantic analysis of the gene function association matrix. This type of analysis 
relies on capturing the implicit dependencies that might be present between 
genes” (ibid). On this aspect some scholars (Noble 2008) have raised some 
critical points about the power and the limits of GO, by claiming that describing 
biological phenomena just in terms of their related, involved, gene products will 
miss the higher-level insight. In order to answer to this issue, many new projects 
in this field are devoted to the development of other ontologies, integrated with 
GO, but concerning different aspects and levels/granularities of biological 
phenomena.  
To sum up, although GO is an extremely powerful tool, scientists who use it 
should be aware its features, paying attention to the nature of annotations and to 
the distinction between annotations and terms. All I have described, I believe that 
points very much to the fact that GO is concerned with the epistemic side. Again, 
by this, one should not deduce that GO does not speak about the real world. 
Moreover I think that scientists are not very much interested in that philosophical 
position known as scientific realism. Pragmatically, they usually behave towards 
the entities they deal with, by following Hacking’s claim (although probably 
unaware of it) that “if you can spray them, then they are real” (Hacking 1983, p 
23). In this sense it is also possible to appreciate how and why a tool like GO is 
objective. Peter Galison and Lorraine Daston have nicely shown that objectivity 
itself has a history (Daston and Galison 2007). Contrary to naïve intuitions, 
different periods of scientific development involved distinct notions of 
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objectivity. One form, particularly relevant for maps, is the so called truth to 
nature meaning that some images and representations were thought as the 
“closest rendering of what truly is” (Daston and Galison 1992, p 84). Indeed 
maps, atlases and databases fostered a particular idea of objectivity as they are 
able to perform a standardisation of the objects observed (through the common, 
relational, representation rules) and the subjects observing (via the common 
interpretation guidelines). Standardising means in fact selecting the working 
objects of scientific inquiry opposed to the unbearable variety of natural ones. 
For example, the anatomic atlases of the 18th and 19th Century are highly based 
on standardisation. Moreover such maps display their objects as typological. 
Indeed, these atlases show, for instance, “this typical liver rather than one with 
hepatitis” (Daston and Galison 1992, p 85). Standardisation and mapping activity 
must be taken together. As recently shown by Müller-Wille (forthcoming), when 
the great Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen started to use statistical methods in 
order to understand the mechanism of inheritance by mapping different 
phenotypes, he struggled a lot with the intrinsic variety of plants that rendered 
those samples unable to be properly treated from a statistical point of view. One 
of the first steps Johannsen adopted was precisely the ‘purification’ of the 
samples by creating ‘pure lines’, or varieties showing stereotypical features. 
Indeed maps allow comparison of data by displaying typical phenomena. 
Ontologists would say that maps deal with universals.  
 
GO. From description to normativity 
However there is definitely more. A tool like GO is a map of knowledge but 
it is also a way to standardise practices. Accordingly, GO presents a form of 
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objectivity that, following Alberto Cambrosio’s suggestions (Cambrosio, 
Keating, Schlich and Weisz 2006), can be called regulatory objectivity. This kind 
of objectivity “is based on the systematic recourse to the collective production of 
evidence. Unlike forms of objectivity that emerged in earlier eras, regulatory 
objectivity consistently results in the production of conventions, […] most often 
arrived at through concerted programs of actions” (Cambrosio, Keating, Schlich 
and Weisz 2006, p 189). As I have previously shown, both GO structure and its 
practical choices, heavily rely on collective concerted actions among different 
‘players’ such as database curators, biologists, other researchers, computer 
scientists etc. A map at first glance, is a standardised representation of different 
elements under a shared, common framework. Standardisation implies also 
agreed conventions both in the construction and in the interpretation of what is 
represented. In this sense a simple description might become a norm.  
It might be useful to use an metaphorical image to explain this epistemic 
passage from descriptive efforts to normative ones. In the field of western 
jurisprudence, it is possible to individuate two main legal systems that have been 
developed differently. These two systems, known as civil law and common law 
are primary distinguishable because of their different historical genesis, thus 
affecting the countries in which they are applied, and then because they embed 
different conceptions concerning the nature of jurisprudence itself and thus the 
nature of what a norm is. Civil law, preponderant in all European countries (with 
the exception of the UK) is rationalised in the framework of the ancient Roman 
law system, further developed by the code of Justinian and finally systematised 
by the Napoleonic code and the German BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). 
Accordingly, civil law is based on the written codification of general norms and 
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principles that constitute the primary source of law. Such systematic collections 
of principle, inform both citizens about the behaviour they should have and 
judges/magistrates on how interpret the law itself. Therefore, civil law 
establishes and explain, from above, principles, rights and duties and how the 
legal system works. Civil law founds and unifies jurisprudence by acting as a 
sort of a top down theoretical framework, thus determining what is consistent 
with its principles and norms, and rejecting what is contrary to it.  
Common law is instead the system adopted by the UK and by most of the 
actual and former colonies/possessions of the British Empire. Common law has 
its raison d’être on precedents, praxis and routines of conduct rather than formal 
codifications of norms and principles. Common law is then systematising and 
ordering the customary practices in a more general and coherent form. Thus 
common law founds and unifies the law not by dictating an overarching structure 
from above, but rather by conforming and standardising the practice in a 
consistent way. 
Bearing in mind this distinction, I would argue that the way GO performs its 
unification power, is closer, metaphorically speaking, to common law than to 
civil law. GO is unifying biological knowledge in a novel way that is different 
from theoretical unification but nevertheless practically useful and robust. 
Indeed, as the UK is a solid democracy without having a proper constitution, 
biology can be unified, in this sense, without having a general overarching 
theory. Indeed, as I have argued in the previous chapter, bio-ontologies were 
created with the precise idea that they could provide a unifying framework for 
the fragmented and variegated status of biological knowledge. In doing so, I have 
also shown that the epistemic strategy is to build a standardised and 
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computationally control vocabulary to address biological notions rather than 
creating an encompassing theory. Thus, a semantic solution. However, one may 
claim that if bio-ontologies are employing the role of theory in biology, then bio-
ontologies are a sort of theory too although divergent from more traditional 
accounts. The problem seems not being pertaining to bio-ontologies, but rather to 
the, too narrow, views on what a theory is (or should be) in this type of contexts.  
 
What are GO categories 
Regarding this aspect some scholars (as Leonelli 2012) have  precisely 
argued that forms of classification can count, in some cases, as specific forms of 
theory. According to Leonelli when the practice of classification is deemed to 
provide a common, shared and formal representation of the very elements being 
classified, this might lead to a something theoretical that, rather than imposed 
from the top, emerges from the data collection itself. As also claimed for 
taxonomical work (Müller-Wille 2007), in biology the collection principles are 
often embedded in the practice itself rather than lowered from abstract theories, 
thus framing from the bottom, the way biological ‘facts’ and ‘objects’ will be 
considered as such. According to this perspective, the type of generalisation 
provided by that kind of classificatory theories provides “an ideal of unity that 
only aims to establish some kind of commonality between different phenomena, 
without necessarily embedding that commonality within an overarching 
conceptual structure” (Leonelli 2012). Leonelli’s reconstruction of ontologies 
unification power has definitely the merit to highlight how many scientific 
theories in the life sciences arose precisely from practice, thus broadening the 
very understanding of what may count as a theory. Since the role of such ways of 
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classification in shaping the research, by favouring the generation of new 
hypotheses and suggesting the type of experimental strategy, it should not be 
surprising to consider them a form of theory. 
However, given the novelty of these tools and their divergence with other 
classificatory practices, I would rather propose to frame the specificity of 
ontologies in different terms. Indeed, if something is so different from the 
stereotypical idea of a theory maybe it is wiser to adopt a different perspective or 
to elaborate a new epistemic category. Thus, starting from Leonelli’s endeavour, 
I go on by specifying how ontologies recall models in their architecture but 
remind theories in their behaviour. In order to do so, again is my focus is GO 
structure. By examining both the epistemic reasons for its implementation and 
the type of analysis provided by GO, I argue how such a tool resembles some 
features of a model but nevertheless constitutes something new in the 
epistemological scenario. Not entirely a theory, more than a model (however 
structurally similar to it), my point is that GO efforts constitute a novel category 
within the epistemic repertoire. Indeed, my central claim is the knowledge 
provided by GO, due to its regulatory objectivity, should be seen as a more or 
less effective tool through which we can discriminate, among an enormous 
amount of data, a convenient way of organising those empirical results which 
were at the basis of the GO analysis. In this perspective GO is a very peculiar 
map. A unique, sui generis instrument. An orienteering tool for biological 
research. Accordingly, such a specific status is better specified given that GO, as 
already argued, is both conventional, as the result of epistemic interactions 
towards a common agreement, and normative, since the tool shapes the 
representation of knowledge as it will be perceived by other, future researchers. 
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It is crucial then to specify first the features of such conventionalism and 
normativity. 
In his famous Science and Hypothesis, Poincaré discusses about the 
epistemic nature of Euclidean axioms17. Poincaré famously argued that axioms of 
geometry “are merely disguised definitions” (Poincaré 1902). Accordingly, their 
nature and validity should not be established in terms of their truth or falsity. 
Rather, geometrical axioms “are conventions; our choice among all possible 
conventions is guided by experimental facts; but it remains free and is limited 
only by the necessity of avoiding all contradiction” (Poincaré 1902). Such a 
conventionalist position has an important consequence on the way we interpret 
representation. Thus scientific terminology does not semantically represent a 
state of affairs by mirroring a supposed metaphysical structure into a unifying 
definition. Science might have hidden ontological commitments but it is not 
directly interested in dealing with metaphysics. On the contrary, following van 
Fraassen (1980, 2008) I think that scientific terms aim to grasp and ordinate the 
sensible experience into a form that accounts for the empirical content but allows 
effective predictions and consistent explanations. That is to say that the language 
we adopt in science must be empirically adequate but it does not necessarily 
require a clear specification of a commitment on its truth. Such a perspective is 
definitively pragmatic and the debate on the nature of axioms in mathematics is 
certainly not over. However, I believe that this account of conventionalism works 
fine in our context. Indeed, moving to Gene Ontology, it is important to recall 
                                                
17 According to Kant, Greek geometry was ‘true’ and unique as constituting a privileged 
a priori form, shaping the sensible experience. However, the invention/discovery of 
non-Euclidean geometries had stimulated a heated debate about the truth of classical 
axioms. Thus the question was to clarify on what basis we should chose between a 
geometry and another one and which one is the ‘real one’ 
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again that such a tool has been developed to deal with knowledge management in 
the life sciences and not to solve metaphysical controversies on the nature of 
scientific categories (i.e. whether there are natural kind of not). Accordingly, I 
argue that the knowledge provided by Gene Ontology should not be evaluated in 
simply terms of its truth or falsity but rather as more or less effective tool 
through which scientists and researchers can discriminate, among an enormous 
amount of data, a convenient way of organising those empirical results which 
were at the basis of the GO representational analysis.  
The view that GO is an orienteering tool means that it is an instrument 
through which scientist can map their data on a wider context and then, thanks to 
this, elaborate new experimental strategies. GO is truly a map for making the 
conceptual content of a particular experimental condition comparable across 
different research contexts. Such a map is essential not as a way to confirm 
experimental results but as a way to compare experimental results with the 
theoretical background (the so called ‘big picture’). However the possibility of 
such a generalisation beyond the locality of data production does not create, per 
se, a unification for the theoretical content. Now, given that GO is a unification 
of “dis-unified fragmented research about a large variety of objects” (Leonelli 
2012) it is important to clarify how exactly GO pursues such a task. Sabina 
Leonelli also claims that the generalisation provided by a tool like GO does not 
aim to universality but rather “only aims to establish some kind of commonality 
between different phenomena, without necessarily embedding that commonality 
within an overarching conceptual structure” (Leonelli 2012). Therefore GO 
unification power would be reductive (following Morrison 2007) and not 
synthetic. This is right if we attribute to synthesis a strong meaning (a là Hegel) 
 98 
as the system arising from shattered parts and the resolution of a diversity at the 
same time.  On the contrary, by adopting a different account, I will argue that 
GO provides indeed a synthesis. Let us see how. 
By following Hacking (1983) natural phenomena are deeply related to the 
experimental dimension. Phenomena are not waiting for scientists to be 
discovered. It is the active enterprise of experimentation that generates the 
conditions by which phenomena become evident. Indeed phenomena are 
observable only under those specific conditions. To put it differently, it is the 
experiment that “creates” the phenomena. Such a claim must not be intended in 
an idealistic fashion but rather the opposite. In other words, phenomena are 
fragments of our understanding of nature and “in nature there is just complexity, 
which we are remarkably able to analyse. We do so […] by presenting, in the 
laboratory, pure, isolated phenomena” (Hacking 1983). Biology is particularly 
complex and very often experiments in biology do not point to general 
phenomena, but they rather isolate aspects of phenomena, due to the locality of 
biological data. Thus, the peculiar epistemic status of biology makes the 
recomposition of such a fragmented picture pretty hard. I suggest that GO fulfils 
this scope in a particular way. Indeed, unlike scientific theories, GO does not 
unify supposed (and still lacking) general biological principles but rather 
biological knowledge by creating a bridge among different perspectives. By that 
I link my argument to what Lorraine Daston (Daston 1992) calls aperspectival 
objectivity. According to Daston such an idea of objectivity started to be 
affirmed in the late 19th Century as the type of scientific objectivity par 
excellence. This notion of objectivity was conceived as opposed to subjective 
idiosyncrasies and interpretations that might occur in scientists’ mind. Thus, in 
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this context, ‘aperspectival’ means precisely an absolute point of view, or as 
famously Thomas Nagel argued, “a view from nowhere” (Nagel 1989). As 
Daston writes “[a]perspectival objectivity was the ethos of the interchangeable 
and therefore featureless observer - unmarked by nationality, by sensory dullness 
or acuity, by training or tradition; by quirky apparatus, by colourful writing style, 
or by any other idiosyncrasy that might interfere with the communication, 
comparison and accumulation of results” (Daston 1992). My argument rests 
precisely on the idea that experiments are, on the contrary, always perspectival in 
an epistemological sense. By that I mean that, although methodologically 
exemplary, experiments reveal aspects of the world. There is no natural science 
of the ‘absolute’. I try to clarify myself by an analogy with visual perception. In 
cognitive understanding, and more importantly, in pictorial representations as 
paintings, objects are always given to perception according to a particular 
perspective. I do not perceive the book on my table in its wholeness. Cognitive 
knowledge always presents perspectives. Within the lab, the model, the 
experimental setting, material and methods are the counterpart of visual 
perspectives. As I recognize the book on my table as a whole through the 
composition of different points of view, also the knowledge about biological 
phenomena derives from many different experiments. The phenomenon is then 
the idealised recomposition of these perspectives. Let us consider a simplified 
example. A type of experimental research is aimed at determining the 
transcription factors binding site within a specific cell type (e.g. macrophages), 
in specific conditions (e.g. after LPS stimulus). A second experimental strategy 
might analyse the same conditions but with an eye on chromatin structure. A 
third experimental team would do the same but it would change some conditions 
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as the cell model or the type of stimuli. A fourth approach would ignore the 
expression profiles and will focus on some functional products associated with 
those genes (e.g. proteins) trying to determine their structure. In the end, a fifth 
lab may be interested in a proteomic analysis of those functional products. All 
these approaches are pointing at biological phenomena but they could not grasp 
them in their entirety. This, again, does not conflict with the idea of a possible 
objective knowledge. Indeed, such a picture fits well with the conception of 
scientific endeavour invoked by the so-called scientific perspectivism. 
“Overlapping perspectives, whether observational or theoretical, suggest that 
there is ‘something’ there” (Callebaut 2012, p 76). However  knowledge is 
precisely the interplay between different perspectives rather than the absence of a 
perspective. Experimental results are thus perspectival representations on 
phenomena. These perspectives represent precise directional understanding 
about more general phenomena. Data coming from these experiments are then 
more abstracted and crystallised via models. An example of this kind of model 
could be the scheme of particular molecular pathway or the sketch of a proposed 
mechanism of action of a protein. As coming from different sources these data 
are dispersed in the fabric of knowledge. A map can help to locate them. This 
what GO can actually do. As a cubist painting, ontologies are ‘synthesising’ 
models of data into meta-models about more general phenomena. Yet, unlike 
cubism, such a synthesis must not be intended as a mere composition of 
perspectives. Indeed, one might see the notion of synthesis as the conflation of 
different aspects into something new that resembles all of them. If this is the 
case, GO would create the view from nowhere. However, in this case GO would 
not fulfil its purpose, that is to make possible to situate and retrieve the 
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information and the knowledge displayed in the big picture within the original 
context. Such a confusion can depend on the account of synthesis we adopt. That 
is why such a synthesis should not be understood in a simplistic way. The kind of 
unification provided by ontologies does built neither an absolute nor a privileged 
vision as it were a view from nowhere or from God’s eye. The integration 
granted by ontologies is neither grasping nor highlighting any supposed, essence 
of biological phenomena. Ontologies are then a unification tool in the sense that 
they construct a grammar of translation, a dictionary, according to which 
scientists can pass through the ‘different languages’ by which biological 
phenomena are given to our knowledge. In other words, ontologies are not 
conflating different perspectives into a new, single, unified and complete point of 
view. They rather provide a common, semantic framework on which diverse 
epistemic contents can be compared to each other into the whole fabric of 
biological knowledge. Thus Leonelli is definitely right when she claims that GO 
generalisations are not an overarching synthesis. However here lies the core of 
the question. I think that Leonelli’s position, and her rejection of the idea that 
ontologies can provide a synthesis, is imputable to the image according to which 
principle guiding bio-ontologies are thought. Indeed, as I have shown, in 
constructing ontologies, many computer scientists based their formal work on the 
analytic framework based on a particular way of thinking that has been derived 
from the interpretation of Aristotle’s work (Smith 2007, Smith and Ceusters 
2010) meaning that most of current bio-ontologies are built on, or at least 
inspired by, an upper-level ontology called BFO (Smith 1998, Smith and 
Ceusters 2010)18. While such a structure can work perfectly fine within an 
                                                
18 Just to recall, BFO is “designed for use in supporting information retrieval, analysis 
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internal viewpoint, (i.e. the research procedures and practical uses of bio-
ontologies) in the light of a more refined epistemic analysis many problems arise.  
In particular, it is fundamental to clarify in what sense a term in GO aims to 
provide a general form (the semantic definition) unifying different perspectives 
about a phenomenon. In other words, since behind any GO term there is a related 
concept, notion, piece of biological knowledge represented and condensed by 
that term, the question is to furnish an analysis of such concept formation 
happens. In doing so, I briefly recall the classic theory of concept formation 
(elaborated by Aristotle and his followers) and then its critique developed by 
Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 1910). Then I present a view according to which GO 
terms should not be based on the classical theory. Last, I apply such a different 
approach to GO terms showing how this better mirrors the use of GO in the 
practice of science. 
In his theory of concept formation Aristotle does not specify a clear 
difference between the object and the concept which is, in an epistemic setting, 
fundamental. But more importantly, according to the Greek philosopher 
“defining a term means giving the essence of what it refers to, that is, it means 
giving the ‘what it is’, or determining the species to which what is referred 
belongs. For to define a term is sufficient to determine the proximal genus and 
the specific difference which distinguishes that species from the other species of 
the same genus. While the genus determines the essence in an undetermined 
way, the difference focalizes the essence by indicating the species” (Boniolo 
                                                                                                                                        
and integration in scientific and other domains. As mentioned before, BFO is an upper 
level ontology. Thus it does not contain physical, chemical, biological or other terms 
which would properly fall within the coverage domains of the special sciences. As 
already shown, BFO is framed into a sort of a simplified Aristotelian scheme, in which 
information content is fundamentally described in terms of substances which possess 
properties or accidents (Smith 1998). 
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2007, italics is mine). Therefore, following Cassirer, for Aristotle the 
individuation of a shared commonality is pursued via abstraction. What makes a 
horse as such, so what all horses have in common, is identified by abstracting the 
form from the accidental properties of single occurrences. According to 
Cassirer’s analysis, the theory of Aristotle must be rejected since it represents 
concepts as containers. On the contrary Cassirer argues that, “the concept should 
no longer be understood as a class containing objects, but as a representation 
unifying given objects in a given way by giving them […] significance. 
Consequently the form of a concept has a fundamental and primary role: to rule 
the intellectual synthesis” (Boniolo 2007). Cassirer’s view is notoriously 
embedded in Kantian tradition. Kant nowadays is a bit ‘out of date’ in 
philosophy of science. Nevertheless his Copernican Revolution reminds us the 
importance of the distinction between ontology and epistemology. A cornerstone 
after which, as philosophers, we should not go back to. Thus, it is not sufficient 
just to observe in order to grasp similarities among natural phenomena. It is 
rather the way by which scientists deal with the objects of their interest, that 
builds such a similarity. 
Let us shift from theoretical rarefaction to a more concrete situation as bio-
ontologies. If we examine any GO term, we could appreciate that they are not 
construed by the mere accumulation of data. The semantic synthesis of 
experimental evidences pursued by GO is a practice that requires the term being 
regulating the future use of the term itself.  Following a Kantian vocabulary, in 
our case of interest, the GO term provides the ‘unity of rules’ for the use of the 
term itself. An important difference with Kant and Cassirer here, lies in the fact 
that the level of such an operation is not just the single epistemic agent but the 
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entire scientific community.  
Giovanni Boniolo has already explored such issues in relation to the 
semantic of standard scientific terminology. “What does possessing a rule mean? 
Nothing but knowing how to apply it and, […] knowing what satisfies it. […] In 
other words, grasping the rule means grasping the concept, more precisely its 
sense” (Boniolo 2007). Following Boniolo’s analysis, I define with 
semanticizing area the set of rule required in order to form a concept. In this 
perspective, the semantic sense of a concept is not something inherent to the 
concept itself but rather to the ways according to which such a concept has been 
synthesized.  I already described that the main aim of GO is to build a unified 
vocabulary for scientific terminology within molecular biology. However, as also 
already shown, a great issue in achieving such a task is the semantic divergence 
among scientists that reflects the differences (aims, model organisms, 
methodologies) present in diverse fields and subfields of the research.  Thus, one 
may interpret GO as a way to systematise, in an ordered manner, the diverse 
semanticizing areas which contribute to grasp the meaning of interested, relevant 
phenomena. By adopting such a view I argue that the presence of semantic 
fluctuations in GO terms, due the advance of scientific research, are explicable as 
variations of the semanticizing areas concerning those specific phenomena under 
investigation. 
To sum up in this chapter I tried to show how and why a tool like GO is a 
kind of epistemic map, an orienteering tool for biomedical research. Moreover I 
also presented an argument to clarify how GO would unify biological knowledge 
and what is the meaning of such a unification. 
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Now it is time to look at the real practice. In the next chapter I will examine 
several specific scientific cases, such as a recent article published on Nature 
Genetics, that heavily relies on GO. 
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Doing science with GO and beyond 
In this chapter I will analyse how GO constitutes a driving force for 
contemporary biomedical research. In doing so, along with the brief examination 
of some cases, I will focus on a particular example, a recent article, “7q11.23 
dosage-dependent dysregulation in human pluripotent stem cells affects 
transcriptional programs in disease-relevant lineages” published on Nature 
Genetics (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015). The article provides an 
excellent, paradigmatic, case of how a tool like GO changed the practice of 
current scientific research in the life sciences. Indeed, in the paper, the 
experimental strategy, the methods and the rationale are all embedded in a map 
thinking framework. However there is more. Such an article really shows a 
peculiar and distinct, way of doing science. This way is not simply ascribable to 
naïve dichotomy between hypothesis-driven vs. data driven. It is rather a 
complex combination of the two, in which the knowledge coming from 
databases, exploited by a tool like GO, drives the other components of scientific 
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efforts by exchanging the epistemic primacy and priority of exploratory 
experiments with the navigation in the data sea. 
The aim of the article is ambitious. Summing up, its purpose is to increase 
the reliability of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) as models for diseases. 
iPSCs are a type of cells, undergone molecular reprogramming, presenting, bona 
fide, the features of embryonic stem cells. iPSCs constitute a promising and 
trendy sector of biomedical research since they challenged the idea that 
specialised cells are inescapably committed to their fate. In 1960s John Gurdon 
(Gurdon, 1962) has shown how somatic, differentiated cells could be turned back 
into their embryonic state by transferring nuclei of epithelial cells into enucleated 
eggs of a frog. Recently, Shinya Yamanaka (Takahashi and Yamanaka, 2006) 
has demonstrated that, without any nuclear transfer, he could reproduce 
Gurdon’s results by exposing differentiated cells to specific factors which 
eventually turned (i.e. reprogrammed) those committed cells back into their 
pluripotent state (i.e. iPSCs). Such a discovery granted the Nobel Prize in 2012 
to both of them, and opened the door to the implementation of iPSCs in many 
areas of biomedical research. One application is precisely disease modelling. The 
potential of such an approach is that iPSCs should allow a better analysis of the 
complex picture of pathogenic drives in a developmental context via molecular 
approaches. In other words iPSCs could shorten the gap between clinical and 
research contexts by permitting the track of the consequences of genetic 
alterations through the cell development thus providing hints of clinical 
relevance. In order to exploit such a potential it is fundamental to provide an 
answer to, at least, two problems. On the one hand it is central to determine how 
much genetic alterations, in early developmental phases, are indicative over 
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related pathological conditions and their molecular pathways (i.e. to observe the 
onset of the disease in a preclinical phase otherwise not detectable). On the other 
hand it is crucial to establish how much iPSCs modelling is apt to identify these 
pathways. Moreover, this approach to disease modelling could, in theory, 
provide suggestions on relevant molecular mechanisms from the point of view of 
future therapeutic implementations.   
The authors of the article addressed then these issues by investigating two 
related genetic syndromes produced “by symmetrical copy number variations 
(CNVs) at 7q11.2319  involving, respectively, the loss and gain of 26-28 genes: 
Williams-Beuren syndrome (WBS) and Williams-Beuren region duplication 
syndrome […] that includes autistic spectrum disorder (7dupASD)” (Adamo, 
Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, p132). The main idea is that, thanks to iPSCs 
modelling, it would be possible to scrutinise such a biological symmetry (let us 
consider that genomic inverted alterations are mirrored by specular, behavioural 
phenotypes) starting from the ‘origin’ or the stem like state. Thus, due to a 
collaboration with clinicians, researchers were able to have samples from a 
cohort of patients resulting in 4 different genotypes: the WSB typical deletion, 
WSB atypical deletion (a shorter one, in terms of base pairs, and less frequent), 
the control case and the 7dupASD duplication. Skin fibroblasts have been 
reprogrammed via synthetic mRNA encoding different pluripotent factors, thus 
developing a total of 27 iPSC lines. Successively, the pluripotent state of these 
cells has been confirmed through transcriptomic analysis20. Such a step is a 
further confirmation of the standardising power of databases for research. 
Indeed, the pluripotent state has been determined as such since the transcriptomic 
                                                
19 a genomic region on human chromosome 7 
20 and also by IF (immunofluorescence) of pluripotent factors 
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profile has been compared and matched with published datasets. RNA-seq 
(roughly, the sequence of the transcription) and Nanostring quantification 
(another methodology to assess gene expression) also confirmed that gene 
expression mirrored gene dosage and, again via database consultation, scientists 
were able to verify that two proteins, GTF2I and BAZ1B, are “encoded by genes 
associated with key traits of WBS and 7dupASD” (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain 
et al. 2015, p133). In particular, GTF2I protein level correlates with gene dosage. 
Next, differential expression analysis between distinct genotypes has been 
conducted by RNA-seq profiling of iPSCs, then comparing the results against 
some control cell lines. This is again through the use of databases, that provided 
the reference context on which to give sense to experimental results. A pairwise 
comparison of the three genotypes (Williams-Beuren syndrome vs. Control 
Group, Williams-Beuren syndrome vs. 7dupASD and 7dupASD vs. Control 
Group) revealed 757 differentially expressed genes (DEGs). Finally, a GO term 
enrichment analysis of the union of DEGs has been performed. 
At this stage Gene Ontology comes explicitly into play. However, I believe 
that GO rationale has driven much part of the experimental design and has highly 
influenced the earlier steps of such a research study. In other words my argument 
is that GO is at the basis of the main heuristic strategy of the entire study. In 
order to justify my claim, before discussing the use of GO and its results, I will 
go back to the previous phases of the experimental strategy in order to detect and 
unveil the role of GO. 
Above all, there is the combined use of iPSCs and Gene Ontology. As 
already mentioned, iPSCs constitute an excellent surrogate of embryonic stem 
cells in terms of pluripotency and stem like features. Indeed, whereas the process 
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of reprogramming had been conducted effectively, it would be virtually 
impossible to distinguish iPSCs from ESCs (embryonic stem cells). Pluripotency 
is defined as the capacity of a cell to differentiate itself into any other cell of an 
organism (see for instance the Oxford Dictionary of Biology, 6th Ed., 2008). At a 
molecular level, cell types are determined by peculiar gene network interactions. 
Being pluripotent means thus that a cell shows a particular molecular signature 
established by the modality of genes’ activity. Indeed, since the genome of any 
cell of an organism is almost the same (there are some exceptions, but it is not 
fundamental to discuss this point here), the differences among cell types and 
states should be mainly attributed to the way genes are differentially expressed 
and regulated. Thus the pluripotent state (as any other cell state) is essentially 
related to epigenetics, or how different parts of the genome are alternatively 
transcribed, silenced and modulated. 
In the case discussed here, the creation of iPSCs lines from patients affected 
by WBS and 7dupASD syndromes, can potentially allow scientists to obtain 
specific cell types (such as neurons) for further experiments. More than a quip, 
this could mean that it would be possible, in theory, to have a “brain in a dish” 
(see for instance Shen 2013). However, the authors of the article do not pursue 
that path (although it is possible that they will do in the future). Why is it so? 
First, the production of specific cell differentiated lines is not 
straightforward. Both reprogramming and transdifferentiation (the artificial 
induction of a somatic cell to commit itself to another cell state) are not an easy 
task to perform. Due to technical difficulties some cell types are either almost 
impossible to obtain or the efficiency of the procedure is so low that becomes 
useless (see for instance Hanna, Saha and Jaenisch 2010). Second, the materiality 
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of somatic cell lines does not ground, per se, a better explanatory framework. 
Indeed cell cultures do not constitute a reliable model in virtue of simple 
similarity. Moreover, given the complex nature of both syndromes, it would be 
very difficult to assess which neurons (among different types) will play a role, 
and how they do so, in the disease. In addition, it would also very troublesome to 
reproduce the material structure of relations of a brain, just through neuronal 
cultures.  However, as explained in the previous chapter, this does not prevent a 
thing such as a cell from being a good model. Every scientist is aware that a 
bunch of cells does not properly portray all the features the related tissue and 
organs. Still, as also shown in the previous chapter, this does not prevent a thing 
such as a cell from being a good model. But a good model for what? 
The choice to focus on iPSCs is motivated precisely because they can 
provide a better model, compared to cultures of differentiated cells, for 
developmental conditions, given the implementation of certain type of analysis. 
It is also, again, a matter of style. Indeed, the type of evidences obtained through 
empirical experimentation are epistemically different from those coming from 
computational approaches. Certainly, the material production of distinctive cell 
types (i.e. neurons) is not mutually exclusive with bioinformatics work. On the 
contrary, they are complementary. However different research strategies will 
prefer some kind of evidence over other types of it. In our example, the 
production of specific cell lines, with no other indication, could have been 
potentially uninformative. On the contrary, the adoption of a tool like GO, allows 
to global map a sort of ‘cell differentiation process in silico’, thus suggesting 
what to look at in further experiments. This is possible because of the 
combination of the features of iPSCs and ontologies. As already said, within 
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iPSCs there is all the potential of developing every cell of the organism. This 
means that iPSCs, given the genetic nature of the diseases taken into account, can 
contain, virtually and ab origo, all the relevant elements that could affect the 
molecular phenotype of interest (and hopingly suggesting therapeutic 
interventions in the clinical setting). On the other hand GO, being an updated, 
global map of biological knowledge, allows to compare local findings with those 
ones coming from other experimental settings and to situate them into a wider 
picture. GO permits then to computationally explore the space of possible 
relations of different cell lineages through the comparison of given samples 
against all the relevant data stored in databases. Therefore, the possibility granted 
by GO, shapes indeed the type of scientific strategy. A strategy that can be 
described as: first, making a map.  
Let us examine the reason why the construction of such a map is possible 
and probably, needed. First the kind of data. This type of science is heavily based 
on omics. Normally, transcriptional profiles show the global set of all RNA 
transcripts of a given genome (under specific conditions). However, their 
analysis affect cell populations rather than single cells. As a matter of fact, no 
cell behaves exactly as others, even if it is of the same type, in the same context. 
Uniqueness and intrinsic variation are indeed features of biological objects since 
19th Century natural history. This means that, by performing transcriptomic 
analysis, scientists normally privilege the understanding of the average behaviour 
rather than the detailed (hopefully mechanistic) description of single cell 
behaviour and its fluctuations and relation with the other cells21. Transcriptional 
                                                
21 Some researchers have argued the necessity to improve single cell analysis study. 
This is perfectly fine and compatible with what I said, as it will also respond to different 
epistemic desiderata. See again for instance Hanna, Saha and Jaenisch 2010. 
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profiles are indeed general, cell-group behavioural maps. Certainly a map of this 
kind misses something. Tiny differences will be neglected and ‘absorbed’ by the 
background. This is not a problem. As I said in the first chapter, a map as much 
detailed as the object it represents, is basically useless. Indeed, when the authors 
of the paper have identified 757 DEGs they did not care (for that moment) about 
how (i.e. which mechanism was responsible for it) these genes were differentially 
regulated (probably many genes are altered in different ways, one from another). 
Their concern was about where this distinct regulation happened. By that I mean 
that scientists have looked at the “number and distribution of DEGs across the 
comparison among the three genotypes” (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, 
p134, fig 2a) rather than looking at the mechanistic nature of such regulations. 
Thus, these finding are suitable precisely to build the kind of map in 
question. If iPSCs ‘contain’ the entire horizon of developmental possibility (in 
terms of different cell types) and their transcriptional behaviour suggests the 
directions of such a development, GO is then a map to navigate this 
computational horizon. And GO allows such a ‘virtual tour’, not by virtue of a 
direct and experimental examination of specific cell type lines, but rather through 
the fact that this tool is capable of computationally disclosing the information 
that is biologically enclosed in pluripotency. Indeed, as the authors themselves 
comment “[s]trikingly, Gene Ontology (GO) analysis of the union of DEGs 
showed significant enrichments for biological processes of obvious relevance to 
the hallmark phenotypes and target organ systems of the two conditions” 
(Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, p134). This shows very well why GO is 
an orienteering tool. GO is able to situate the information coming from the 
experimental work into the most updated map of current biological knowledge, 
 114 
thus highlighting connections and relations practically invisible to any single 
researcher or group. The power of GO is therefore to unveil existing, hidden 
links of biological knowledge. If the map of species and organisms provided by 
taxonomists is capable of suggesting possible indications on the relationships 
among those species, then the map provided by GO shows the capacity to do 
something similar for biological processes at molecular level. GO thus revealed 
that “[t]he top-ranking categories were related on one hand to cell adhesion, 
migration and motility, which appear especially relevant in light of the wide 
range of connective tissue alterations that characterize WBS, and on the other 
hand to the nervous system, providing a molecular context for the defining 
neurodevelopmental features of the two conditions. Additionally, further 
enrichments were related to remarkably specific features of the two diseases, 
including (i) cellular calcium ion homeostasis, a category of potential relevance 
across disease areas but that acquires particular salience given the high 
prevalence of hypercalcemia in WBS; (ii) inner ear morphogenesis, consistent 
with the hyperacusis and sensorineural hearing loss in WBS, as well as with the 
balance and sensory processing alterations found in ASD; (iii) a number of 
categories relevant for the craniofacial phenotypes, as represented by several 
categories, such as skeletal muscle organ development, migration and neural 
crest cell differentiation; (iv) blood vessel development and cardiovascular 
system development, reflecting the wide range of cardiovascular problems in 
WBS; and (v) kidney epithelium development, in line with the highly prevalent 
kidney abnormalities in WBS” (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, p134). 
The possibility of such an approach suggested also a further step. If the GO 
analysis on iPSCs provided such a global map, the researchers, in order to prove 
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whether transcriptional dysregulation would be amplified during development, 
derived also three lineages of cell types precursors: PAX6-positive telencephalic 
neural progenitor cells (NPCs, responsible for radial glia cells formation which, 
in turn, form cerebral cortex); neural crest stem cells (NSCSs, involved in the 
formation of craniofacial structures; and mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs, which 
are progenitors of osteocytes, chondrocytes and other cell types relevant for both 
syndromes). All these three lineages are crucially significant for the pathological 
conditions under examination. The GO analysis can be seen here as the creation 
of three sub-maps of the previous one, against which they should be compared 
and judged. Indeed the researchers “evaluated, for each of the three differentiated 
lineages under study, the proportion of DEGs showing conservation of the GO 
categories that were found to be enriched in iPSCs. Upon differentiation, iPSC 
DEGs were preferentially retained by category in a lineage-appropriate manner 
such that, for each target lineage, the proportion of conserved iPSC DEGs was 
much greater in categories relevant to that lineage (such as axonogenesis and 
axon guidance in the neural lineage, synapse-related categories in NCSCs that 
originate the peripheral nervous system and smooth muscle–related categories in 
MSCs)” (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, p138). 
By looking at the conclusion of the study, it is quite clear that the main result 
of the research is the production of a specific kind of map. In particular, GO 
served perfectly the purpose of exploiting the potential of iPSCs. First, GO was 
an indispensable tool in order to manage the intrinsic variability of iPSCs as 
model for diseases, given that such a variability occurs across both individuals 
and lines derived by the same individual. Indeed, in order to obtain a reliable, 
and as much as global, picture, variability has had to be taken into account and 
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produced, by the creation of the greatest cohort of iPSCs lines for any relevant 
condition. Next, of course, all this information should has been processed via 
high-throughput approaches. As in a complex forecast model where scientists 
need to take into account and compare different kind of data such as 
geographical details, temperature differences, winds’ directions and intensity, 
geological factors etc. and to display all of them on a common representation 
format, here the different transcriptional behaviours of distinct genetic 
conditions, the developmental issues and the pathological considerations were all 
consistently represented and managed by GO analysis. Indeed, such an approach 
perfectly exploits the potentiality embedded in iPSCs by predicting, already in 
the pluripotent state, which pathways will be affected given the specificity of the 
conditions under investigation. Moreover, the creation of a such a map, is indeed 
an orienteering tool by which scientists navigated the developmental trajectories 
thus showing how such a dysregulation “selectively amplified in a lineage-
specific manner, with disease-relevant pathways preferentially and progressively 
more affected in differentiated lineages matching specific disease domains” 
(Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, p139).  
Once such a complex, multi-map has been built, it is also possible to better 
locate and address single factors (such as that particular protein) into the wider 
context of the disease development, thus suggesting further possible steps and 
experimental approaches. Indeed, as the relevance of specific gene products is 
globally assessed by GO analysis, then it would be possible to better focus on 
them (also with more traditional, mechanistic approaches). As the authors 
themselves argue “[n]otably, our analysis of symmetrically dysregulated targets 
also uncovered the following genes as prime candidates for mediating the 
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molecular pathogenesis of defining aspects of the two conditions: (i) PDLIM1, 
which has been associated with ADHD, neurite outgrowth, cardiovascular 
defects and hyperacusis; (ii) MYH14, which is involved in hearing impairment; 
and (iii) BEND4, encoding a transcription factor harboring the BEN domain that 
distinguishes a recently characterized family of neural repressors and that was 
sensitive to both GTF2I dosage and its LSD1-mediated repressive activity, a 
finding that also resonates with the inversely correlated pattern of GTF2I and 
BEND4 expression in the human brain” (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015, 
p140). Such a scientific contribution does not certainly exhaust all the 
possibilities of map generation in this context. On the contrary it promotes the 
implementation of new maps and it suggests possible directions for more 
traditional, mechanistic experiments in order to investigate the single elements 
displayed on the generated map. As argued before, such efforts will be better 
addressed given the standardisation created by GO. Hence, in order to promote 
and enhance such a common frame, researchers have also designed a web 
platform, named WikiWilliams-7qGeneBase to make data available to the 
research community working on these syndromes. Such a database will be open 
to external contributions given the adherence to shared format principles. In the 
end, by granting an original kind of scientific results, aimed at disentangling 
some crucial aspects of complex syndromes, and by contributing to the 
implementation of regulatory standardisation procedures in data display and 
management, such a study provides a clear example of a new way to 
conceptually and experimentally address the practice of epigenetic studies and 
transcriptional analysis. 
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Although quite innovative, such an example is not isolated. As argued in a 
recent publication (Hoehndorf et al. 2014) the use and the importance of 
ontologies in biomedical research have radically increased. This is due both to 
the amount and the type of data produced in many areas of biological research. 
Ontologies rapidly became a key tool in the interpretation of data and they 
fostered the creation of biomedical IT infrastructure, such as the Elixir initiative 
(http://www.elixir-europe.org). The purpose of ELIXIR is to coordinate the 
collection, quality check and archiving of large amounts of biological data 
generated by all varieties of experiments in the life sciences. Some of these 
datasets are extremely specialised and would previously only have been available 
only to those researchers working in the context in which they were produced. 
Ontologies are thus becoming, being already a fundamental instrument for the 
interpretation of data, an inspirational resource for users and developers in 
building new analysis methods.  
In this sense, a good example is constituted by a recent research (Yang, 
Chen et al. 2014) that adopts GO terms in order to highlight probable common 
features of tumour suppressor genes (TSGs). The aim of that kind of research is 
precisely to enhance the creation of building effective prediction methods for the 
identification of TSGs. The idea is that if it is possible to individuate a set of 
properties shared to all TSGs and express it in a semantic representation 
framework, then such an information could be extremely useful in order to detect 
and discover new TSGs. In other words, scientists have first adopted a huge 
database known as TSGene (http://bioinfo.mc.vanderbilt.edu/TSGene/)  which is 
a repository of known, validated tumour suppressor genes. Next, researchers 
used GO terms enrichment analysis as parameters to encode the genes of interest 
 119 
within the TSGene database. GO terms have been easily selected as codes for 
TSGs since the database itself has been constructed in a GO friendly way. The 
first analysis on GO biological process domain, ranked top five terms: GO: 
0022610: biological adhesion, GO: 0040007: growth, GO: 0032502: 
developmental process, GO:0065007: biological regulation and GO:0050896: 
response to stimulus. Both biological adhesion and response to stimulus resume 
important features of TS proteins as they are involved in the alarm reaction and 
they show a guardian role both in tumorigenesis and in the metastasis formation. 
The term single-organism process has also been highlighted. This again suggests 
and confirms a very known property of TSGs, since the fate of an organism 
dramatically depends on the cell cycle and apoptotic processes. Indeed, TSGs 
play a crucial role in the conservation of the cell cycle checkpoints and in the 
induction of apoptosis. The same approach has been used for cellular component 
and molecular function. In the first case the most important terms are GO: 
0030054: cell junction and GO: 0044422: organelle part. Again the first term 
reflects the very well known fact that some TSGs are as such because of their 
relevance for cell adhesion which is a key component of metastatic process. 
While the second term confirms the involvement of organelles (such as 
mitochondria, ribosomes and ubiquitin-proteasome system) in the phenomenon 
of tumorigenesis. Lastly, concerning molecular function the most represented 
terms are GO: 0005488: binding, GO: 0003824: catalytic activity, GO: 0030234: 
enzyme regulator activity, GO:0004872: receptor activity and GO:0060089: 
molecular transducer activity. Also in this case GO terms individuate properties 
which are considered crucial for TSGs. Given the type of results, a biologist 
could ask why making such an effort if the results are, in a sense, already known. 
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This is certainly true but such a picture does tell just the half of the story. The 
map produced by GO is a first attempt to have all the properties shared by TSGs 
addressed in a common format. This means precisely that functions, cellular 
structures and activities can be all taken into account in order to construct a 
common signature for the features defining TSGs. Thus, such a knowledge, 
given also the way it is displayed, can definitely constitute the first step for future 
heuristic strategies aimed at the discovery of new TSGs. Indeed the researchers  
have tried “to predict the novel TSGs based on features in the total optimal 
feature set, i.e., the key functions that defines tumor suppressor. For each 
‘negative gene’, we counted the number of key tumor suppressor functions that it 
was annotated onto. The genes with great number of key tumor suppressor 
functions were considered as candidate tumor suppressors, since they shared 
similar functions with the known tumor suppressors” (Yang, Chen et al. 2014, p 
9). Finally this analysis revealed a list of possible candidates (based on the fact 
that these genes share 293 annotations with known tumour suppressors) that will 
be proposed for further experimental and clinical validation. As argued in the 
previous chapter, GO is not a discovery tool per se, but it is an enhancer for 
discovery strategies. It is a map to navigate biological knowledge. 
A third example (Cheng et al. 2014) affects directly areas of research that 
traditionally have been addressed by mechanistic approaches such as gene 
function prediction. In this case GO analysis is adopted to extract the information 
on function dispersed within the biomedical literature in order to enhance gene 
function prediction. From a methodological perspective, such a task can be 
achieved due to the hierarchical structure provided by GO. In other words, 
researchers first adopt a literature-based method (via text-mining tools) 
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extracting gene function from annotations. However such approaches, in the past, 
have shown a low accuracy in function prediction. One possible explanation is 
that previous attempts ignored the hierarchical structure of GO. Indeed, being a 
map, GO does not simply represent the content of biological knowledge but it 
also display how such a knowledge is structured and hierarchically organised. 
This aspect shows very well how GO is precisely representing biological 
knowledge rather than hypothetical natural kinds. It does not stand for what is 
out there, but it illustrates our epistemic categories in the analysis of natural 
world. Moreover, biologists know very well that genes may likely have more 
than one function, depending on the environmental and temporal context, the 
type of cell considered, the tissue to which those cells belong and the expression 
of other genes. The same gene product can then been subjected to multiple 
annotations which, in turn, contribute to different terms. Therefore, if one adopts 
a traditional classificatory approach, it would result that one instance should 
correspond to one class, while in biological reality it may pertain to many 
classes. Because of that, researchers have implemented a multi-label 
classification in which each gene is likely to be associated with several GO 
concepts. In other words, “[f]or example, the gene P25686 in the UniProt 
database is annotated by GO terms with id 0032436 (positive regulation of 
proteasomal the ubiquitin-dependent protein, catabolic process), 0090086 
(negative regulation of protein deubiquitination), 0030433 (ER-associated 
protein catabolic process), 0031398 (positive regulation of protein 
ubiquitination), 0090084 (negative regulation of the inclusion of the body 
assembly). These GO concepts together describe the gene functions: protease-
based pan-hormone catabolic process positive regulation of protein de-ubiquitin 
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negative adjustment, the ER-associated protein catabolic process, positive 
regulation of protein ubiquitin, the virus endosome assembly negative regulation. 
Therefore, we may regard the prediction of gene function as a problem of multi-
label annotation, namely selecting several GO concepts as function description of 
a given gene”  (Cheng et al. 2014, p 2, emphasis is mine). This study offers a 
clear example of how this new way of doing proceeds. Rather than taking one 
gene and empirically check its putative functions by implementing different 
experimental conditions, such a result has been obtained by a tool capable of 
navigating different databases. In other words, while the traditional approach 
started from the object (the gene) in order to investigate certain properties 
(functions) of it, this new approaches begins the other way round, with mapping 
all the known functions and then trying to attribute them to single genes due to 
the power of big data. 
The rise of ontologies as drivers for scientific research does not stop with 
GO. As already argued, in the last years many other ontologies have been 
developed and implemented (consider for instance the aforementioned OBO 
Foundry initiative), sometimes orthogonally integrated with GO itself. It is the 
case, just to mention some examples, of Sequence Ontology (SO, 
http://www.sequenceontology.org/ ) that is aimed at the management of the 
increased production of more and more sequencing data in order to built a 
compatibility framework for the characteristics of diverse data formats of 
genomic sequences. On the other side, we have Protein Ontology (PRO, 
http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro/), the first logically-based classification of diverse 
classes of proteins. By gaining information from different types of databases, 
PRO representations include protein isoforms and variant, naturally and 
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artificially modified forms (due to biotech innovations) and also protein 
complexes. In order to do so, PRO is articulated in three sub-ontologies, ProEvo 
which classifies proteins according to their evolutionary relatedness, ProForm 
grouping proteins assembled by a specific genetic locus and ProComp which 
deals with specific amino acid chains presenting complexes. Another good 
example is constituted by Celltype Ontology (CL, http://www.obofoundry.org/) 
whose purpose is to construct a formal representation of cellular phenotypes 
among different organisms.  
The proliferation of ontologies in biomedical research represents not only a 
new sign of scientific creativity but, as it is part of a collective and organised 
enterprise (involving consortia and diverse groups), it also responds to specific 
needs of the scientific community. Thus such an explosion provides an indication 
of the transition from the descriptive side to the normative one exposed in the 
previous chapter. Moreover, the limitations of a given ontology can be overcome 
by its implementation with other, orthogonal resources. For instance some 
researches have recently suggested (Wittkop  et al. 2013) that term enrichment 
analysis based on GO, although widely used, shows the best efficacy on 
predefined gene annotations that are restricted to those domains highly manually 
curated. In order to cope with this issue, by developing tools hybridising the 
analysis of manually curation with automatic text search from other ontologies, it 
would be possible to expand the set of hypotheses created by term enrichment 
analysis. In this respect it is interesting to examine a case (i.e. Washington and 
Haendel et al. 2009) in which scientists adopt several ontological resources to 
deal with more traditional problems. That is to say that here researchers do not 
just produce different types of evidences and procedures, neither they just 
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endorse new perspectives and angles through which they could look at their 
object of investigation. In this situation they also tackle a very classical problem 
by addressing it with a new way of doing. I will further examine the features of 
this approach and its philosophical implication in the next section. For the 
moment, let us just delineate the main characteristics of such an effort. The scope 
of the article is to create a formal, shared, frame in order to better ground the 
connection between the experimental results obtained via animal models with the 
human diseases. The relation between the ‘bench and the bedside’ (i.e. how to 
exploit the findings of scientific research in order to develop new drugs, tools, 
and therapeutic interventions at the clinical level) is quite problematic (also in its 
definition) and constitutes an entire area of research called translational 
medicine (see for instance Woolf 2008). One of the main issues at stake is that 
phenotypic outcomes of mutations are generally based on criteria pertaining to 
different organism-communities and therefore they are described according to 
specific semantic choices, often anchored to the anatomical and physiological 
peculiarities of the animal models under consideration. Moreover, while the 
research on model organisms is often centralised and already subject to forms of 
internal standardisation, human-focused biomedical research does not present a 
clear and established form of commonality in terms of database structures and 
resources (see also Leonelli 2012). In addition, despite the presence of methods 
for comparing sequences (such as BLAST algorithm) the genetic basis of many 
diseases is still obscure and most the clinical classification of diseases rests on 
phenotypic descriptions. Thus, the main idea of using ontologies, is to have a 
tool to standardise and compare phenotypic descriptions across species and 
databases. Let us briefly examine the strategy adopted by Washington, Haendel 
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and colleagues. First, they grounded their analysis on a general database of 
phenotypic resources: the Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man or OMIM. 
Second, each phenotypic character has been registered through the combination 
of two elements (named EQ method): an entity (E, such an anatomical part or a 
process) that bears a quality (Q, such as big, increased temperature etc.). 
Interestingly such a classification procedure is the result of the merge of terms 
coming from different ontologies. Indeed, while entities are usually extracted by 
GO or other anatomical ontology, qualities come from PATO (Phenotype and 
Trait Ontology) which is orthogonal and fully integrated with GO and other 
OBO ontologies. “For instance, a Drosophila ‘redness of eye’ phenotype could 
be described using the terms “red” from PATO and “eye” from the Fly Anatomy 
ontology (FBbt) into the EQ statement EQ = FBbt:eye + PATO:red.” 
(Washington and Haendel et al. 2009, p3). Next, researchers have tested whether 
EQ system can ease and reveal possible relations between genotypes and 
phenotypes across different species. Then, they used the EQ classification 
method to annotate 11 human disease genes from OMIM database to create a 
sub-dataset suitable for cross-species comparison. In order to cope with different 
anatomical structures pertaining to different organisms (zebra fish and mouse in 
this case), scientists have also developed a cross-species unifying ontology for 
anatomical structures (UBERON, http://uberon.github.io/). In the end, 
researchers were able to show that, within the same organism but also in 
different species, most of the allelic variants were phenotypically close to other 
allelic variants of the same gene. Second, through this analysis it was possible to 
map affinities among pathways due to the phenotypic similarity. Third, the 
information collected by phenotypic comparison was able to identify orthologous 
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genes across several species. Again, such results were obtained by the massive 
comparison of available data, crossing data coming from different sources and 
formats. Moreover, and interestingly from an epistemological point of view, the 
order of epistemic steps in the discovery strategy has been inverted. Indeed, 
while the traditional strategy would have privileged genetic manipulation in 
order to detect phenotypic variations, here researchers started from the map of 
known phenotype (a database) and, through a tool capable of integrating such 
information with other maps, they were able to detect genes and pathways of 
interest, filtering then possible candidates for further, more classical, 
experiments. As a matter of fact, such way of doing changes the meaning and the 
role of experiments themselves in the current practice of science. This fact, being 
a key aspect of such an epistemological turn, will be precisely addressed in the 
next section.  
In the end, by looking at this kind of science, it should be now obvious how 
much it embeds a different way of doing rather than a change in the theoretical 
paradigm. Indeed, the molecular tenets are still there. The molecular stance, 
which drove biomedical research since the 1970s has been certainly modified, 
definitely extended and revised here and there, but its guiding principle are still 
valid. This is why I would argue that these new approaches pertain more to the 
epistemic and methodological side than to the theoretical dimensions of scientific 
paradigm. They concern how scientific evidences are produced, and how the 
methods to produce them can be considered reliable and scientific. If traditional 
molecular biologists were like old fishermen, carefully selecting the bait, the 
fishing pole, and focused on specific varieties of fish, the new generation of 
biologists seem to adopt a sort of bottom trawling, trying to collect as much 
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information as possible. Accidental or not relevant elements such as crabs, 
prawns, rocks and old shoes (a metaphor for the biological noise) does not 
constitute a problem, given that the intellectual efforts of scientific practice will 
shift towards the theoretical principles and the practical constraints of collection 
design. In the next section I will precisely address the peculiarity of working in 
science with ontology from an epistemological point view. 
 
 
Doing science with ontologies: epistemic categories 
Molecular biologists usually look for mechanisms (see for instance Craver 
and Darden 2013). Moreover, as argued in previous chapters, molecular biology 
lacks a theoretical unification. Molecular biology has then been described more 
as a set of techniques or, better, experimental cultures (see also Morange 2000, 
2006, Rheinberger 1997). Thus I argued that what really makes molecular 
biology is the adherence of molecular biologists to a certain way of doing. It is a 
matter of style.  
What is then the molecular style? Practice of science is more fluid than 
theoretical reflection. This is because practices may slightly vary (diversity is a 
virtue) while theory tends to fill discrepancies. In order to describe a way of 
doing it is not possible to establish precise necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Rather, I will try to characterise some notions or hallmarks that clearly 
circumscribe the practice of molecular biology. 
First, experimental systems. The Nobel Prize François Jacob writes that “[i]n 
analyzing a problem, the biologist is constrained to focus on a fragment of 
reality, on a piece of the universe which he arbitrarily isolates to define certain of 
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its parameters. In biology, any study thus begins with the choice of a ‘system’” 
(Jacob 1988, p 234). Experimental systems delimit the purpose, the boundaries 
and constraints of scientists’ research efforts. These systems are constituted by 
the range of techniques adopted, the types of material instruments and resources, 
and, of course, the model organism on which the research will be conducted. 
Experimental systems are then those portions of reality, epistemically and 
practically demarcated, in which molecular biologists try to make discoveries. 
However science is not just discovery. Scientists do not just want to number 
phenomena. They also want to explain them. As already argued in chapter 2, 
scientific models are the main tool of the explanatory side in science. Thus, in 
molecular biology, experiments and models are inextricably connected. Indeed, 
“in molecular biology many experiments serve the purpose of developing and 
shaping hypotheses – about working models” (Boem and Ratti forthcoming). As 
nicely argued by William Bechtel and Robert Richardson, in order to make the 
complexity of biological phenomena (that are experimentally addressed) 
tractable, biologists use models to decompose the system into functional or 
structural elements and then try to localise to which structures belong certain 
functions and vice versa (see Bechtel and Richardson 2010).   
The second notion is what Rheinberger (1997) calls conjuncture. 
Accordingly, a conjuncture is the potential intrinsic to the experimental process 
that can lead scientists to something that was not initially estimated. Following 
Rheinberger, the discovery of transfer RNA is a good example of this aspect. 
While protein synthesis was originally ad area of pure biochemical investigation, 
the discovery of such a new molecule made it a central research field in 
molecular biology. Indeed, the fact that tRNA is a biochemical intermediary 
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between DNA and proteins, fostered the idea that it could be also an 
intermediary in genetic information transfer, thus establishing new paths of 
scientific inquiry.  
Third, there is hybridization.  Such a process occurs when different 
experimental systems are combined in unforeseen ways. This can reveal 
unexpected, promising features. “The history of molecular biology is replete with 
hybridization events. The fusion, e.g., of François Jacob's bacterial conjugation 
and phage replication system with Jacques Monod's system of induced enzyme 
synthesis led to the emergence of another novel RNA entity, messenger RNA, 
and to a pathbreaking model of genetic regulation” (Rheinberger 1997, p s250). 
Fourth, bifurcation. Briefly, a bifurcation is constituted by a new 
experimental system stemming out from another one (as when an in vitro 
technique is translated in vivo). Sometimes different systems present some 
degree of sharing, other times they become fully disconnected.  
All these elements contribute to create what Rheinberger calls experimental 
culture. As he points out, the adhesion of biologists to such a culture is not 
determined just by a theoretical commitment (which often is a set of guiding 
principles imported from other scientific disciplines such as chemistry and 
physics) but more on material tools and practical behaviours. It is how things are 
done that best individuates the nature of molecular biology. The seductive 
metaphor adopted by Rheinberger is that biological research looks then like a net 
of interconnected experimental systems, deploying different strategies, 
employing distinct approaches and materials. Namely, the patchwork view of 
research.  
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I want to argue that the rise of ontologies may challenge this picture. 
However, more than dismantling it, it is broadening it. A tool like GO has not the 
purpose to make traditional molecular biology obsolete. It rather changes the 
meaning that experiments, experimental systems and other categories have for 
contemporary research. If heuristic strategy of molecular biology is decomposing 
complexity and localising its building elements, now ontologies open the 
possibility to re-compose complexity thus adding a new, or at least an additional, 
layer of what scientific understanding is. 
Again, such a change should not be intended as a paradigm shift. The point 
here is to examine what is the peculiarity of doing science with ontologies from 
an epistemological perspective that takes into account the elements discussed in 
the previous paragraphs.  
First, ontologies seem to extend the notion of experimental system. By the 
implementation of procedures that allow packaging and un-packaging data, 
database seem allowing data to travel (see Leonelli 2009) across different 
research contexts and experimental systems. In other words, data do not just 
serve the purposes for which they have been created. They can also be re-used. 
This is certainly true in everyday practice of research. However it is necessary to 
specify the epistemic nature of such a travel. According to Emanuele Ratti 
(2015), such a re-use should be intended as a way scientists can pursue in order 
to establish the presence of common features among different experimental 
systems. Indeed, following Ratti, data do not simply make a journey across 
several contexts. The fact that GO provides indications about the type of 
evidence supporting a given claim, shows that data are not simply packed, 
unpacked and re-used neglecting their original experimental context. On the 
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contrary, by creating a map that unifies the vocabulary of experimental 
procedures and resources, ontologies are able to make distinctions across 
research contexts emerge. Indeed ontologies are enhancing comparison power 
and not smoothening diversities. This is because they allow data comparison 
rather than data homogenization. With the use ontologies, the feature of locality 
of experimental systems is diminished. The “piece of universe” (recalling 
Jacob’s words) isolated by the scientist is not fully confined any longer. On the 
contrary, it is now always possible to situate the space of experimental 
manoeuvres into a wider context. In this sense the implementation of ontological 
work changes also the nature of conjunctures. While in traditional experimental 
contexts conjunctures have an intrinsic, unforeseen potential for further 
discoveries which, nevertheless, cannot be disclosed from the beginning, the map 
provided by a tool like GO makes this epistemic horizon explorable (consider the 
case of Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015) described in the previous 
section, at least in its directions. Moreover, ontologies modify also hybridization 
and bifurcation. By standardising the way knowledge is represented, ontologies 
can either enhance the connections between different experimental contexts or 
dissolve them.  Indeed, the idea of a global map for biological knowledge could 
mean the end of different epistemic cultures interweaving and contrasting one 
with another, towards the establishment of a more uniform epistemic scenario. 
However, again, due to the peculiar form of unification provided by ontologies, I 
suggest that, rather than suppressing intrinsic and distinctive features of different 
experimental cultures, ontologies are favouring the appreciation of differences 
under a common view and not the dissolution of them. As translational 
dictionaries, ontologies are not conflating different idioms neither reducing one 
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language into another. They are rather creating a way to grasp the meaning of a 
sentence (i.e. an experimental system) expressed in a given language into another 
one. 
Moreover, map thinking, embedded in the application of bio-ontologies, 
produces a distinctive signature in the way scientific research is thought and 
perceived, also by scientists themselves. This is because the capacity of 
ontologies to represent, in a human understandable fashion, the patterns 
emerging from databases, sets a new frame into which understanding the 
peculiarity of a prominent part of contemporary research. Indeed ontologies offer 
a fruitful perspective in order to analyse two important ways of thinking of 
biological sciences, the comparative style and the exemplary style, and their 
epistemic relationship. My claim is that such a distinction is fundamental to 
understand the peculiarity of many current approaches in doing science.  
The two styles embed to different strategies of scientific generalisations of 
particular findings. While, for instance in comparative anatomy or taxonomy, the 
generality of a scientific claim is grounded on the comparison among many 
different samples, the discovery of the so-called molecular basis of living things 
by new biology, promoted the idea that, as famously stated by Monod, “anything 
found to be true of E.coli must also be true of elephants” (Jacob and Monod 
1961). This perspective means that, since the ‘code of life’ has the same structure 
for all the living beings, the universality of certain finding at the molecular level 
can be generalised through the assumption that the model organism, taken as the 
exemplary, serves as a reliable proxy for the phenomenon under investigation. 
However these two ways of thinking should not be conceived as characterising 
the disciplinary and epistemic boundaries between natural history and molecular 
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biology. On the contrary, such a distinction has been proposed by Bruno Strasser 
and Soraya de Chadarevian (2011) to analyse different components of scientific 
practices within molecular biology. In their study, Strasser and Chadarevian 
point out that the historical reconstruction that has depicted the rise of molecular 
biology as simply the triumph of experimentalism over observations and 
collection methods employed by natural history, is partially erroneous. Indeed, 
Strasser and Chadarevian have shown that many great achievements of 
molecular biology, such as the study of protein structure and function or even the 
‘crack’ of the genetic code, were made possible also because of comparative 
strategies (think, for instance, about the collections of mutations gathered and 
classified by Morgan). Molecular biology flourished because of the combination, 
sometimes even the proficuous contrast, between different styles of reasoning. 
Very often these styles were anchored to specific phases of the scientific 
progress. This means that the exemplary and the comparative style do not 
represent a way of thinking peculiar to this or that research programme. Rather, 
these styles were often combined.  
The early history of genetics provides a good example of this fact. Indeed, 
by examining the rise of modern genetics it is possible to detect when and how 
the generalisation about certain phenomena has been differentially justified by 
appealing to this or that style. Let us briefly focus on the case of one of the most 
famous model organism: the fruit-fly Drosophila melanogaster. In 1910 Thomas 
Hunt Morgan “discovered” the first mutant white eyes and in 1926 , due to his 
study on those flies, he published his famous Theory of the Gene. Here lies the 
exemplary style. The theory of Morgan was not only about fruit-flies. The gene 
became the fundamental unit of biological explanation (see for instance Griffiths 
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and Stotz 2006, 2013). Every living thing has genes as any material object is 
composed by atoms. Because of that (and its use in the laboratory work), 
Drosophila has become a symbol of biological research for many experimental 
biologists. From an experimental point of view, Drosophila became really a 
standard laboratory instrument like a microscope or chemical compounds. 
However, although fruit-flies were clearly a key component of an experimental 
work, the way of thinking of Morgan rested also on a very detailed classificatory 
strategies. Moreover, the capacity of inferring as universals those findings 
obtained through the fruit-flies was based on the great number of samples and 
specimens produced and compared. Morgan adopted a first system (called neo-
Mendelian) of classifying genetic factors “into organ group systems - eye color, 
wing shape, body color, thorax pattern” (Kohler 1994, p 56) which helped him to 
identify “how many genetic factors were involved in the formation of each 
morphological feature” (ibid.). This system was helpful to understand the 
developmental processes and relationships between different strains. Another 
classification system Morgan adopted was rather “structural and spatial”. The 
aim of this classificatory approach was useful instead to help scientists to locate 
physically genetic factors, forming a sort of genetic map. Observing, collecting, 
comparing, were not replaced by the rise of experimental practice, instead they 
coexisted along with experiments. It is important to notice that not only the 
practice of classification has been fundamental to complete the genetic study of 
Drosophila but also that different systems of classification provide different 
answers to questions which often are seen as typically experimental. Moreover, 
the following failure of the neo-Mendelian system of classification due to the 
vastness of new mutants, on the one hand forced scientists to elaborate new 
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classificatory systems and on the other hand helped geneticists to understand the 
limits of Mendelian genetics. I would say that different ways of knowing have 
“interfered” with each other. In other words, again, a problem of classification 
involves directly the practice and the theory of experimental science. However, if 
we consider the question the other way round, we see how the experimental work 
affects the strategy of classification. Indeed “drosophilists were the first to 
encounter the limits of Mendelian system because they were only ones whose 
breeding experiments were big enough to produce new mutants” (Kohler 1994, p 
60, emphasis is mine). So choosing a specific tool (Drosophila) was the 
fundamental condition to understand the limits of Mendelian approach. Because 
of that “Mendelians who worked with mice or fowl had no such experience, 
because new mutants appeared infrequently if at all in their experiments”(ibid.).  
Nevertheless, despite this methodological blurriness in which distinct 
approaches hybridise one into another, the epistemic primacy of experimentalism 
has definitely prevailed within molecular studies, maybe not entirely in the 
practice, but certainly in the way the results of biology were publicly disclosed 
and justified (within and without the scientific community). For instance, an 
article like the first one examined (Adamo, Atashpaz, Germain et al. 2015) 
would has not been probably published fifteen years ago. This is not because 
such a study relies on a different theoretical framework, but rather because it 
employs a diverse working approach. The map thinking shapes the entire 
rationale of the article allowing to count as evidence what, in the past, was just 
noise or it could have been considered not relevant. I will come, more in detail, 
back to this point in the next chapter. 
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Such an example offers a different perspective according to which 
interpreting the intellectual battle on the nature of science, mentioned in the first 
chapter. Indeed, the epistemological point is not just on the adoption of this or 
that methodology, but rather on the order and hierarchy of distinct ways of 
thinking. In other words, both opponents in this debate (see, for instance, the 
controversy on Nature 2010 between Robert Weinberg and Todd Golub) do not 
claim that one scientific practice should entirely replace the other, but they rather 
state which way of thinking should come first (epistemically, chronologically or 
economically). Therefore, the rise of ontologies within bioinformatics and their 
impact on the design of research, should not be understood as a shift from the 
experimental practice to the advent of a sort of ‘in silico age’ of the life sciences. 
Even if some projects can be certainly pursued purely in a computational fashion, 
biologists will keep doing experiments. It is not the practice of experimentation 
that is changing. Rather, it is the transformation of the epistemic role of 
experiments within research. Thus, such an innovation indicates a difference in 
the general practice of science. It is a matter of style. 
To sum up, in this chapter I provided several examples of current research 
actually driven by the application of bio-ontologies. I examined different areas of 
biomedical sciences, by showing how ontologies are not only applied within 
computational studies, but they also start to be adopted for approaching more 
traditional problems (such as gene function prediction), offering different and 
unusual perspectives. Then I proposed an analysis of how bio-ontologies change 
the practice of science, not just implementing the comparative style over the 
exemplary one, but by modifying the hierarchy of methods and evidences of 
research. 
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In the next chapter I will examine such a peculiar style of reasoning, 
compared to traditional molecular biology, and how it affects the epistemic 
dimension of biomedical sciences.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
“The Scientist must set in order. 
Science is built up with facts, as a 
house is with stones. But a collection 
of facts is no more a science than a 
heap of stones is a house.” 
 
Henri Poincaré 
 
Molecular biology is dead. Long live to molecular biology 
Molecular biology arose in the late first half of the 1900s as an essentially 
new kind of biology. As already argued and shown, the development of sciences 
is far from being linear. Following Rheinberger (2007) and Morange (2000) it is 
possible to identify two main moments or turning point, in the development of 
molecular biology, which constitute the necessary antecedents in order to 
understand the cultural and practical change that I address in this study. 
In the second chapter I have discussed the problems concerning the status of 
biology as a discipline. Morange defines molecular biology as “all those 
techniques and discoveries that make it possible to carry out molecular analyses 
of the most fundamental biological processes – those involved in the stability, 
survival, and reproduction of the organisms” (Morange, 2000, p 1). As already 
argued, it is very hard, if not impossible, to set clear boundaries of such a 
science, given also that the origin of the molecular paradigm involved the import 
and the combination of procedures and notions coming from chemistry, physics, 
genetics (and, in a sense, computer science). Very wisely, rather than numbering 
or setting necessary and sufficient conditions, Morange individuates, 
chronologically, some practical and theoretical moves that, produced a sort of 
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uniformity in the procedural efforts of these new kind of scientists, namely: 
molecular biologists. Following Morange, in his examination, Rheinberger 
(2007) adopts the notion of assemblage (proposed by the anthropologist Paul 
Rabinow) to characterise set of elements contributing to the creation and the 
progress of a scientific discipline as the combination of styles, working strategies 
and apparatuses, institutions, people and their developmental dynamics. Thus the 
‘moments’ of Morange should be intended, according to Rheinberger, as 
historical events showing how different components of scientific efforts 
undergone to a reconfiguration of the assemblage. 
The first reassembling moment, happened between the 1940s and the 1960s. 
This phase is mainly characterised by the discovery of the DNA structure and its 
connection with the study of protein synthesis eventually leading to ‘crack’ the 
genetic code (on this aspect, see for instance Darden and Craver 2002). 
According to Rheinberger, it is possible to individuate some key component for 
such a change. First, the rise of new technological innovations such as X-ray 
diffraction, the invention of the electron microscopy, electrophoresis, 
chromatography and ultracentrifugation. Second, the adoption of model 
organisms which could be easier manipulated (precisely at the molecular level) 
than drosophila or maize, such as bacteria (E. coli) and viruses (the 
bacteriophages). Third, as already stated, the fruitful combination of procedures 
coming from different disciplinary areas. Fourth, the import, from computer 
science, of the informational metaphor and its adaptation to biology thus 
generating the notion of biological information. 
The second phase happened in the 1970s and its legacy highly affected the 
1980s. This phase is heavily characterised by the possibility of actually 
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manipulate the gene, thus fostering an engineered view of the biological 
phenomena. Along with in vitro analysis, biology went in vivo. The development 
of plasmids, restriction and ligation enzymes and first viral vectors all belong to 
this period. In the 1980s, the discovery of PCR (polymerase chain reaction) by 
Kary B. Mullis (see Mullis 1990), which allows the possibility to amplify, 
virtually, any DNA fragment, extended the range of manipulability in 
experimental practice. Finally, for molecular biologists, it was possible to 
intervene on the living cell as a mechanic can work on an engine. Molecular 
biology as a mature science has been finally established for good. 
 
Key features of molecular biology style: intervention and manipulation 
This element can actually help to understand how much manipulation 
constitutes a key component in the traditional style of reasoning of molecular 
biology. Certainly in molecular biology the practice of experimentation - the 
making of science - precedes the theoretical specification at the epistemic level. 
Following Hacking’s idea (1983), experiments have their own life. This is not to 
say that theory does not play any role in the development of molecular studies, 
but rather that most epistemological reconstruction that rely too much on 
theoretical justification fail to entirely grasp the efforts of contemporary biology. 
Accordingly, it is the manipulation of scientific entities (such as genes) at the 
experimental level, that grounds the possibility of a more adequate epistemic 
understanding of what traditional molecular biology is. Indeed, as already 
pointed out, the process of discovery in molecular biology is far from linear, 
purely deductive and hierarchical. A key component of the ‘molecular style’ is 
then the ability of the single scientist to tinker with the experimental system 
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allowing him to constantly update and evaluate the relation between the 
hypothetical assumptions and the empirical results. As Hacking puts it “[i]n 
schools and colleges experiments are repeated ad nauseam. The point of those 
classroom exercises is never to test or elaborate the theory. The point is to teach 
people how to become experimenters” (Hacking 1983, p 231). This also shows 
how much the molecular style privileges practice over theory.  It is a way of 
doing indeed, as the nature of scientific knowledge is conceived, perceived, and 
conducted as an activity rather than a speculation. Knowing is doing. Therefore 
intervening (i.e. material manipulation) is the main way through which molecular 
biologists know the world.  
As I have shown in the introduction, a style of reasoning sets also the nature 
of a scientific evidence, its reliability and the validity of the procedures aimed at 
obtaining it. “Most of molecular biological articles from the mid 1970s are 
written by telling a story, thereby emphasizing the importance of narratives. The 
flow of reasoning seems to be as follows. First, one starts from a general guess 
about a biological system, how it is produced, etc. Due to the generality of the 
guess, several – though often contrasting – predictions may be derived. Then one 
devises several experiments exactly to stimulate the experimental system to 
‘reveal’ more information. Some initial predictions are discarded, while others 
are transformed into hypotheses that are more precise than the initial guess. Next, 
other experiments are done again to observe reactions from the experimental 
systems. Then, some hypotheses are further developed while others are 
discarded. This process continues, virtually, ad libitum. This is a sort of 
progressive and non-linear deductive process, developed by poking and prodding 
experimental systems. Moreover, in molecular biology, experimental systems are 
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eminently created. Again, as in Hacking’s perspective, this is not at all a socio-
constructivist drift. In order to study a biological phenomenon, scientists try to 
isolate it from its environment, creating another – more controlled – context (the 
so-called experimental system)” (Boem and Ratti, forthcoming). 
If manipulation is a central feature of the experimental style, it should be 
notice that experiments may play different roles in the practice of ‘questioning 
nature’. Accordingly, it is possible to distinguish experiments to prove (see 
Popper 1959, Kadane and Seidenfeld 1990) and experiments to learn or 
exploratory experiments (see Burian 1997, Steinle 1997). The first ones are those 
aimed at testing already stated hypotheses while the latter are those capable of 
fostering the formulation of new hypotheses. However such a distinction (as also 
argued by Waters 2008) should not be intended in a sharp way. Different types of 
experiments thus differ not just in their supposed independency from theoretical 
contributions, but in how theoretical constraints affect them. Indeed, different 
experimental strategies enable different forms of interventions. Experiments, 
whose purpose is to check something that is guided by the theoretical framework, 
will focus on a narrower range of interventions, thus aiming the attention to those 
ones which seem most promising according to the understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation. These experiments are definitely theory-driven, 
in the sense their scope and rationale is constructed according to specific 
constraints shaped by the theory. However this aspect must be better specified. 
Following Laura Franklin (2005) here the term “theory” means, at least, two 
distinct things. On the one hand, theory may count as general theoretical 
background. This should be seen as a broad conceptual stance coupled with 
empirical findings used as examples. For instance, the original hypotheses 
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concerning gene regulation and translation, rested on the general idea that protein 
levels might be controlled by different concentrations of mRNA. On the other 
hand theory can mean something more specific, narrower and more 
circumscribed. This is what Franklin calls local theory. This term concerns the 
behaviour of objects which are observed and measured. Consider the Western 
blot technique. Western blot is a method to determine the presence of a protein of 
interest in a given sample. In the most common protocol, proteins are first 
separated according to their molecular weight by running them onto a specific 
denaturing gel through electrophoresis. Then proteins are transferred from the gel 
to a nitrocellulose membrane and there the protein of interest is identified by the 
recognition of a specific antibody. The fact that different bands on the gel are 
interpreted as showing the distinct molecular weights of different proteins, is part 
of the local theory concerning the Western blot technique. As argued by Franklin 
(2005), a theory-driven experiment is not always directed at the test of a specific 
hypothesis. Rather, it just requires that such an experiment is designed and 
performed according to specific theoretical constraints. These constraints are 
then shaping the possible manipulations, thus narrowing the horizon of expected 
outcomes. Therefore, the results can meet or not the expectations of the 
researchers, eventually leading either to confirmations of the previous 
assumptions, or to methodological problems, or even to potential discoveries. On 
the contrary, experiments aimed at generating interesting findings about certain 
phenomena without clearly appealing to a theory, present less formal constraints. 
In this case the weight of manipulation seems to be higher. Indeed, by employing 
more intervention possibilities, scientists have also less expectation, because they 
are ‘just’ exploring the phenomena. Exploration here means that 
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experimentation, more than questioning nature, is ‘teasing’ nature, trying to map 
how it reacts to material intervention. Of course, such an independence from 
theory should not be intended in a strong sense, as if scientists did their work 
completely out of the blue. To give reason to such a ‘methodological freedom’ 
we can say that here experiments are only theory-informed. Again, the 
differences in the type of intervention are not in terms of being dependent or not 
from a theoretical framework, but rather to which degree such a dependence is 
possible and how it is articulated, i.e. how much and according to which 
modality, theory affects the practice. Although epistemically useful, such a 
distinction is not an ontological dichotomy. These divisions should not be 
intended as fully discrete and mutually exclusive. On the contrary, we should 
think about different types of experiments as idealised extremities of a 
methodological spectrum which is quite complex and interrelate. Of course, 
within a given research programme, it is possible to see different experimental 
approaches combined.  
However, the computational turn, and the production of biological 
knowledge through the exploration of datasets might let someone to think (as 
shown before) that now science is facing something different and that the 
comparative style is actually threatening the old experimental approaches by 
replacing them. Interestingly, O’Malley (2007) proposed that the increasing role 
of database and highthrouput techniques in molecular studies should not be seen 
as mere alternative to experimentation but as a new kind of it, where exemplary 
and comparative styles are put together. This is why she labels this new approach 
as natural history experimentation. O’Malley examines a very interesting case in 
which scientists were able to show that a group of marine bacteria can code for a 
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photoactive protein (i.e. proteorhodopsin). The novelty of such a study relies on 
metagenomics. Metagenomics can be defined as the sequencing samples of 
uncultured micro organisms, taken directly from their environment (see for 
instance Pace 1997; Chen and Pachter 2005). Since direct hypothesis testing is 
practically impossible due to the complexity of the samples and their hybrid 
composition, natural history experimentation “involves various activities of 
discovery, classification, comparison and probing for specific attributes or 
properties. Natural history experimentation confers the status of experimenter on 
nature itself, and reads the results of those experiments as if they had been 
controlled in biologically meaningful ways […]. More controlled laboratory 
experiments can, in fact, simply be seen as idealized forms of nature’s own 
experiments. Certain parameters are interpreted as set by nature, and these 
conditions are taken into account for the systematic comparison of observations” 
(O’Malley 2007). Following this perspective, if we assume that all these 
approaches, heavily based on database consultation, data comparison and 
classification are indeed a new type of exploratory experiments, then it is 
necessary to clarify in which sense they are different from traditional ones. From 
a ‘style of reasoning’ analysis certainly the main aspect regards the notion of 
intervention as it seems inextricably linked to the practice of experimentation. 
If we assume that manipulation, intended as a form of material intervention, 
is one of the main features of the traditional style in molecular studies, the 
increasing role of databases in biology and their spread among any level of 
research, has definitely produced a change in the strategy of molecular science. 
Although, as already shown in the previous chapter, the practice of comparison 
has never disappeared from molecular biology, it is also true that the creation of 
 146 
biological databases, collections of data computationally administered, and thus 
accessible, have clearly fostered and enhanced the value of comparative 
approaches as a key mode to generate scientific knowledge. The very term, data-
mining, suggests this type of turn. Indeed, as miners digging into caves enormous 
amounts of worthless material in order to find gold and gems, computational 
scientists penetrate the whole architecture of databases in order to retrieve 
valuable information. By following Ratti (PhD dissertation, 2015) the “logic of 
discovery” of these procedures differs from ‘traditional’ strategies of 
manipulation substantially. Unlike the search for mechanism, molecular biology 
here is aimed the individuation of statistically relevant regularities within big 
data sets that only computational approaches can manage. “This access to 
biological phenomena, through the accumulation of data, has been perceived in a 
way as ‘unbiased’ in the sense that phenomena are not created in laboratories by 
abstracting them from their environment and put into a different context. Instead, 
data about phenomena are obtained through primary samples. Moreover, there is 
no need to continuously stimulate experimental systems to squeeze partial 
information. Though sequencing is a kind of manipulation, data are obtained in 
one single shot. Moreover, there is no need to devise new experiments to develop 
general hypotheses, because data obtained by sequencing are taken to be all data 
one needs in principle. Data are then subjected to bioinformatics analyses, and 
these analyses do not need additional experiments to put forth hypotheses. 
Putting aside the initial sequencing part, big consortia do not to need, at first 
glance, robust interventionist strategies. In other words, sequencing technologies 
plus computational analysis tools, is a kind of molecular biology without the 
traditional experimental side.” (Boem and Ratti, forthcoming). 
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However, I want to argue that the fact the data-mining rests on the capacity 
of exploring vast collections, does not mean that computational methods are not 
subjected to forms of intervention. On the contrary, the way a collection is 
constructed heavily affects the type of information that can be retrieved. As 
argued in the first chapter, a collection is not a mere repository. It is a set of data 
disposed following a precise order. Ordering and reordering data is definitely a 
form of intervention, although not material. For the purpose of clarifying this 
point on collections, let us first consider two examples coming from traditional 
collections of natural history. This is to show that ordering and reordering is not 
completely new in the history of the life sciences. Then I will move to 
contemporary biological databases. 
 
 
Examples of ordering as intervention 
The first example refers to the very origin of modern biology. Talking about 
the Galapagos’ fauna in his Voyage of the Beagle, Charles Darwin writes: “It has 
been mentioned, that the inhabitants can distinguish the tortoises, according to 
the islands whence they are brought. I was also informed that many of the islands 
possess trees and plants which do not occur on the others. [...] Unfortunately, I 
was not aware of these facts till my collection was nearly completed: it never 
occurred to me, that the production of islands only few miles apart, and placed 
under same physical conditions, would be dissimilar” (Darwin, 1839, 1989, p 
287, my italics). Darwin here explicitly says that his collection was almost 
completed. At that time the final version of his famous theory of evolution was 
yet to come (the first publication was in 1859). Thus Darwin built his collection 
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still on a Lamarckian ground. Indeed he put together samples coming from 
different islands all together. Darwin had to go back to his samples and change 
the classificatory strategy. He did not change the content, but the general order 
(we could say the structure of the database) according to which data have been 
gathered. It is the reordering of that collection according to new theoretical 
constraints, as nicely described by the historian Giulio Barsanti (2005), that 
constitutes the first step towards the famous Darwinian theory of evolution. 
The second example is more recent. In their famous article Punctuated 
Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism the two great palaeontologists 
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould (1972) proposed an alternative model to 
the problem of speciation. While the vast majority of models at that time claimed 
that evolution of species occurs mainly due to the slow but inexorable and 
gradual accumulation of modifications, Gould and Eldredge argued in favour of 
a model of speciation that alternates long periods of stasis with short (in 
geological terms) cycles of acceleration. It is not relevant here to discuss the 
details of such a proposal. Rather, the interesting point is that Gould and 
Eldredge did not construct their model on new experimental findings but they 
just went back to the, already collected, fossil records. By working with widely 
known data, but disposing them in a different order, the two scientists were able 
to highlight new patterns and relations that were invisible to the previous 
classification. 
Although they might seem distant, such intervention procedures are also 
central in contemporary biological collections, i.e. databases. For instance, let us 
focus on current cancer research and the notion of mutation. Cancer is a broad 
term to refer to a kind of disease characterised by relatively uncontrolled 
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proliferation of cells that, from a given area of origin, can penetrate into tissues 
and metastasise to different organs. First examinations under the microscope in 
the late 19th Century revealed peculiar chromosomal aberrations, thus leading 
scientists to postulate a central role of hereditary material as a main cause of 
cancer. The discovery of DNA structure as the molecular ground of biological 
inheritance eventually promoted the idea that specific agents and environmental 
contexts can alter the genomic organisation thus generating mutations which can, 
in turn, give rise to cancer. Despite the variety of tissues in which cancer may 
occur, the mainstream view (e.g. Stratton, Campbell and Futreal 2009) argues 
that all types of tumour share some common elements. First, the on-going 
variation at the genetic level in individual cells and second, the selective process 
on the phenotypic outcomes of such a variation. Speaking roughly, this means 
that cancer is usually associated with the presence of mutations. Here 
classification plays a central role in mapping knowledge. Indeed, mutations are 
first distinguished in germline mutations (those inherited by parents) and somatic 
mutations that are mutations acquired by the cells in their process of 
differentiations from their progenitors. Nevertheless, further classificatory 
distinctions can be provided. First one may categorise mutations according to 
their underlying different biochemical ways. Indeed, given that a genetic 
mutation is a change in the DNA sequence, this may occur in different manners. 
First, one nitrogenous base can be substituted by another one. Then, there could 
be insertions or deletions of DNA segments of different size, or rearrangements, 
in which DNA breaks in one point and it is subsequently re-joined in another 
place. Third, the copy number of a gene can exceed the normal number (two, in 
human diploid genome), as in gene amplification in which the same coding 
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sequence is repeated several hundred times, or it can be reduced or even deleted 
from the genome itself. Moreover, the genome can also acquire external genomic 
content via viral infection (e.g. HPV) or even gain epigenetic changes that will 
affect the structure of the chromatin and consequently the gene expression.  
Potentially harming mutations happen regularly in the genome. Most of 
them however are ‘identified’ and ‘corrected’ by the cell machinery. The rate of 
mutations may vary, depending also on the cell type and on the presence of 
external factors that can increase their chance of being fixed in the genome itself. 
Moreover, a global comprehension of the occurrence of mutations is still at an 
embryonic stage. The picture is also complicated by the fact that cancer 
progression is not linear and smooth. On the contrary, certain cells can 
unexpectedly acquire a great number of new mutations with no clear prior 
indications. As argued in quite recent review “[a]lthough complex and 
potentially cryptic to decipher, the catalogue of somatic mutations present in a 
cancer cell therefore represents a cumulative archaeological record of all the 
mutational processes the cancer cell has experienced throughout the lifetime of 
the patient. It provides a rich, and predominantly unmined, source of information 
for cancer epidemiologists and biologists with which to interrogate the 
development of individual tumours” (Stratton, Campbell and Futreal 2009, p 720 
my italics). It is not by chance that the terms adopted are “catalogue” and 
“archaeological record”. Indeed, despite the obvious differences of data format, 
the collection of somatic mutations is indeed a type map as the collection of 
fossils. Indeed, as already argued, collections are maps because they highlight 
the structure, the relational disposition of data, thus creating a common 
interpretational framework for the information that data convey. The case of 
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somatic mutations and their classification offers a good example of this aspect. 
This because here classification does not just organise data, but, by ordering 
them, it ‘creates’ phenomena (see again Hacking 1983) as much as material 
intervention does in traditional experiments. Indeed until 30 years ago there was 
not any clue that mutations can be separated according to their functional 
contribution to cancer progressions. In the past, mutations were just different 
configurations (as described above) of different kinds, concerning genetic 
sequences. Such a classification is simply structural. When scientists discovered 
that not all mutations equally contribute to tumorigenesis then the old frame 
showed its limits. As many other times in its history (see for instance the history 
of systematics, Mayr 1982, Barsanti 2005) biological world needed to be 
partitioned in a new way. Moreover, such a new way is not simply the 
implementation, within the classificatory efforts, of new experimental findings. It 
should be rather seen the other way round, meaning that empirical puzzles, 
unsolvable with previous categories, have found a solution through the new order 
given to data. Let us examine this change. 
First, as anticipated, all somatic mutations can be distinguished and 
categorised according to their effect on tumour development. Usually, those 
mutations that confer a growth advantage to the cells which possess them are 
labelled as driver mutations. A driver mutation is thought to have a causal 
relation with cancer (i.e. cancer is caused by these kind of mutations) and it has 
been positively selected during the development of the disease itself thus 
granting its self-sustenance and propagation (although it is not always necessary 
that a driver mutations is required for the maintenance of tumour till its final 
stage). Accordingly, driver mutations are found in so called cancer genes, 
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defined as “those genes harboring more mutations than expected, given the 
average background mutation frequency for the cancer type” (Lawrence et al. 
2013, p 214). In other words, cancer genes are those genes that, by being 
suppressed or overexpressed as a result of genomic catastrophic events (e.g. 
mutations or structural variations), can lead to the development of tumours. On 
the contrary, those mutations that are not involved in cancer progression and 
maintenance are called passenger mutations. Therefore, distinguishing between 
driver and passenger mutations has become a fundamental task for contemporary 
cancer genomics.  
From a philosophical point of view, such a classificatory approach is 
particularly interesting as it shows how much the collection design reflects a 
particular theoretical stance and also reveals some fundamental, underlying, 
conceptual issues.  
First of all, most of the analytical tools to analyse somatic mutations are 
based on a framework imported by evolutionary genomics. This is clear by 
considering the fact that mutations are divided according to their ability to confer 
a selective advantage to cancer progression. This type of classification can be 
seen as functional, in the sense commonly ascribed to function in evolutionary 
studies, that is selected effect and that is not immune from serious theoretical 
debates (see for instance Germain at al. 2014). Moreover, the analysis of the rate 
of mutations can offer a sort of molecular clock to discriminate among different 
tumour stages, as much as in evolutionary biology it is possible to analyses 
speciation events (see Vogelstein et al. 2013). Accordingly, if cancer cells are the 
result of driver somatic mutations, and since those mutations confer a growth 
advantage to cancer cells, then driver mutations are positiv
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should be more conserved than mutations having no effect whatsoever on the 
fitness of cells. Therefore, by increasing the sample size, one would be able to 
discover those driver mutations that, by conferring growth advantage to cancer 
cells, are positively selected. However the picture is far more complicated. By 
analysing the data set of The Cancer Genome Atlas, Lawrence and colleagues 
(Lawrence et al. 2013) discovered that such analytical tools (based on the 
assumption that bigger sample size will lead eventually to the discovery of new 
cancer genes) needed to be corrected. An analysis of the whole-exome (roughly, 
the coding part) sequence data from 178 lung squamous cell carcinoma revealed 
that many recurrently mutated genes could be hardly cancer genes. For instance, 
large genes are notably highly mutated. Moreover, olfactory receptor genes 
(whose physiological function seems unrelated with lung cancer) are mutated at a 
suspicious high rate. Thus, scientists decided to see whether taking into account 
the phenomenon of ‘heterogeneity’ in tumours can be make sense of such 
suspicious cases. Heterogeneity in cancer can stand for different things (see 
Vogelstein et al. 2013). Again, classification plays a central role not just in 
ordering but also in establishing what biological phenomena are as such. First 
heterogeneity can refer to the fact that mutations, in the same type of tumour, 
may vary across different patients (inter-patient heterogeneity). Second, there is 
intra tumoural heterogeneity, meaning that, within a single primary tumour, cells 
can show distinct morphological, genetic and phenotypic profiles. Third and 
fourth, differences can be found between distinct metastases coming from the 
same primary tumour (intermetastatic heterogeneity) and within the same 
metastasis (intrametastatic heterogeneity). Scientists wanted to analyse 
heterogeneities in 3,083 tumours samples across 27 tumour types of TCGA.  
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“This analysis does not just advance general knowledge about cancer. 
Actually, it can also explain the reason why there are certain false positives in 
using traditional analytical tools for discovering cancer genes. For instance, from 
the whole analysis researchers revealed that there is a strong correlation between 
somatic mutation frequency in cancer and low gene expression levels, in the 
sense that the more a gene is expressed, the less it is mutated. Moreover, they 
also observe a marked correlation between somatic mutations and DNA 
replication timing. Two prominent examples of false positive cancer genes 
analysed by Lawrence and colleagues were olfactory receptor genes. Their high 
mutation rate is explained by the fact that they are late in replication timing and 
since they have low expression level in lung tumours, they have a high mutation 
rate. The same applies to large genes, which in lung cancer are low expressed 
and are late in replication” (Boem and Ratti, forthcoming). Moreover, such a 
practice of ordering and clustering data in big data sets shows how much 
classification is a dynamic enterprise. Very often an empirical problem cannot be 
easily solved precisely because of the categories in which it is framed. Ordering 
and reordering data in this case show the limits of the cancer gene definition. 
Besides, classification here can also offer hints on how causal contribution to 
cancer development can be differently spelled out. Indeed, if cancer genes can be 
thought as those genes causally linked to cancer onset, such a definition lacks to 
specify how such a link occurs and whether different ways of contribution might 
actually exist. In the future, cancer genomics might shift from looking for cancer 
genes to searching for different and specific causal factors in candidate cancer 
genes. This fact means to reorder data according to new collection principles. 
First, following Vogelstein and colleagues (2013), it is possible to label cancer 
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genes as driver genes and then to distinguish driver genes from driver mutations. 
Such a clarification is very important since driver genes certainly contain driver 
mutations but they can also harbour passenger gene mutations. “For example, 
APC is a large driver gene, but only those mutations that truncate the encoded 
protein within its N-terminal 1600 amino acids are driver gene mutations. 
Missense mutations throughout the gene, as well as protein-truncating mutations 
in the C-terminal 1200 amino acids, are passenger gene mutations” (Vogelstein 
et al. 2013, p 1548). However, and more interestingly, Vogelstein and colleagues 
(ibid.) note that those genes which do not contain driver mutations cannot be 
driver genes by definition. Still, many genes that do not harbour driver mutations 
can also affect tumorigenesis through their overexpression, underexpression or 
epigenetic alteration. In a sense, also these genes somehow ‘drive the tumour’. In 
this case a change in the classificatory frame helps to individuate and settle 
different ways in which a gene can contribute to cancer formation and 
development. “To reconcile the two connotations of driver genes, we suggest that 
genes suspected of increasing the selective growth advantage of tumor cells be 
categorized as either ‘Mut-driver genes’ or ‘Epi-driver genes’. Mut-driver genes 
contain a sufficient number or type of driver gene mutations to unambiguously 
distinguish them from other genes. Epi-driver genes are expressed aberrantly in 
tumors but not frequently mutated; they are altered through changes in DNA 
methylation or chromatin modification that persist as the tumor cell divides”  
(Vogelstein et al. 2013, p 1550).  
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Conceptual issues 
Beside technical problems, a further element of complexity is deeply 
conceptual. Indeed, all the current approaches heavily rely on the idea that 
harming mutations mainly occur in the coding region of the genome. This is 
normally motivated by the fact that a mutation is easily detected when it affects 
the sequence of an encoded functional product (e.g. a protein). However, recent 
studies (such as Huang et al. 2013) have started to show how mutations 
happening in intergenic or intronic regions, potentially serving as regulatory 
elements of the coded part, can also play a central role in tumorigenesis. The 
dark matter (as named by Vogelstein et al. 2013) of the genome, i.e. the great 
portion of it that does not contain genes, might press scientists to reconsider their 
discovery strategies, even promoting a change in the classification that would 
broaden cancer gene definition itself. Indeed, by changing the notion of the gene, 
the partition of the genome itself can dramatically change. This can be seen in 
line with what is argued by ENCODE project authors when they claim that genes 
should not be seen as fundamental, structurally defined, units of genomic 
organisations any longer. Rather, according to such a view, “genes represent a 
higher-order framework around which individual transcripts coalesce, creating a 
polyfunctional entity that assumes different forms under different cellular states, 
guided by differential utilization of regulatory DNA” (Stamatoyannopoulos 
2012). Assuming a different notion of gene means to also to chose other 
classification strategies. By changing the category under which biologists 
classify and order their data, the very same datasets can provide different 
responses. As for experimental systems, classificatory systems establish the 
nature of question researchers can ask and thus the kind of answers that can be 
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obtained. Of course there are some differences. As already argued, molecular 
biologists can tinker with their experimental system. On this fact rests the 
possibility of, more or less coherently, setting their space of manoeuvre. Playing 
with databases is certainly a different game. “Traditional interventionist 
strategies are clearly different from the practices of ‘ordering’ in a 
straightforward sense. Empirical manipulation deals with the ‘materiality’ of 
living systems. Even though biological systems are built in the sense that a 
phenomenon is abstracted from its natural occurrences and ‘situated’ in a 
different context, still the experimental systems are subjected to material 
manipulation. Following Parke (2014), we might say that when a experimenter 
wants to study one system (the object of study, e.g. lung cancer development in 
mice) in order to make inferences about another (the target, e.g. lung cancer 
development in humans) there is the intuition that working on the object puts the 
experimenter in a privileged position, because there is a sort of ‘material’ 
correspondence between the object and the target. Parke (2014) calls this 
intuition the materiality thesis. This thesis has been used to claim in favour of the 
epistemic privilege of experiments over computer simulations, because in 
experiments there is a material correspondence between object and target, while 
in computer simulation the relation is a formal one (see for instance Guala 2002). 
Because of this materiality thesis, especially in molecular biology, experiments 
are supposed to have a remarkable inferential power. Ordering data in large 
datasets clearly does not meet the materiality thesis. As a matter of fact, data are 
computational ‘entities’ with certain features having formal relations with each 
other. Scientists do not materially modify experimental systems when ordering 
data: they only play with parameters of data to cluster data themselves according 
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to a certain aim. But this ‘playing’ is formal, not material. No material 
manipulations are done in ordering data. However, the materiality of 
interventionist strategies is just half of the story. ‘Intervention’ and 
‘manipulation’ imply also that researchers modify a little bit the system under 
investigation by abstracting some of its features that are of interest for them. 
Practically speaking, scientists modify some of system’s conditions to let certain 
features emerge. For instance, in the case of disease modelling in murine models, 
the modification of some genetic features of mice (e.g. gene insertion) is aimed 
at observing phenotypic consequences. ‘Ordering’ data also implies looking at 
datasets just with respect to some of its features in order to see what a dataset 
reveals about itself. However this is not mere ‘observation’ of data as simply 
gathered. Actually, database construction means actively intervening on the data 
set by changing some parameters to let emerge only what is of interest. For 
instance, in the case described above (Lawrence et al. 2013), the dataset of 
TCGA is scrutinised by looking at different types of heterogeneity. Here 
scientists have ‘stimulated’ the dataset by clustering data according to a specific 
aim. Indeed, they have abstracted a dataset from its ‘totality’ and they have 
considered just certain features to check the consequences. Dataset considered 
after ordering is different from the data before ordering. Before ordering, the 
dataset is just the sum of all data. After ordering, the dataset is what the dataset 
can tell us about a certain phenomenon. Therefore scientists ‘intervene’ on the 
data set, because they want just to observe what is of interest to them by 
stimulating it to reveal its ‘secrets’. To sum up, ‘ordering’ data (in the sense of 
clustering) is a form of intervention, though it lacks the ‘material’ part of typical 
interventionist strategies of molecular biology.” (Boem and Ratti, forthcoming).  
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On the notion of data 
Nevertheless there is more. Data ordering and reordering is a form of 
intervention also because data are meaningful precisely because they are 
disposed and organised according to a particular order. Indeed, data organisation 
is fundamental not just to comprehend data, but also, and more important, to 
consider, conceive and perceive them for what they are: data. Clarifying this 
point is crucial. Data are as such only in relation to other data and to the context 
of their production and gathering. Let us examine how and why.  
By following Floridi (2008, 2011) it is possible to distinguish several 
interpretation of what a datum is. First, data can be epistemically intended, when 
they are conceived as collections of facts. This is probably the closest 
interpretation to the etymological root of the term. Data are then ‘given’ in the 
sense that they constitute the ground on which constructing further 
argumentations. Floridi acknowledges that such an account, although useful, 
lacks in providing an explanations of phenomena as data compression and data 
cryptography. Second, data can be equated to information. Again, this might be 
helpful in some practices, but it fails to recognise that the relation is not 
biconditional, i.e. if information “meaningful and truthful data” not every data 
constitute information. Third, data can be computationally conceived as sets of 
binary elements. This solution however conflates data with the format in which 
data are encrypted. 
In order to overcome all these issues, Floridi adopts what he calls a 
diaphoric interpretation claiming that data stand for, basically, lack of 
uniformity. A datum is then something that can be recognised, perceived, or 
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measured as distinctive from the background conditions. However, the relation to 
the context in which data are produced or gathered is not a simply background. 
As Floridi writes “[a] white sheet of paper is not just the necessary background 
condition for the occurrence of a black dot as a datum, it is a constitutive part of 
the [black-dot-on-white-sheet] datum itself, together with the fundamental 
relation of inequality that couples it with the dot. Nothing is a datum in itself. 
Rather, being a datum is an external property.” (Floridi 2008, p 7 emphasis is 
mine). If data are relational entities, thus ordering and reordering a database is 
formally tinkering with the system. It is manipulation.  To put it differently, 
giving order to data is then giving them a meaning. Moreover, each order defines 
a particular epistemic space. Each data organisation represents a sort of set of 
classificatory configurations as much as material interventions delimit 
experimental conditions. “If data are relational entities - in the sense that they 
acquired their meaning only when they stand in specific relations to each other - 
then the way we associate a bit of data to another makes the difference as to their 
interpretation. Contrary to common interpretations portrayed by popular science 
(see Anderson 2008), data do not speak for themselves. In order to give meaning 
to data, we should organize them in a framework. Mining databases is exactly an 
operation of putting into specific relations different bits of data. Without 
ordering, a database is just a sum of data with no meaning. By paraphrasing 
Hacking, in biological databases there is just complexity, and ‘phenomena’ (in 
the sense of meaningful patterns) emerge only if we intervene on the database by 
reordering it. If in biological databases there is just complexity, after the 
operation of ordering databases themselves looks quite differently as to the 
information that we can extract. In this sense, this form of intervention is a kind 
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of (formal) manipulation because the system (the database) is modified. By 
relating data in a particular way, we let emerge particular patterns that, strictly 
speaking, we create by ordering the database. As the Hall effect “does not exist 
outside of certain kinds of apparatus” (Hacking 1983, p 226), patterns detected 
through data mining exist only through the algorithm that we apply to mine the 
database and through the collection designed to build the database. This is a 
consequence of the notion of datum as Floridi meant it, in the sense that data 
become meaningful only if put in appropriate relations with each other” (Boem 
and Ratti, forthcoming). 
 
 
Still molecular biology? 
The fact that computational approaches and database consultation and 
curation have changed the practice of molecular biology can mean different 
things. In a strong sense, one may think that such a ‘new’ scientific venture has 
diminished, in some cases even eliminated, the role of experimentation within 
the research in favour of pure bioinformatics efforts. Although high-sounding, 
this interpretation is quite inaccurate.  As already shown (see the aforementioned 
case on TGCA or the study on the properties of TS genes presented in Chapter 
IV), it is certainly true that some projects can be pursued mainly due to the 
reorder of known data via database integration and consultation. In this sense, 
mining database constitutes a legitimate form of creating biological knowledge 
without any contribution from the experimental side. However, it is pretty 
obvious that the material source of many databases is coming precisely from 
experimental findings. Certainly, experiments still play a central role in 
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contemporary research. As anticipated before, it is the role of experiments that 
has changed. By this, I mean that the contribution of experimental work within 
the research has epistemically shifted in the very practice of science.  
As previously shown, sometimes experiments can be pursued according to 
their exploratory power. As ancient geographers, molecular biologists were 
exploring unknown landscapes with no awareness of the configuration of the 
surrounding areas. It was indeed an exploration. It is not a surprise then that the 
verb “to explore” has been originally associated with geographical expeditions22. 
However due to the technological advancement, such as satellite technology, also 
geographical explorations changed their meaning. As a matter of fact, general 
mapping does not request direct investigation any longer. High-throughput 
technologies can be seen as the biological counterpart of satellites. However, 
despite the accuracy of the aerial representations, an investigation of such a kind 
would inevitably miss some details. These aspects are not fundamental for the 
global picture but they can become essential for a more complete description of a 
location. Thus direct expeditions are now aimed not at exploring, but rather at 
fitting the details. Out of this analogy, many experiments in contemporary 
molecular biology are designed precisely for a similar purpose. This means that 
experiments, in many cases, do not show an intrinsic aim, but rather they present 
an instrumental value, as they serve as a confirmation tool. Nowadays, an 
increasing number of scientific publications perform traditional experiments as 
confirmations, meaning that empirical results would either corroborate or not the 
indications provided by high-throughput approaches. For instance, the entire 
                                                
22 It is noteworthy to see how to explore means: "to go to a country or place in quest of 
discoveries", thus grounding the activity of discovery on the practice of exploration (see 
the Online Etymology Dictionary - 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=explore) 
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group of results published by the ENCODE project fits such a picture. As I 
recently argued with my colleagues (see Germain et al. 2014) ENCODE’s first 
step strategy lies precisely in the identification of a “specific subset of 
biochemical activities (transcription, transcription factor binding, and specific 
combinations of histone modifications, etc.) which very often contribute and 
make a difference to the phenomena scientists are interested in” (Germain et al. 
2014, p 816). At a later stage, these activities will be specified, either confirmed 
or dismissed via experimentation, which will also clarify their nature and their 
contribution to the phenomena of interest (by the way, such further efforts do not 
have necessarily to be conducted by the ENCODE project itself). This means that 
it is the computational part, not the empirical manipulation, that has assumed the 
role of exploration, traditionally ascribed to experimentation. In order to better 
explain this aspect, let us focus on a recent article (Barozzi, Simonatto et al. 
2014) published on Molecular Cell in which traditional experiments are exactly 
fitting the details, while the general ‘questioning nature’ is entirely based on 
computational efforts through database consultation and integration. The aim of 
the article is to show that transcription factor binding is somehow co-regulated 
with the nucleosome occupancy due to the features of certain DNA regulatory 
segments (enhancers) shared by mammalians. Transcription factors (TFs) are 
proteins that bind to specific  DNA sequences thus regulating the rate of 
transcription of other functional products. Nucleosomes are instead fundamental 
units of chromatin organization constituted by a core of proteins, called histones, 
around which DNA filaments are somehow wrapped up. Enhancers are DNA 
regions that favour genetic transcription. Nucleosomes are important also for 
transcription since they contribute to chromatin conformation, thus either 
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allowing or impeding the possibility of regulatory elements to actually transcribe 
the genetic information (from DNA to mRNA). 
Let us briefly examine the rationale of the study from an epistemic point of 
view. In this article, scientists start from the knowledge that TFs usually bind 
sites of regions that previous computational analyses predicted to be with a high 
nucleosomal occupancy. However, TFs binding sites are hard to detect since 
their recognition sequence can be easily repeated just by chance, thus creating a 
high number of false positives. Next, researchers hypothesized that the same 
information regulating nucleosome establishment also rules TFs in binding 
specific regulatory elements and neglecting false positives. From an 
epistemological point of view, all this starting knowledge has been produced by 
computational approaches. Such approaches were possible because different 
specific repositories, containing diverse kinds of information (such as factors 
determining nucleosome occupancy or cell lineage specific enhancers), have 
been created. Of course this information is as such, precisely because it 
represents the order according to which data coming from experimental findings 
have been collected and systematized. Coming back to the article and leaving 
aside technical details, the important epistemic point here, is that the choices of 
the experimental system (i.e. what cell lines to work with, what factors to focus 
on) are fully determined by the needs of bioinformatics. Indeed researchers have 
chosen to work on primary mouse macrophages and to compare them with 
several control lines, also because a single specific TF, Pu.1, behaves differently 
in these diverse cell lineages (it is expressed only in hematopoietic cells). All the 
experimental materials in this study are instrumental to the accomplishment of 
the  computational analysis or to corroborate in vivo and in vitro the discoveries 
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made through bioinformatics tools. Such a change means that experiments here 
have changed their epistemic role within scientific enterprise. By this I mean 
that, contrary to the idea that data-driven science has diminished the 
experimental side of scientific work, such a new way of doing rather changes the 
epistemic primacy of material manipulation that was the benchmark of 
traditional molecular biology. 
By looking at scientific practice in terms of style of reasoning thus, the rise 
of bioinformatics and biological databases has not enhanced the comparative 
style, after all never disappeared in molecular biology (see again Bruno 
Strasser’s work, 2012), over the exemplary one. As a matter of fact, the current 
practice of scientific research in the biomedical field still considers both of them. 
What has been changed, as I showed, it is rather the relation between the two 
styles. I would argue that this is due precisely to the epistemic change entailed by 
map thinking. First because maps, by creating a common order for data 
gathering, provide a general interpretation framework which allows the epistemic 
journey from data to meaningful information. The second reason involves a 
higher level of analysis. Indeed, the map thinking also affects the epistemic 
dimension of science both at its foundational core and at its institutional setting. 
 
Map thinking and molecular biology 3.0 
Names and labels have often the purpose to delimitate categories. Thus one 
may think that ‘bioinformatics’ well circumscribes the boundaries of a discipline. 
However, as I argued above many times, when looking at the practice of science 
we find more styles and approaches deeply intertwined one into another, rather 
than clean and sharp disciplinary limits. From this perspective, disciplines 
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themselves look like a posteriori, epistemic reconstructions. Thus the change 
promoted by the rise of computational approaches and the creation of databases 
does not constitute a shift from molecular biology to a new discipline but rather 
an epistemic reordering of styles within the biomedical research field which, as 
shown in the previous chapters, is still grounded on the theoretical paradigm at 
the very origin of molecular biology. However, something else changed too. 
By adopting the evocative notion of assemblage, as a sign of a non hetero 
directed phenomenon, Rheinberger suggests that “the coming into being of 
molecular biology was certainly not a project in the sense of, for instance, the 
humane genome initiative in the late 1980s” (Rheinberger, 2007, p 218, emphasis 
is mine). Certainly, the rise and the development of molecular science was 
possible also (someone could say mainly) due to economical and political 
decisions. Indeed, the central role of the Rockefeller Foundation in shaping the 
form and the aims of biological research at the beginning of the molecular era, is 
not a mystery to anyone (see Morange 1998, 2000; Strasser 2014). Also the 
making of biotech industry, which corresponds to the aforementioned second 
phase, presents a strong political and societal drive. The historian of science and 
technology Eric Vettel has recently reconstructed the development of 
biotechnology by linking it to the cultural and political scenario of the 1970s in 
the United States (Vettel, 2006). Vettel analysis sheds a light on two important 
aspect of the development of molecular studies after the first phase. First, while 
early molecular biology rested mainly on philanthropic funding (i.e. the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and on pioneering efforts of scientists coming from 
different research fields, the second shift has been instead characterised by the 
creation of specific federal funding, thus also helping to delineate and stabilise 
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molecular biology as a discipline. Indeed, while many research groups working 
with molecules were usually part of medical schools or agricultural departments, 
such a shift let some peculiar laboratories to emerge as genuinely independent 
because of their specific research agenda. In particular, the Wendell Stanley’s 
Biochemistry and Virus Laboratory in Berkley, arose as a messenger of a new 
kind of science focused on basic research, and because of that connected with the 
epistemic idea (and rhetoric) of pursuing ‘pure knowledge’, which highlighted 
the link with already established ‘noble’ sciences, such as physics. This aspect is 
important to understand that the institutional independence of Stanley’s lab 
allowed also epistemic independence meaning that the procedures, the 
methodologies and styles employed by the lab were not subjected to higher 
authority. However, as already argued in previous chapters, science development 
is far from being linear and straightforward.  Paradoxically, it was Stanley’s lab 
emphasis on its work concerning the physics and the chemistry of life that 
granted the possibility of one of the most technological innovations in the life 
sciences: recombinant DNA. Such a technique allows the creation of specific 
molecules, in order to combine together genetic material from diverse sources, 
thus generating sequences that would not otherwise be found in biological 
organisms. The very possibility of recombinant DNA lies in the fact that all 
known living beings share the same DNA structure. Indeed, a message perfectly 
in line with Stanley Laboratory’s views. However, if in some places some 
research directions are settled, the very same decisions can also promote 
countercultures. As argued by Doogab Yi (2015), the advent of recombinant 
DNA technique fostered the rise of biotech companies which creates, 
concomitantly, a new kind of researchers, both scientists and entrepreneurs. Far 
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from being clean and clear, this period was full of tensions, both at the social and 
the epistemic level. This was particularly true in the relationship between the life 
sciences and medicine. “Molecular biology was challenged at the institutional 
level by those who opposed its ‘imperialistic’ disciplinary politics and its 
standing as a new postwar discipline. […] Often, molecular biologists’ scientific 
and medical claims were bold enough to draw criticism from researchers in a 
number of other biological fields. To some molecular biologists, it seemed that 
the future of their discipline increasingly depended on its ability to find available 
intellectual and institutional niches in order to become a constructive part of the 
expanding biomedical complex” (Yi 2015, p 61-62). In this sense, in the same 
years, the US government promoted policies emphasising the practical 
implementation of biological findings. Such a passage helps to understand the 
transition from the life sciences research to biomedicine. Accordingly, the 
famous War on Cancer supported by Richard Nixon administration (National 
Cancer Act of 1971) in those crucial years, has definitely contributed to create 
the field of biomedical research. As also argued by Strasser “[a]t present, 
‘biomedical research’ is used […] to designate a form of medical research based 
on experimentation in the laboratory and framed by knowledge in natural 
sciences, such as physiology or bacteriology” (Strasser 2014, p 11). In terms of 
style of reasoning this means that it is the practice of experimentation, the 
experimental way of doing, meaning the conviction that material manipulation 
allows the best understanding of phenomena, that has framed the change from 
early molecular biology to the second phase that Rheinberger (2007) calls the 
“gene technological shift”. Again, the molecular paradigm, the view that living 
phenomena can be rightfully grasped and described at their best at the molecular 
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level still holds. 
The new turning point, as also recognised by Rheinberger, is the Human 
Genome Project. The HGP constitutes (see chapter 2) a first rupture or the 
beginning of a new phase. This is true in many senses. First, as already argued in 
the second chapter, because the HGP reflects and re-establishes a way of 
thinking based on the creation of maps and the fact that the knowledge produced 
through maps would have solved some key problems, that were considered un-
attachable from other approaches. In other words mapping would reveal secrets 
that other methods will inevitably miss. “The voices that placed genome 
sequencing on a par with a march to the holy grail of life became loud and 
dominant” (Rheinberger 2007, p 221). Second, because the shift towards map 
building coincides with the establishment of big science projects. Contrary to the 
assemblage, with the HGP, biomedical research seems to have found a higher 
order which determines its methods, approaches and epistemic desiderata. The 
proliferation of big science projects over the dispersed frame of traditional 
laboratories, is a challenge to the organisation of scientific venture also from a 
genuine epistemological point of view. Indeed, this situation challenges also 
philosophy of science itself. As a matter of fact, such a transformation confronts 
both those who have defended the irreducibility of scientific discovery to its 
rational, a posteriori, systematisation (see, among all, Feyerabend 1975), and 
those who have advocated for intrinsic value of epistemic pluralism as the main 
sign of the success of natural sciences (e.g. Dupré 1993). In Against Method 
Feyerabend argued that any attempt to individuate a method of scientific 
enterprise is doomed to fail. In other words, his famous anarchist stance claims 
that there are no suitable, exception-less, methodological procedures regulating 
 170 
the development of science or the advancement of knowledge. Moreover, any 
effort to establish or impose a set of features designating the method of science 
will produce the undesired effect of inhibiting scientific progress itself, by 
applying too narrow and exclusive conditions. On the other side, Dupré (1993) 
challenges the idea that knowledge can be equated to the attempt to provide a 
consistent, general order to the chaos of everyday experience. In doing so, he 
endorses a form of epistemic pluralism concerning scientific method, but also, 
and more profoundly, he defends the idea that the very term ‘science’, conceived 
as a unique endeavour, reveals a metaphysical assumption which can be 
detrimental for the message of scientific disciplines. Moreover, as recently 
argued by Kyle Stanford, “Kuhn himself also argued influentially that even in the 
course of such normal science the intellectual flexibility and freedom of younger 
scholars and those new to a given scientific field to propose and pursue 
alternatives to existing theoretical orthodoxy was the most crucial ingredient in 
the possibility of any truly fundamental or revolutionary change in our scientific 
beliefs” (Stanford 2015, p 9). All these arguments defend the freedom of science 
and its intrinsic pluralism as the key of its success. 
The establishment of map thinking seems to contest the epistemic freedom 
of science at different levels.  
First, this involves the nature of scientific explanations. The change from the 
gene to the genome (and next, all the other ‘-omes’) it is not only a mutation in 
the object of scientific inquiry that obviously requires the adoption of new tools 
and discovery strategies, but also, as already shown, a transformation in the style 
of reasoning. This means that what counts as scientific data and reliable evidence 
will be prone to the peculiar explanatory strategy of big science projects. By this 
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I mean that the independence of local explanations, usually those provided by 
mechanistic molecular biology, will be inevitably diminished, because all 
empirical results would be as such only in the wider, common context provided 
my maps of biological knowledge. In the age of map thinking only the general 
picture, no matter if still inaccurate or incomplete, could provide the most 
genuine level of explanation. Indeed, by broadening the notion of experimental 
systems, and contrary to what argued by Hacking (1983), maps seem pointing at 
phenomena not by revealing them in ceteris paribus conditions, but by putting 
different sources in relation for the construction of a common picture. The take 
home message is clear: true scientific explanations are global explanations. 
Paraphrasing Dobzhansky’s dictum (Dobzhansky 1964) one may argue that 
“nothing in molecular biology will make sense except in the light of map 
building”. Traditional molecular biology becomes then explanatory flawed 
because of its reductionist stance. Indeed “[i]n the late 1990s, scientists, among 
them Ludwig Winnacker, who was president of the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) at the time, talked of the beginning of a new age, the age of 
postgenomics. Statements began to be heard such as ‘It is time to transcend old 
reductionisms,’ and ‘What must come into view again is the whole of the 
organism in the full broadness of its functions on the level of cells, tissues, and 
organs and in the depth of its development’” (Rheinberger 2007, p 221). Of 
course, in Winnacker’s words there is a certain amount of rhetoric. As previously 
argued, mapping does not solve, per se, the problem of reduction. The ‘global’ 
perspective granted by highthrouput approaches cannot be equated to the holistic 
understanding of the underlying phenomena. Indeed, roughly speaking, holism 
stands for the idea that the whole cannot fully correspond to the mere sum of its 
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parts. I am not interested in entering such a debate, but it should be clear that 
map thinking, as shown in chapter 3, has certainly the capacity to look at 
different parts in an integrated manner (due to the shared representational 
framework it provides) but cannot resolve complexity by itself (see also Morange 
2006). Maps, as previously argued, constitute a form of unification that should be 
labelled as standardisation. Such a standardisation is the key feature according to 
which data coming from different sources can be compared and integrated. This 
also explains why maps ‘work’ even if they are not complete or fully accurate. 
The most important feature of maps is to highlight the underlying structure 
which connects different kinds of data. However, standardisation here means 
also that data should be produced the more and more according to shared 
procedural rules and common sanity check parameters (see Stevens 2013).  
Second, from the institutional side this has an obvious consequence. As 
nicely shown by the biologists Aaron Hirsch “[a]cross many different fields, new 
data are generated by a smaller and smaller number of bigger and bigger 
projects.[…] If the nineteenth century was an age of far-flung investigators alone 
in the wilderness or the book-lined study, the twenty first century is, so far, an 
age of scientists as administrators. Many of the best-known scientists of our day 
are men and women exceptionally talented in herding the resources—human and 
otherwise—required to plan, construct, and use big sophisticated facilities.[…] 
There’s something disturbingly hierarchical about the new architecture of the 
scientific community: what was before something like a network of small villages 
is today more like an urban high-rise, with big offices at the top and a lot of 
cubicles down below” (Hirsch 2009, emphasis is mine). The epistemic 
consequence of this can surprisingly offer and pragmatic and sharp way to 
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establish what science is from what is not, or at least to separate what I can label 
as major league science - the ‘good one’ – from  minor and marginal scientific 
efforts. Under the umbrella of such a methodological homogenisation, the 
disciplinary boundaries within molecular studies will vanish as the new biology 
will take place. If the rise of bioinformatics – and its impact on the practice of 
research - can be labelled as biology 2.0, the epistemic primacy of classificatory 
strategies and of the comparative style through the construction of immense 
databases, over the traditional material manipulation of wet biology experiments 
can be seen as biology 3.0. As Hallam Stevens recently argued “[w]e can already 
perceive the outlines of what this biology might look like. First, it draws on the 
tools of Web 3.0, particularly the Semantic Web, to create a hyperdata-driven 
biology. Not only will massive amounts of biological data be available online 
(this is already true), but these data may soon be semantically connected in such 
a way that discoveries about biological function can readily fall out of the data. 
But Biology 3.0 also constitutes an erasure of the boundary between the 
biological and the informatic: biological objects and their informatic 
representations will become apparently interchangeable. Data will be rich and 
reliable enough that doing a digital experiment by manipulating data will be 
considered the same thing as doing an experiment with cells and molecules.[…] 
Biology 3.0 predicts the culmination of the process in which the biological and 
the informatic have become a single practice. In other words, bioinformatics may 
disappear. The practice of using computers to generate or run simulations in 
physics is not designated separately from the rest of physics—there is no “phys-
informatics.” Such could be the case for bioinformatics—its practices seem 
likely to become so ubiquitous that it will be absorbed into biology itself. More 
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precisely, what the notion of Biology 3.0 suggests is that the practices and 
knowledge associated with bioinformatics may gradually subsume those of the 
rest of biology.[…] The ‘wet’ work of biology may become increasingly 
confined to highly ordered and disciplined spaces designed to produce data with 
the greatest possible efficiency. Meanwhile, “dry” biology can be done 
anywhere, by anyone with a computer and an Internet connection. (Stevens 2013, 
p 219-220).  
If this future depicted by Stevens will happen, it will be precisely because of 
the role of biomedical ontologies. As tools which overarch the boundaries of 
specific databases, ontologies are the first and the best candidate to manage the 
information coming from different sources and to integrate them - through their 
standardisation power – thus creating the most comprehensive and updated map 
of current biological knowledge. However ontologies can do even more. 
As previously shown in chapter 3, ontologies were originally intended as 
tools of integration. Yet, recently they have started to be employed for scientific, 
technological and medical publishing (STM) in order to increase information 
gathering and text mining thus enhancing application for hypotheses generation 
and promoting common assets for discovery strategies. The application of 
ontologies to scientific literature in order to create a standard in information 
retrieval has been recommended by various scholars (see Blake 2004, Seringhaus 
and Gerstein 2007) in the biomedical field. An example is offered by the tool 
Textpresso (Müller, Kenny, and Sternberg 2004) which is an ontology-based 
mining and retrieval system. Once a set of articles has been uploaded, Textpresso 
is able to identify single sentences and to relate them to 33 ontological terms, 
three of which are GO ontologies. The results are then ranked according to their 
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relevance by highlighting the terms and can be visualised in a single chart that 
provides also links to external databases. Even if  scientists will still continue to 
read articles in a traditional manner, these tools will increasingly shape the way 
they gather technical information by creating an always more refined literature 
which will be fully integrated in the ontological paradigm. Moreover “formalized 
assertions, perhaps maintained in specialized “structured abstracts” will provide 
indexing and browsing tools with computational access to causal and ontological 
relationships. Hypertext linking will be extensive, generated both automatically 
and by readers providing commentary on blogs and through shared annotation 
databases. At the same time, more tools for enhanced searching, scanning, and 
analyzing will appear and exploit the increasingly rich layer of indexing, linking, 
and annotation information” (Reaner and Palmer 2009, p 832). However 
fascinating, and oriented to increase the efficiency of information retrieval, this 
scenario has also a potential dark side. Analogously with Amazon or Google 
algorithms, which prioritise both research results and the type of information 
according to users’ profile, such a unification of research strategies can 
potentially reduce the freedom of single scientists (who can also be totally 
unaware of this). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In a very recent Nature’s book review of the historian David Wootton’s last 
manuscript (The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific 
Revolution, Penguin, UK, 2015) it is written that “[w]hat marks out modern 
science is not the conduct of experiments, […] but the formation of a critical 
community capable of assessing discoveries and replicating results” (Ball 2015, 
p 413). Making experiments has been thought and perceived indeed as one the 
hallmarks of modern science, and molecular biologists considered their 
discipline epistemically mature and genuinely scientific (such as physics) 
precisely because of the power of experiments. However, it is not the material 
manipulation in itself, that has granted the real success to molecular biology. It 
was rather a matter of style. In other words, the main feature of molecular 
biology was the establishment of a community which adopted experimentalism 
(i.e. the idea that ‘truths about nature’ can be discovered and justified through 
specific tests conducted under particular and controlled conditions) as a way of 
working and thus, as a way of thinking. Indeed, such a way guided biologists in 
determining what counts as evidence, explanation or what constitutes a reliable 
solution to a problem. 
Hence, styles of reasoning are a powerful analytic tool to examine, dissect 
and track the changes in the development of a scientific discipline. The fact that 
in molecular biology the role of computers has definitely grown, cannot be seen, 
per se, as the element deciphering the essence of the transformation through 
which computational methodologies are affecting molecular research. The rise of 
bioinformatics reveals more. It shows that change of practice is not simply a 
methodological and technological innovation but, more important, it is rather a 
 177 
change in the way scientists decide what a good scientific practice is. Moreover, 
it is also a change in the meaning of key scientific notion such as proof, evidence, 
explanation and experiment. It is a transformation in how molecular biologists 
think. 
In this study, I tried to show that map thinking precisely embraces and 
resumes at best the features of this new way of knowing. This is because the 
notion of map embeds some features of the classificatory styles under a new 
light. In doing so I tried also to highlight how much of this novelty actually rests 
on styles and epistemic cultures already present in the history of sciences but 
filled with totally new elements. Indeed, contemporary map thinking in 
molecular biology should not be seen neither as the mere presenting again of old 
approaches nor as something which determines the disappear of experimentalism 
from molecular studies. This because styles of reason are epistemic categories 
which have to be intertwined with other analytic tools, such as models, 
metaphors and paradigms. Therefore, rather than simply opposing the novelties 
provided by new computational approaches I tried to show how map thinking has 
restructured, rather than dissolved, the role of traditional elements of research 
according to new and different epistemic criteria. 
The value of this work, I think, lies also in the fact such an epistemological 
reconstruction is not simply based on philosophical analysis but is also grounded 
on the rise of specific tools, bio-ontologies, which definitely incarnate the spirit 
of map thinking. The intrinsic encyclopaedic agenda of bio-ontologies perfectly 
represents the empirical counterpart of my theoretical discourse. This explains 
why I dedicated to bio-ontologies a large part of my attention. Ontologies are not 
just a tool. They are really a different way of knowing in practice with the 
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potential to change the face of contemporary molecular research. Would this 
change be positive for science? Despite its intrinsic interest, a discussion on 
values within science is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the meaning 
of “positive” here is not so easy to address. However, from a philosophical 
perspective, some genuine epistemic points can be stressed out. 
As I already argued elsewhere, “[s]uch a change has the potential of being more 
disruptive, at the epistemic level, than one may think. Indeed, this new venture 
seems to challenge the idea, supported by the second phase of philosophy of 
science, according to which there is no logic of discovery within sciences, since 
scientific enterprise cannot be completely reduced to clean and sharp logical 
steps (Feyerabend 1975). The richness of science has been argued as lying 
precisely in its capacity of going through different paths. Thus epistemic 
pluralism (Dupré 1993) has been established as the current mainstream view 
concerning the success of science and also about the intrinsic value of scientific 
research itself. However, the constraints imposed by consortia running Big 
Science projects do not pertain just the economic side of scientific research. By 
creating a standardization of methods and procedures, Big Science projects are, 
inevitably and probably unwittingly creating, from the practical side, a set of 
criteria for the old demarcation problem. If the technical and the epistemic 
repertoire of molecular studies will be completely subdued to the creation of vast 
maps of biological knowledge through computational approaches of massive 
amounts of data, scientific methodological pluralism will pass over. Pace 
Dupré’s “disorder of things,” it seems that a new order could prevail. If such a 
thing will happen, at the moment is just a risk. This risk is twofold. On the one 
hand no one knows whether such a standardization will contribute either to shape 
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a better science (in the sense of more effective) or to impoverish it23. On the 
other hand, if such a way of doing should take place more vastly in the research 
landscape, this would also mean the end of many small labs that will not be able 
to do science any longer. Perhaps the core of the problem rests on the notion of 
‘effectiveness’. What does it mean to be effective in science? How is this related 
with the idea that scientists and philosophers have about what “good science” is? 
Such a concept because of its importance for scientific research, should be one of 
the future most important challenge for both science and philosophy of science” 
(Boem and Ratti, forthcoming) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23  For instance, standardisation could undermine the creative aspects of scientific 
discovery which, quite paradoxically, are sometimes taken as important as the rational 
nature of the scientific work 
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